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EXPLORING VIEWS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HOW IT SHOULD BE 
ADDRESSED: WHAT ROLE IS PLAYED BY THE DISCUSSION OF MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES AND THE EXPERIENCE OF EXTREME CLIMATIC CONDITIONS? 
SUMMARY 
Some sociologists have suggested that focusing on individual behaviour change 
to reduce emissions detracts attention from larger structural issues. The first part of this 
thesis draws on mixed methods (1 interview study and 3 experimental studies) to look at 
the relationship between views on individual and structural levels of climate change 
mitigation. Interviewees mostly suggested individual behaviour change as a means for 
addressing climate change. The subsequent experimental studies investigate to what 
extent support for structural level change is minimised by focusing attention on 
individual behaviour change, but no such evidence emerged. However, there are other 
unexpected outcomes: for example, participants judge recycling to be one of the most 
impactful behaviours, illustrating that people’s judgements of effective climate change 
mitigation may need revising. 
The second part of the thesis relates to suggestions that lack of personal 
experience of climate change partly explains people’s inaction. Drawing on fieldwork 
consisting of 77 interviews conducted in California on people’s experience of drought, I 
firstly explore how people experience the drought itself; such as what changes they note 
and how drought perceptions are influenced by location. Secondly, I discuss whether 
and why people tend to think that drought and climate change are related or not. 
Importantly, people mostly interpret the drought according to their pre-existing climate 
change beliefs, so that if they already believed climate change was happening then the 
drought is treated as further evidence, whereas those who were sceptical of climate 
change usually see the drought as part of a natural cycle. In conjunction these studies 
expand the existing literature on views towards climate change mitigation and the role 
that personal experience plays in understandings of climate change.  
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- Chapter 1 - 
Introduction 
“Global climate change, although not the only environmental problem, is one of the 
most important environmental issues facing humanity. Short of systematic 
transformation, global climate change may produce alterations in the atmosphere, which 
could threaten the survival of many species, including humans.” (Clark & York, 2005, 
p. 397) 
 
My concern about anthropogenic climate change (hereafter just climate change) 
is not only rooted in the awe I feel for our natural environment, but also reflects my 
understanding of how climate change will affect humanity. Climate change has no 
borders, although it will affect countries and their inhabitants differently, nor has it been 
caused equally by all humans (as some parts of the world have produced higher 
greenhouse gas emissions than others). Per capita carbon emissions have historically 
been higher in countries in the ‘West’1 (Clark, 2011), who have more recently 
outsourced some emissions by relocating production to other countries (Goldenberg, 
2014; Kanemoto, Moran, Lenzen & Geschke, 2014). Yet, Western countries have 
predominantly reaped the benefits from these emissions, as well as benefits from other 
past and present power relations and exploitation. Therefore, those who are already 
marginalised and vulnerable, although they have contributed fewer emissions, will be 
more exposed and less equipped to respond to the impacts of climate change (Byrne, 
Martinez & Glover, 2002; Klein, 2014; Norgaard, 2011; Parks & Roberts, 2006; 
Stoddart, Tindall & Greenfield, 2012). As Stoddart et al. (2012) summarised:  
While the wealthier nations of the global North bear the greatest historical 
responsibility for contributing to the problem, many of the poorest countries of 
the global South will likely be the most vulnerable to flooding, drought, food 
shortages, and other environmental risks. Discrepancies in climate change 
responsibility and vulnerability overlay historical relations of colonialism and 
exploitation between the global North and global South, adding to the 
difficulties of creating international environmental policy. (p. 43) 
Further, issues of climate and environmental justice exist both at the international and 
intranational scale and interact with, for example, race, gender and class (Bullard, 1993; 
                                                 
1 ‘The West’ or ‘Western’ being a term used as shorthand for a heterogeneous 
amalgamation of places with further internal differences. 
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Byrne, Martinez & Glover, 2002; Godfrey, 2012; Sultana, 2014; Terry, 2009). An 
understanding of how some people in the West view climate change might ultimately 
contribute to shifting support in favour of mitigation and social change in a direction 
that involves actual reduction of emissions and greater climate justice. 
Research in Psychology and other disciplines has investigated many aspects of 
people’s beliefs and behaviours in relation to climate change. There have been surveys 
tracking the prevalence of certain beliefs concerning climate change, such as whether or 
not it is anthropogenic (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon & Upham, 2014; 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg & Rosenthal, 2015). Whitmarsh (2009) 
also examined which actions participants took with the express intention of contributing 
towards climate change mitigation. 
One of the most cited articles discussed seven psychological barriers to explain 
high emitters’ inaction towards reducing emissions (Gifford, 2011). While the author 
clearly highlighted that there are structural barriers which must be removed, the 
psychological barriers were presented as if they could be addressed separately from 
structural barriers. The author noted that:  
However, for almost everyone who is not severely restricted by structural 
barriers, adopting more pro-environmental choices and behaviors is possible, but 
this adoption is not occurring to the extent necessary to stem the increasing flow 
of greenhouse gases and other environmental damage. (p. 290) 
It could be argued that most people are likely to be severely restricted by structural 
barriers, since, for example, public transport within and between cities influences the 
whole population living in a given area. Further, Gifford (2011) did not explain what 
would constitute more pro-environmental behaviours and actions? What were the kind 
of behaviours that people were expected to, but did not, engage in? A clearer 
identification of these absent behaviours would allow for a closer examination of firstly 
why in each case the behaviour might be absent, secondly it would allow to examine 
how effective that behaviour would even be in reducing emissions and thirdly to explore 
to what extent behaviour may or may not be constrained by structural barriers.  
Amongst one of the barriers Gifford (2011) listed ‘limited cognition’, including 
humans’ ancient brains and therefore their preoccupation with immediate dangers and 
the present moment, which was contrasted to the issue of global climate change 
described as: “… slow, usually distant, and unrelated to the present welfare of ourselves 
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and our significant others” (p. 291). However, constructions of time and distance have 
also been argued to be influenced by culture (Norgaard, 2011) and are not inherently 
given by the evolution of our brains.  
To my knowledge no psychological literature has looked in more detail (beyond 
quantitative survey measures) at what actions people think should be taken to mitigate 
climate change and at who is seen to be responsible for bringing about these changes 
and, at reasons as to why they are not happening. This is precisely what the first study 
reported in this thesis undertook. The examination of people’s responses to open-ended 
interview questions aimed to reveal which mitigation strategies came to participants’ 
minds, as well as how participants debated the obstacles faced by individuals, 
governments and corporations in mitigating climate change. This contributed to current 
literature by examining not only what actions people thought should be taken, but also 
what reasons people gave for these actions occurring or not occurring and how the 
individual (citizens) and structural (governments and corporations) levels of action were 
seen to interact.  
 The third chapter reports a second set of studies which investigated to what 
extent an emphasis on individual behaviour change to mitigate climate change might 
reduce attention and support for more structural level approaches to climate change 
mitigation.  
 Finally, in the last study (reported in chapters 4 and 5) the aim was to examine in 
more detail which factors influence people’s perceptions of climate change when they 
experience an extreme climatic event that has been linked to climate change. This 
included examining, for example, to what extent distance was a key influence and 
inherent in people’s perceptions of climate change.  
In summary, this thesis aims to explore: 
1. People’s views on climate change mitigation strategies and how responsibility 
for mitigation is attributed across different levels of action 
2. To what extent individual level mitigation approaches might attenuate support 
for structural level approaches 
3. The experience of drought in California and how it relates to views on climate 
change  
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Societal context of climate change 
The aim of the current research is to study views on climate change with regard 
to the social context in which those views exist. Hulme (2009) has emphasised that 
climate change is not a discrete ‘problem’ to be ‘fixed’, but an idea (despite physical 
properties) which is understood in various ways and implies different courses of action 
to people in different contexts. (Nonetheless, for lack of a better term, I also refer to 
climate change as an environmental issue or problem.) Hulme (2009) has argued that 
climate change is a social phenomenon, as much as a physical one:  
… as society has been increasingly confronted with the observable realities of 
climate change and heard of the dangers that scientists claim lie ahead, climate 
change has moved from being predominantly a physical phenomenon to being 
simultaneously a social phenomenon … As we have slowly, and at times 
reluctantly, realised that humanity has become an active agent in the reshaping 
of physical climates around the world, so our cultural, social, political and 
ethical practices are reinterpreting what climate change means. (p. xxv) 
Not only are the reactions to climate change social in nature, but so is the production of 
emissions, since it depends on the way societies organise and produce. Norgaard (2017) 
has pointed out that although climate change is the result of high greenhouse gas 
emissions, it is necessary to question why these emissions are occurring in the first 
place: “For climate change in particular, we need to better understand the social side of 
why emissions are occurring” (p. 172).  
By looking at how people discuss climate change, I am inevitably looking at 
how people have come to view climate change in a given historical period; in a certain 
cultural, political and economic context, one that many people refer to broadly as 
‘capitalism’. Although there are many ways of defining capitalism, I draw here on a 
definition by Kasser, Cohn, Kanner and Ryan (2007) who have demarcated the defining 
characteristics as involving private property owned by individuals and corporations 
(shareholders) to produce goods or services in the pursuit of growth and profit. The 
production and exchange of goods and services occurs in a market economy, involving 
labourers who, in exchange for their work, earn a wage which they can use to consume 
other goods and services. The authors outlined that one of the fundamental assumptions 
underlying capitalism is that the system works best, when everyone acts in their own 
self-interest, resulting in a system where the capitalist tries to minimise expenses, even 
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at the cost of low wages (and it could be added environmental damage). Kasser et al. 
(2007) summarized the basic premise of capitalism as being that:  
… members of society will be provided with the opportunity to get what they 
want (i.e., a profit, a wage, and/or a product) through competing with each other 
and pursuing their self-interests. Moreover, such competition is assumed to lead 
to the highest quality goods and services at the lowest price to the consumer, 
thus benefiting society as a whole. (p. 4)  
Foster (2000) drawing on Marx, also described some of the defining features of 
capitalism as characterised by a society that is: “… alienated by the institution of private 
property and the accumulation of wealth as the driving force of industry” (p. 79). 
Capitalism has also been described as follows:  
Spurred on by competition and constant growth, capitalism is not capable of 
‘self-sufficiency’. It must be constantly renewed, replenished, but on a larger 
scale. It cannot be stationary, thus it is ‘fundamentally unrestrainable’ and 
cannot ‘recognize boundaries’, whether social or natural, regardless of ‘how 
devastating the consequences’. (Clark & Foster, 2009, p. 314, referring to work 
by Mészáros, 1995) 
This means that capitalism hinges on a particular extractive relationship between 
humans and the natural environment, as its existence depends on continued resource 
extraction:  
While the appropriation of resources from distant lands has taken place 
throughout human history, the origins and ongoing growth of capitalism are 
dependent upon further ecological exploitation and ecological unequal 
exchange. It takes different forms, depending upon historical context and the 
demands of economic production, but it continues to operate in order to funnel 
resources – land, raw materials, and/or labor – into the process of capital 
accumulation. (Clark & Foster, 2009, pp. 311-312) 
Climate change is the result of, and is responded to, in the context of the 
currently existing form of capitalism, which has defined modes of production and 
interaction between humans with each other, as well as with the environment of which 
they are a part (Clark & York, 2005; Klein, 2014; Newell, 2012; Norgaard, 2011). Clark 
and York (2005) outlined the tie between accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere and 
the accumulation of capital by the economic elite. Owing to the logic of capital 
accumulation, the authors argued that refinements of capitalism would not repair the 
core issue and proposed that: “… the transcendence of the growth driven, capitalist 
system is necessary if ecological sustainability is to be obtained” (p. 397). However, the 
complexity and interrelatedness of structural factors means that no single social cause 
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for climate change can be pinpointed, which is expressed in Beck’s (1992) statement 
about the difficulty of relating:  
… destructive effects to individual factors that can scarcely be isolated within 
the complex system of the industrial mode of production. The systemic 
interdependence of the highly specialized agents of modernization in business, 
agriculture, the law, and politics corresponds to the absence of isolable single 
causes and responsibilities. (p. 32) 
Notably, capitalism does not just define how the economy is organised, but 
ultimately how we relate to ourselves, each other and our environment. For example, 
Harvey (2006) argued that: “For any system of thought to become hegemonic requires 
the articulation of fundamental concepts that become so deeply embedded in common-
sense understandings that they become taken for granted and beyond question” (p. 146). 
Similarly, Kasser et al. (2007) examined the (largely detrimental) influence of capitalist 
goals on how people think and behave, stating that capitalism:  
… carries with it certain practices and beliefs that foster the pursuit of self-
interest, competition, economic growth, and high levels of consumption. As 
such, ACC [American corporate capitalism] is more than just money and 
goods—it is a system of beliefs, social relationships, and institutions that 
encourage, regulate, and direct human motivations and values …” (p. 6)  
Kasser et al. (2007) note that given the inescapability of capitalism in 
contemporary culture, its influence has been acknowledged and studied relatively little 
in psychology. They suggested that given the pervasive nature of capitalism it could be 
expected that there would be substantial research on: 
… the psychology of the capitalistic economic system and the psychological and 
social consequences of living under it. However, a PsychInfo search using the 
term ‘capitalis*’ (to capture ‘capitalistic’ and ‘capitalism’) yielded only 816 
articles in peer-reviewed journals published between 1887 and May 6, 2006. (p. 
2)  
The authors suggested that because these findings included articles from anthropology 
and sociology the actual figure would be lower if it comprised only literature in 
psychology. Similarly, the only time capitalist culture is mentioned in the American 
Psychological Association task force report on climate change (Swim et al., 2009) 
(using the search term “capitalis”) is in discussing precisely the Kasser et al. (2007) 
paper mentioned above. The reference to capitalist culture is presented only in relation 
to its influence on consumerism, which ignores the many facets in which capitalism 
influences behaviour outside of consumption, such as in the way in which it defines 
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productivity, work, education and social relations as well as recreation and fun 
(Fincham, 2016). For example, Fincham (2016) argued that leisure has been influenced 
by and capitalised on as another market for selling activities and products:  
… the relationship between leisure, culture and consumption gives clues as a 
hegemonic construct of fun through capitalist provision of leisure 
spaces/activities and the development of leisure industries. Whilst not directly 
addressing fun they, nonetheless, often called upon fun as the motivation for the 
consumption of particular leisure activities and/or products. (p. 7) 
Moreover, Fincham (2016) outlined how conceptions of fun and the right time for fun 
have been defined by a capitalist-driven interest in productivity, which in turn 
influences the organisation of education and work spaces:  
… manufactured fun is an attempt to control social interactions within 
environments where adherence to rules and control are privileged or important. 
When it comes to school and work the control of fun and a relationship to 
productivity is clear. The necessity to inculcate a population with the idea that 
fun is important but only in the right time and place becomes apparent when 
data about experiences of work is examined. It is in the interests of employers 
that they control how employees use time. The idea that something as non-
productive as fun might happen in productive time is the antithesis of the logic 
of capitalist employment practice, and school is where we compartmentalise fun 
into the routines that then are reflected in work. (p. 202) 
Even where the influence of capitalism is not the focus of a given investigation, its 
existence could at least be acknowledged and taken into account as the context (as is the 
case in the above quotes, where the topic of interest was the study of fun). This absence 
of acknowledging the importance of the socio-economic context is illustrated for 
example by a research paper which investigated reactions to models of potential 
consequences of climate change in focus groups in Switzerland (Stoll-Kleemann, 
O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001). One participant in the focus groups highlighted the 
significance of the economic system in contributing to environmental damage:  
To say in short, you can’t do that much as long as the economy continues to be 
so powerful. As long as economic interests are still so predominant. Before 
being able effectively to face environmental problems you would hence have to 
ecologize the economy first. (pp. 114-115) 
However, rather than treating this as a relevant criticism of the economic system and 
examining what it would mean to the participant to act on such structural barriers, the 
authors simply interpreted it as another example of denial of one’s individual 
responsibility: “The denials described above are therapeutic strategies to deal with the 
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pain involved in dissonance” (p. 115). Acknowledging capitalism as a defining force of 
current infrastructure, politics and daily life could influence, shape and change the 
analysis and interpretation of research findings.   
One large gap in the psychological literature therefore seems to be that 
capitalism as the overarching structural context for people’s views and behaviours has 
been largely ignored. This means that there is little psychological literature which I can 
cite and use as a guide to embed my research in a psychological understanding of 
climate change views in the context of capitalism. This thesis, although not primarily 
examining the influence of capitalism on perceptions of climate change, does take 
capitalism into account by presenting it as the context of the research. Although I do not 
consistently relate all perceptions and attitudes that are under investigation back to 
capitalism, I am presenting the above definitions of capitalism as the context in which 
my research was conducted and as a basis for the analysis and understanding of my 
findings. For example, I examine people’s perceptions of corporations’ profit motives 
which are a key characteristic of capitalism and were discussed in relation to 
responsibility for climate change mitigation.  
Definitions of nature 
In studying perceptions of climate change and views on mitigation, I look at 
people’s constructions of the natural and social environment. Ingold (2000) argued that 
in Western societies, nature and culture are typically constructed as a dualism: “… the 
basic contrast between physical substance and conceptual form, of which the dichotomy 
between nature and culture is one expression, is deeply embedded within the tradition of 
Western thought” (p. 41). This stands in contrast to other ways of conceptualising this 
relationship where nature and culture are seen as inextricably entwined. For example, 
Watt-Cloutier (a former international chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
interviewed by Callison, 2014) stated: “I think that some people have not fully come to 
understand that there is no disconnect between the suicide rates in our communities and 
climate change … Environmental issues—it’s all connected” (p. 49). In line with this 
view, Ingold (2000) argued that humans and society are not separate from nature: 
“There can, then, be no radical break between social and ecological relations; rather, the 
former constitute a subset of the latter” (p. 60). The author proposed that a first step to 
the endeavour of ecological anthropology (and the same point could be made for any 
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other discipline that studies humans in their environment) is to recognise that: “… the 
relations with which it deals, between human beings and their environments, are not 
confined to a domain of ‘nature’, separate from, and given independently of, the domain 
in which they lead their lives as persons” (p. 60). I attempt to examine how discussions 
of nature and culture manifest themselves in Western societies, such as the UK and the 
USA, in line with Ingold’s (2000) proposition that: “… we need to think again about 
our own ways of comprehending human action, perception and cognition, and indeed 
about our very understanding of the environment and of our relations and 
responsibilities towards it” (p. 40).  
Definitions of risk 
Like definitions of nature, the role of definitions of risk is also important. Beck 
(1992) argued that debates concerning the destruction of nature were being 
predominantly conducted in terms of natural science, while the social, cultural and 
political meaning that was inherent in scientific definitions, including definitions of risk, 
remained unrecognised. His critique highlighted that risk and environmental destruction 
is mediated by social definitions and values, i.e. not purely an issue of natural sciences 
or neutral and objective scientific study in terms of biological or chemical components. 
For example, social values will come into play when evaluating questions such as: 
“Where and how does one draw the line between still acceptable and no longer 
acceptable exposures?” (Beck, 1992, p. 29), answers to which are not inherently given 
by the natural sciences. In the case of climate change this is illustrated, for example, by 
the 2° Celsius set as the limit for ‘acceptable’ levels of global warming (Anderson & 
Bows, 2011). Climate change mitigation and adaptation also involve the negotiation of 
questions such as: “Should the possibility of an ecological catastrophe be accepted, for 
example, in order to satisfy economic interests?” (Beck, 1992, p. 29). Thus, although 
climate change is the result of chemical, physical and biological factors, these processes 
were set in motion by a particular socially-based relationship with nature. The social 
definition (which understands humans as separate from nature) and relationship (e.g., 
nature as a resource to be exploited) creates environmental destruction, but also 
represents the context in which it is addressed.  
Structure and agency 
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If one regards capitalism and the industrial mode of production as causes of 
environmental destruction, however, then where does responsibility for climate change 
mitigation lie, and where can change occur? Beck (1992) problematized the concept of 
system as follows:  
… there is a general complicity, and the complicity is matched by a general lack 
of responsibility. Everyone is cause and effect, and thus non-cause. The causes 
dribble away into a general amalgam of agents and conditions, reactions and 
counter-reactions, which brings social certainty and popularity to the concept of 
system. (p. 33)  
With climate change mitigation, as with many other environmental issues, there are 
questions related to structure and agency. My stance – underlying this research – is that 
structure and agency fluidly reproduce each other whereby structures create and restrain 
agency, but agency nonetheless exists to an extent, and again forms the larger structure, 
so that structure and agency are not separable as two ends of a dichotomy. This may be 
considered in line with the approach taken in structuration theory, where: “… it is fully 
recognised that individuals are at the same time constrained by, and co-creators of, 
societal infrastructure, and that social institutions are reproduced through the daily 
actions of individuals” (Giddens, 1984, cited in Seyfang, 2009, p. 9). However, rather 
than delving into this debate, my interest lies in looking at how certain structures of 
social organisation produce and constrain forms of agency, such as ways of thinking, 
perceiving and acting, and how the structural influences express themselves and are 
experienced at the individual and psychological level, which in turn directs the 
reproduction of the larger structure. This relationship between agency and structure 
relates to my focus on asking people about their views on different levels of action on 
climate change mitigation and responsibility. 
Individual behaviour change approach and its criticism 
Individual behaviour change approaches are those which focus on inducing 
people to change their lifestyle and consumption individually in their homes, at work 
and in terms of transportation. Examples of such behaviours include recycling, driving 
less and buying ‘green’ energy-efficient appliances and products (e.g., Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Defra, 2008; Environmental Protection Agency, 
EPA, 2016). A range of criticism has been raised over this approach. The criticisms are 
not about suggesting that people can or should continue consuming to excess, but rather 
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that other more structural mitigation approaches are being obscured (Kent, 2009; Shove, 
2010; Webb, 2012). This is because the individualised approach locates the cause and 
solution to environmental problems in the individual. It rests on a certain 
conceptualisation of the individual as a rational decision maker and consumer with the 
underlying assumption and implication being that climate change mitigation hinges on 
individual people’s choices: “The popularity of the … framework is an indication of the 
extent to which responsibility for responding to climate change is thought to lie with 
individuals whose behavioural choices will make the difference” (Shove, 2010, p. 
1274). 
Several sociologists have problematized this approach arguing that the approach 
is unlikely to deliver the required emission reductions, while obscuring government 
responsibility, the role of economic structures and modes of production, and distracting 
from other mitigation approaches (Brulle, 2010; Kent, 2009; Maniates, 2001; Norgaard, 
2011, 2017; Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012). Further, the individualised approach to climate 
change mitigation is indicative of the current time period and economic structure: 
“Neoliberalism has generated rationalist models of individual responsibility towards 
environmental problems which rely on freedom of choice and freewill and encouraged 
through consumerism” (Kent, 2009, p. 146). Individualised approaches are not neutral, 
but political, precisely because they hide the extent to which governments are involved 
in sustaining unsustainable institutions, economics and lifestyles, and the degree to 
which they influence and constrain options and possibilities (Shove, 2010).  
The individualised approach directs attention towards certain kinds of climate 
change mitigation strategies (e.g., recycling), while distracting from others, or in 
Shove’s (2010) words, it deters people: “… from opting for other, less desired, courses 
of action” (p. 1280). The extent and power of the social organisation of attention and 
silence around undiscussable topics (or ‘solutions’) was examined by Zerubavel (2006). 
In the case of individual behaviour change approaches, the prime example of ‘the 
elephant in the room’ are structural factors, shaped by capitalism and under which 
growth, profit and consumption are required. The public is not stimulated to imagine 
and formulate a large scale social transformation, as the individual approach: “… does 
not contain within it the terms and concepts required to discuss or debate significant 
societal transformation” (Shove, 2010, p. 1277). For example, outlining the 
marginalisation of other approaches, Webb (2012) stated that:  
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In adopting an individualized consumer model of citizenship, government 
strategy simultaneously obscures or marginalizes societal analyses, and obstructs 
acknowledgement of the contradictions between neo-liberal political economy 
and sustainable society. Short-term, instrumental economic values thus dominate 
climate change debate, to the extent that other systems of value are downgraded. 
The result is a perspective which is unable to identify effective routes towards a 
sustainable way of life. (p. 121 - 122)  
So, not only is the role of structural factors in reproducing high-emissions downgraded, 
but other approaches to mitigating climate change are thereby neglected. In this vein, 
Brulle (2010) argued that the individualised approach atomises people and reproduces 
collective passivity: “Citizens are called upon to take individual—not collective—
actions; thus encouraging a passive civil society” (p. 90).  
To provide one example of a significant contributor to emissions which people 
are distracted from thinking about (i.e. where attention could, but is not directed to) is 
the US military. Sanders (2009) contrasted the way in which people are encouraged to 
consider individual behaviour changes, but not large scale polluters such as the US 
military:   
Over the years, my family has bought three or four little books on how to lead 
the greenest life possible… While they may pale these days considering the 
enormity of the environmental crisis, we nonetheless still take the advice to 
heart, choosing low-energy light bulbs … Every little bit helps, as the experts 
tell us, and, besides, we need to feel that we are doing something. But no list in 
any of those books addresses the largest single source of pollution in this 
country and in the world: the United States military … (p. 21) 
The military is a large-scale polluter whose emissions are rarely discussed, let alone 
subjected to cuts (Sanders, 2009). Sanders (2014) drew an analogy comparing the US 
military to a daily occurring worst case BP oil spill, equivalent to releasing 1 million 
barrels into the environment every day. This stands in contrast to individual behaviour 
change messages, which imply that as long as behaviour changes occur, the 
surroundings can remain the same: “The extent to which these suggestions reinforce the 
status quo—broadly sustaining existing standards and conventions but doing so more 
efficiently—is partly but not simply a matter of politics …” (Shove, 2010, p. 1277). 
Further, Maniates (2001) maintained that people will become disillusioned with 
the individualised approach, as they increasingly realise the approach does not work and 
that environmental problems continue to get worse:  
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It’s more than coincidental that as our collective perception of environmental 
problems has become more global, our prevailing way of framing environmental 
problem-solving has become more individualized. In the end, individualizing 
responsibility does not work—you can’t plant a tree to save the world—and as 
citizens and consumers slowly come to discover this fact their cynicism about 
social change will only grow: ‘you mean after fifteen years of washing out these 
crummy jars and recycling them, environmental problems are still getting 
worse—geesh, what’s the use?’. (p. 44) 
My intention in the research reported in this thesis has been to investigate how 
larger societal approaches and discourses (such as individual behaviour change 
approaches and the discourse of growth and profit related to capitalism) manifest in 
ideas for mitigation strategies, as well as how they influence attention to and support for 
structural level changes. Specifically, I looked at what role people see for themselves 
and those around them (friends and family) and for government and corporations in 
climate change mitigation. Views on the relationship between the individual and 
structural level were investigated and are detailed in chapter 2. I also examined how one 
of the dominant approaches to mitigation, which focuses on encouraging individual 
level ‘pro-environmental’ behaviour change, might reduce support for structural level 
change (see chapter 3).  
The experience of drought and views on climate change 
While the above critiques relate to the processes influencing views on mitigation 
strategies, in the following paragraphs I outline the rationale for the second part of my 
research, which examined people’s perceptions of environmental change. Here, the 
focus was on how climate change has come to be understood in the context of extreme 
climate conditions (see also Callison, 2014; Norgaard, 2011).  
One of the reasons sometimes given by both lay people and academics for 
Western people’s inaction on climate change, is that the consequences of climate 
change are intangible, distant and gradual, and hence fail to provoke understanding, 
alarm and action (for a version of this argument see for example Giddens, 2011; Moser, 
2010; Weber & Stern, 2011). However, people do care and act to a certain extent, even 
if climate change does not affect them (Isenhour, 2013). Additionally, several places 
and people are already being affected by climate change in both poorer and wealthier 
countries (Callison, 2014; IPCC, 2012, 2014). I draw on the recent California drought as 
an example of the latter. The drought poses a case study of people in a Western, 
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industrialised country, who are used to living in a culture of abundance, being 
confronted to some extent with ‘natural’ boundaries. This touches upon questions of 
how certain people respond in the face of environmental change and how the 
relationship between people and their environment is mediated by social and structural 
factors. For the planning of and research in California, I was guided by Norgaard’s 
(2011) work in a town in Norway, where she looked into how people were responding 
(or not) to climate change. She contextualised her research by relating people’s 
responses to cultural practices, norms and values as well as Norway’s economic benefits 
from oil. Based on a similar approach, the latter part of the current thesis is more 
focused on people’s perception of climate change as a basis for understanding how this 
may or may not influence action. Questions addressed were how people perceived 
changes (or not), how people linked them to climate change (or not), and how social 
factors enabled certain perceptions and not others (see also Callison, 2014; Norgaard, 
2011). The aim of the second part of the thesis was to examine people’s perceptions of 
drought and climate change in California. 
One way in which the research in relation to individual behaviour change 
approaches connects to the later research on the experience of climate change, is that 
they are both concerned with social processes of selective attention and meaning 
making (Zerubavel, 2006). For example, Norgaard (2006) noted the lack of attention 
given to climate change in the absence of discussions and response to climate change in 
a town in Norway:  
It did not appear to be a common topic of either political or private conversation. 
How did people manage to outwardly ignore such significant risks? Why did 
such seemingly serious problems draw so little response? … Despite the extreme 
seriousness of global warming, the pattern of meager public response in the way 
of social movement activity, behavioral changes, or public pressure on 
governments exists worldwide. (p. 373) 
Sampling 
When I write about ‘people’ or ‘the public’ these are very generalising terms. 
What I mean is that I recruited members of the general public, such as students, rather 
than focusing on people who engage with climate change specifically (e.g., in their 
work or as activists) or people who have particular political and economic power. 
Further, I aimed to study people with a similar social status as myself to decrease the 
power imbalance between me as the researcher and those who ‘participate’. The aim 
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was to examine the practices that were taken for granted and normalised in my own 
‘society’ or similar Western societies. Additionally, as mentioned above, it can be 
argued that people in Western countries have more responsibility to reduce emissions 
because of their countries’ histories of colonisation and higher per capita carbon 
emissions. As a consequence, people living there also have more time, resources and 
power to reduce emissions.  
The people who constitute my sample (and whom I am referring to when I 
discuss ‘people’, ‘participants’ or ‘the public’) consist of students at my University in 
the south-east of England and of a convenience sample of Californians. This was 
because of my aforementioned interest in studying this particular subsection of society 
and for ease of access. Of interest were both idiosyncrasies and similarities between 
people which indicate larger patterns and divergences (hence the use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods).  
Methodology 
I studied questions of interest using the tools that I had available and that 
seemed most conducive to understanding what I was looking at, which resulted in a 
mixture of methods. Interviews and observations were a way of tapping into a more 
natural setting of how climate change was talked about in society: “By paying attention 
to conversation norms, we can begin to see the contours of social structure in private 
life and the links between political economy and interpersonal interaction” (Norgaard, 
2011, p. 98). Interviews reveal in more depth the reasoning, the arguments, the feelings, 
the thought process and the negotiation that people engage in when conceptualising 
climate change. Crucially, qualitative methods also allow for the study of omissions 
(what is not present, what is not being said) and how discourse and omissions fit into 
the bigger picture. That is, with qualitative methods there tends to be an emphasis on 
taking into account the role of the context, a lack of which is one of the criticisms of 
experimental methods: “Within experimental psychology, the separation of the person 
from the natural context is so complete that no recent theorist has argued for the 
necessity of this separation; this issue is simply not addressed” (Kidner, 2001, p. 96). In 
contrast however, I also used quantitative methods, because they allow the researcher to 
focus on one particular question and isolate specific factors of influence on opinions and 
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to establish statistical significance (which is a commonly used tool in the research 
literature).  
Research approach 
In this research I do not claim objectivity or neutrality. My research is grounded 
in my direct experience of the world and interaction with the research participants. For 
example in my first study, I chose to use semi-structured interviews to gain a somewhat 
more personal exchange with my participants, seeking a deeper understanding of their 
perspectives and reasoning. The analysis is my interpretation of responses that I 
received from fellow humans to specific questions which I posed in the contexts in 
which we both exist (Ferrell, 2009). In conducting this research I have also been aware 
of the power relations that exist between ‘the researcher’ and the participants. For 
example, I decided on the research topic, research questions and interview questions, 
and I analysed and interpreted the participants’ responses without their further input.  
Overview of chapters 
In the following chapters I present my research examining some of the processes 
and influences on people’s views on climate change mitigation and people’s 
interpretation of climate change during drought. The first study was an interview study 
with 20 participants (mostly university students in the south-east of England) to 
investigate what they think should be done to mitigate climate change. Specifically, 
they were asked about their views on what individuals such as themselves and their 
friends and family should be doing, as well as on the role of the UK government and 
corporations. These questions necessarily touched on beliefs about climate change and 
concern, or lack thereof and what difficulties people saw for climate change mitigation. 
Further, it contributed towards revealing what kind of awareness of mitigation strategies 
existed in the public, how mitigation was thought of and talked about, and how these 
strategies were related to the larger social, economic and political context. Hence, 
chapter 2 is an exploration of people’s orientation towards different levels of climate 
change mitigation and responsibility of individuals, government and corporations. The 
themes that were extracted from the interviews examined, for example, the persisting 
doubt around human caused climate change, the relationship between different levels of 
intervention and discourse around choice and profit. This study will contribute to the 
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existing literature by exploring which mitigation strategies participants are aware of, 
what they think should be done and who they think is responsible for bringing about 
such changes. Additionally, the qualitative nature of the study means that participants 
will be able to express their views using their own words and are not constrained by the 
answers provided, such as is the case in survey or experimental studies. To my 
knowledge no such interview study examining what students think should be done to 
mitigate climate change and who should do it, has been conducted in the UK. Exploring 
views on possibilities and responsibility for climate change mitigation in the public is 
important in order to understand which mitigation approaches are prevalent in the 
public debate and which approaches might need further dissemination, as well as being 
able to inform which measures the public would be likely to support.  
Chapter 3 reports three experimental studies that were designed in relation to the 
critiques of individual behaviour change approaches discussed above. In these studies 
participants were allocated to different conditions in which climate change mitigation 
on the individual level was presented either as favourable, ineffective, or was compared 
to the benefits of structural level change. Several outcome variables measured support 
for structural level change and structural level actors’ responsibility to reduce emissions. 
Broadly, it was expected that positive presentation of individual behaviour change 
would detract support from structural level change. The studies reported in chapter 3 
will contribute to the existing literature by applying sociological critiques of 
individualised approaches to climate change mitigation. To my knowledge the impact of 
individual behaviour change messages on support for structural level change to mitigate 
climate change has not yet been experimentally tested.  
Chapters 4 and 5 draw on research conducted in drought-affected California in 
late 2015. This fieldwork was inspired by some of the responses obtained in the 
interviews with students (reported in chapter 2) who repeatedly pointed towards the 
need for people to ‘really’ feel the effects of climate change, before behaviour would 
change. This idea was raised despite increased flooding in the UK, which occurred only 
a few weeks prior to the interviews. This notion was also echoed in some of the 
academic literature which explained climate change inaction at least partly, in terms of 
distant consequences of climate change (Giddens, 2011; Moser, 2010; Weber & Stern, 
2011). Additionally, I was struck by the news coverage about Governor Brown’s (the 
Governor of California) linking of the drought to climate change. This news coverage 
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was likely to have influenced public opinion and discourse. In contrast, it seemed to me 
(although I did not conduct any thorough review of this) that the news coverage of the 
floods in England rarely mentioned climate change. In California, reports were grave 
and mentioned mandatory water reductions. People in a Western industrialised country 
were being subjected to mandatory water cuts in relation to drought and climate change. 
I wanted to study how this was being experienced on the ground and to follow up the 
idea that people need to feel the effects of climate change before serious action is taken 
to actually reduce emissions. In chapter 3 I focus on how Californians experienced the 
drought itself, while in chapter 4 I look specifically at their experience of drought in 
relation to views on climate change.  
The research in California contributes to existing literature by exploring how 
drought, which climate scientists have argued to be exacerbated by anthropogenic 
climate change, is experienced on the ground. The qualitative approach allowed a more 
open and in-depth exploration of participants’ experiences and reasoning. Chapter 4 
examined some of the factors that influenced participants’ experiences of drought. To 
my knowledge there has not been a qualitative study examining the experience of 
drought in California or the USA more generally. Chapter 5 investigated the reasons 
participants gave for their views on why drought is linked or not to climate change. This 
research is important since an examination of how climate change is perceived in an 
industrialised country can inform an understanding of how people make sense of 
climate change locally and ultimately under what circumstances experiencing change 
might lead to action on mitigation. It is my aim that, in combination, these studies will 
add to the research on views of climate change in their societal context. This thesis 
examines the way in which some people have come to relate to climate change, and 
thereby may in the long run contribute towards an understanding of and change in 
perceptions and actions.
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- Chapter 2 - 
Talking about climate change responsibility: Individual, governmental and 
corporate levels of action for mitigation 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates how climate change mitigation is discussed publicly by 
examining how people talk about different levels of intervention. In an interview study 
20 people (mostly university students) were interviewed about what they think should 
be done to reduce the degree of climate change. Four main themes were discussed: the 
first relates to the acceptance of the reality and severity of climate change; the second 
touches on responsibility and suggested action; the third addresses opposing 
environmental and economic interests and the fourth examines views on protest and 
reasons for inertia. Overall there was support for a variety of climate change mitigation 
strategies. There was some emphasis on individual behaviour change combined with 
suggestions for more information and the importance of personal choice. Although 
some participants criticized economic and profit-oriented structures, there was a strong 
sense that change in this regard was unlikely. I conclude by suggesting that more 
examples of alternative strategies to address climate change need to be presented, firstly 
in order to go beyond individualised approaches, and secondly to make significant 
change seem more possible. 
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“I feel one of the crises that we’re facing is a crisis of language. We are not speaking 
about [climate change] with the language of urgency or mortality that the issue 
deserves.” (Naomi Klein, in an interview with Mark, 2013) 
 
Owing to the increased greenhouse gas emissions from human activities climate 
change is affecting environmental and social systems (IPCC, 2014). Faced with 
increased natural catastrophes - sea level rise, destruction of eco-systems and other 
impacts which are occurring across the globe (IPCC, 2014) - the question of how to 
respond to climate change remains unanswered. Many suggestions exist as to why 
emissions are not successfully being reduced in order to mitigate climate change. These 
range from personal level explanations, for example, scepticism, inconvenience and 
habits, to structural analyses, for example, the ‘denial industry’ organised by fossil fuel 
lobbies, and the economic and political systems of capitalism which are based on 
continued fossil fuel extraction.  
In this chapter I examine how ways of mitigating climate change are talked 
about by the public (based on a sample of students in the UK) in relation to individual, 
governmental and corporate levels of action. What roles and responsibilities do people 
assign to themselves and those around them, as well as to government and 
corporations?2 What possibilities for mitigating climate change come to mind and which 
ones constitute ‘unthinkable’ ideas that are omitted? It can be argued that: “… climate 
change challenges our existing political and economic structures like no other prior 
problem” (Norgaard, 2011, p. 191), but to what extent is climate change perceived and 
discussed as such a pressing and system challenging issue among the general public? 
Individualised responses to climate change 
Individual behaviour changes include those that call on individuals to reduce 
their emissions, mostly through changes in lifestyle, such as driving less or recycling 
more. In contrast, structural-level changes could relate, for example, to changes in 
infrastructure such as transportation, or through regulation on emissions of polluting 
industries, or through cultural and economic shifts that lead to entirely different ways of 
                                                 
2 The individual and structural level are not separate but constitute and shape each other. 
However, they are often treated as separate in society, e.g., as if individuals could be 
persuaded to recycle more through increased information, irrespective of recycling 
infrastructure.  
34 
 
 
 
producing and consuming. The relatively dominant approach to reducing carbon 
emissions through individual behaviour change has been criticised for locating the 
responsibility for emissions and ‘solutions’ to mitigation at the individual level, while 
failing to address the political and economic structures and decisions which maintain 
high emissions and constrain individual behaviour (Brulle, 2010; Kent, 2009; Maniates, 
2001; Norgaard, 2011, 2017; Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012). Brulle (2010), for example, 
criticised environmental communication approaches that are based exclusively on 
cognitive science and advertising techniques, because they: 
… lack any contextual basis within a larger theoretical structure of the role of 
communication in facilitating large-scale social change processes. This 
theoretical deficit leads to the development of climate messaging strategies that 
support short-term pragmatic actions that fit within economic and political 
imperatives, but fail to address meaningfully the ecological imperatives defined 
by global warming. (p. 83) 
It is important to make explicit the conceptualisation of the individual that 
underlies this approach, as it influences the understanding and interpretation of people’s 
behaviour. In some studies people’s views on climate change mitigation and (in)action 
have been construed as forms of an individual’s psychological denial, such as to avoid 
some sort of process of dissonance. For example, when interpreting their focus group’s 
varied analyses on necessary steps to mitigate climate change, Stoll-Kleemann, 
O’Riordan and Jaeger (2001) stated that “The denials described above are therapeutic 
strategies to deal with the pain involved in dissonance” (p. 115). One participant had 
commented on economic structures:  
To say in short, you can’t do that much as long as the economy continues to be 
so powerful. As long as economic interests are still so predominant. Before 
being able effectively to face environmental problems you would hence have to 
ecologize the economy first. (p. 114-115) 
Although this could be interpreted as a displacement of responsibility (i.e. a form of 
denial of individual responsibility), it can also be treated as a relevant criticism of the 
economic system. Rather than brushing it off as denial, it may be worthwhile instead to 
ask what it would mean to this person to act upon such systemic criticism.  
Thus, the focus on individual responsibility found in today’s climate change 
mitigation strategies can be contextualised as arising from a certain neoliberal 
conceptualisation of the individual: “Drawn from the neoliberal, capitalist tradition, 
individual responsibility now resonates much more widely, becoming a familiar 
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catchcry of politicians, bureaucrats and NGOs, including environmental organizations” 
(Kent, 2009, p.137). Drawing on the way in which students understand and discuss 
climate change mitigation, the present study examines how this conceptualisation 
manifests and is expressed at the micro level.  
While being called upon to take ‘pro-environmental action’ some people express 
feelings of helplessness, partly because they see individual behaviour change as 
ineffective. For example, Norgaard (2011) argued that: “… helplessness is the product 
of a situation where people perceive that neither individual actions nor existing political 
or economic structures are adequate” (p. 193). Citing the American Geophysical Union, 
the author suggested that public apathy is related to perceptions of whether anything can 
be done:  
… informing the public of the problems can increase frustration and apathy 
rather than build support. Our research suggests that what the public is most 
skeptical about is not the existence of problems but our ability to solve them. 
What will make the public invest energy in these issues is not the conviction that 
the problems are real, but that we can do something about them. (Immerwahr, 
1999, cited in Norgaard, 2011, pp. 191-192) 
In line with this suggestion, the present study investigated what some members of the 
public thought should be done to mitigate climate change.  
Relationship between the individual and governmental level 
A study by Butler and Pidgeon (2011) highlighted the relationship between 
different actors’ perceived responsibility for climate change adaptation in the form of 
flood risk management in the UK. The authors conducted interviews and focus groups 
with professionals working in flood risk as well as with residents in three cities that 
experienced floods in 2007. They noted a shift in policy response from the previous 
approach, where the focus had been primarily on government’s responsibility to keep 
the water out, towards an approach where individuals were supposed to take 
responsibility. For example, the authors described agencies’ aim to shift the public’s 
expectation and perception towards one where residents know about and accept the risk 
of floods (so that living with flood risk becomes the norm). In contrast, members of the 
public expected authorities to take responsibility, since they were seen to have the 
power to change structural development. Thus, different actors had varying ideas of 
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appropriate strategies and responsibility for climate change adaptation, and similar 
patterns may apply in the case of mitigation.  
Corporations3 and industry 
Modern corporations’ influence on social and economic processes has grown 
under globalization, neo-liberalism and industrialisation, as Banerjee (2008) formulated: 
“While the wealth creating ability of modern corporations is unquestionable, their social 
and environmental effects (and indeed some economic effects) are unquestionably 
damaging as well” (p. 54). Banerjee (2008) suggested that, although sometimes 
presented as a fundamental economic change, corporate language on sustainability 
supports the ‘greener’ version of business-as-usual. Further, the author argued that 
governments and organizations such as the United Nations also framed so-called 
sustainable development as a business matter, leading to an approach towards 
sustainability based on business terms and market value, rather than societal or 
ecological priorities. Nyberg and Wright (2012) examined discursive strategies 
employed by companies’ sustainability managers in relation to their environmental 
sustainability agendas, which have developed in order to legitimise and counteract 
criticisms of corporations’ otherwise socially and environmentally damaging activities. 
They found that their interviewees persistently referred to market value, justifying 
environmental projects as reactions to both business risks and opportunities presented 
by climate change and that responding to consumer alarm about climate change was 
seen as a crucial way of selling products and services. More general ‘green’ marketing 
of the company through affiliations with NGOs and environmental groups was often 
treated as creating a positive public image that would lead to enhanced sales and profits. 
Owing to corporations’ significant social and environmental impact as well as their 
                                                 
3 The use of the term corporation in the present study is in line with Bakan’s (2004) 
definition: “A key premise is that the corporation is an institution—a unique structure 
and set of imperatives that direct the actions of people within it. It is also a legal 
institution, one whose existence and capacity to operate depend upon the law. The 
corporation’s legally defined mandate is to pursue, relentlessly and without exception, 
its own self-interest, regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to 
others … I use the word ‘corporation’ to describe the large Anglo-American publicly 
traded business corporation, as opposed to small incorporated businesses, or small and 
large not-for-profit or privately owned ones” (pp. 1-3). 
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green-marketing strategies, participants in the present interviews were asked about their 
views on corporations’ and industry’s role in climate change mitigation.  
Views on climate change mitigation responsibility 
Drawing on a large sample in Canada and employing open-ended qualitative 
methods, Stoddart, Tindall and Greenfield (2012) examined environmental group 
members’ views on who should be most responsible for addressing climate change, 
concrete suggestions for mitigation, and the relationship between different actors. They 
found that the top four responses participants identified were government leadership 
(76.3%), then individuals as the driving force (39.4%), ‘everyone’ (28.4%) and 
corporate responsibility (21.6%). Government was seen as responsible because they 
have the power to legislate (such as obliging corporations to act more sustainably) and 
to enable or mandate individual behaviour change. At the same time respondents also 
indicated that individuals play an important role in putting pressure on governments to 
act. The authors noted widespread scepticism concerning corporations’ willingness to 
safeguard the environment: “The discussion of responsibility is largely limited to two 
“levels” of social life: the nation-state and the microsocial” (p. 49). In contrast they 
found little mention of action at the community or international level.  
Ipsos Mori surveys have examined and tracked public attitudes over time. In 
2014, 88% of the people surveyed in Great Britain believed that the world’s climate is 
changing, although concern decreased from 82% in 2005 to 68% in 2014. Importantly, 
in 2013, 64% agreed that ‘the climate change we are currently seeing is largely the 
result of human activity’ while 24% disagreed. Further, of the people surveyed prior to 
and during the climate change conference of the parties (COP 21) in Paris in 2015, 31% 
strongly agreed that the UK government should take a lead role in global action on 
climate change, while 46% agreed that the government should take actions necessary to 
tackle climate change ‘only if it does not harm economic growth’. Seventy percent 
tended to agree or strongly agreed that companies should do more to decrease their 
impact on climate change. Notably, the environment (including climate change) 
consistently fell behind other issues that people thought were affecting Britain, which 
were ranked in the following order in 2015: immigration, NHS, economy, 
unemployment and the environment (Ipsos Mori, 2015). In 2008, 4% agreed that 
‘individuals should not be expected to do anything, it is not their responsibility’ to 
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tackle climate change, while 47% agreed that individuals should engage in some actions 
like recycling more, driving and flying less (Ipsos Mori, 2008). These figures suggest 
that climate change is not a top priority for the public at large in Great Britain, but that 
there is some support for government, corporate and individual level action. Although 
these surveys provide some insight into the prevalence of each belief they say little 
about which reasons people give and how climate change mitigation is discussed more 
generally. 
The present study 
There is little qualitative research examining beliefs about climate change 
mitigation strategies. Therefore, similar to Stoddart et al. (2012) the present study uses 
qualitative methods to explore participants’ interpretation and discursive elements 
concerning responsibility for climate change mitigation, in order to connect research on 
climate change beliefs and intervention. However, while Stoddart et al. (2012) 
exclusively examined the views of members of environmental groups, i.e. people who 
are more attentive to environmental topics, the present study draws on a largely student 
based sample with no particular affiliations to environmental groups in the south of 
England. Although students are not representative of the general public, interviews will 
reflect how some people who have access to university education view responsibility 
and strategies to tackle climate change. 
In outlining dialectic linguistics, Steffensen (2007) argued that language is 
contingent on its context, such as the circumstances for its production, circulation and 
usage. According to Steffensen (2007), employing language as a research tool thus 
allows one to bridge the social realm with the psychological realm, as language presents 
both what people are willing and able to say about their thoughts, reasoning, emotions 
and actions, as well as reflecting societal discourse and current cultural values. Further, 
the author suggested that dialectical linguistics can be used to investigate the effect of 
language on social affairs and its part in the continuing ecological and social ‘crises’.  
In summary, this study examines what a sample of students think should be done 
to mitigate climate change.  
 
 
39 
 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty participants were recruited for interview through an e-mail to a 
University’s Psychology participant database and through an online system for 
managing study participation. All participants who responded were invited to the 
interview until the recruitment limit of twenty participants was reached. Eighteen 
participants were undergraduate students studying a diverse range of subjects. Two 
participants were local residents who were on the Psychology database. Fourteen 
females and 6 males participated. Their age ranged from 18 to 37 years (M = 22.45, SD 
= 5.16). In return for their time and effort participants were paid £5.00.  
Data generation 
Two researchers conducted separate interviews (the author conducted 13; a 
research assistant conducted 7). A semi-structured interview plan with approximately 
seven open-ended exploratory questions was employed flexibly with additions, 
omissions or adaptations according to the responses obtained. The interview began with 
the question “What do you think should be done in order to reduce the degree of climate 
change, if anything?” Sometimes this question led to discussions regarding beliefs about 
climate change, such as whether or not it is occurring, anthropogenic and problematic, 
or otherwise to discussions about possible personal and political interventions. 
Additional questions concerned participants’ views of their own role in reducing the 
degree of climate change, as well as that of other individuals, such as friends and family 
and that of government and corporations4. Finally, so that people would not feel 
constrained in their answers by the way things are now or by being ‘realistic’, 
participants were also asked what they would do to reduce climate change if they had all 
the decision making power. The interviewers engaged in a two-way dialogue with 
participants to follow up on comments and encourage clarification. Interviews lasted 
                                                 
4 Although it is difficult to separate different levels of action on climate change 
mitigation (e.g., personal/individual, governmental and corporate), I used these concepts 
as starting points for a discussion. I acknowledge that they can neither theoretically nor 
practically be separated, but as a reference point for my interviews and the analysis it 
was easier to discuss them separately.  
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between 10 and 30 minutes. All interviews were voice recorded with two Dictaphones. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim (all words and some fillers [err, um] but no non-
verbal communication was included).  
Procedure 
Interviews were run individually in a group study room in the University library. 
Upon arrival participants were welcomed, handed the information and consent forms 
and, if they agreed to continue, the recording of the interview began. Participants were 
informed that the interview would be similar to having a conversation although there 
were set questions. They were also told that there were no right or wrong answers as the 
researcher was interested in their opinions and it was also emphasised that participants 
could say if they did not have any opinions or ideas about a subject. At the end 
participants were thanked, paid and debriefed.  
Analytic Approach 
Thematic analysis - a method to examine, analyse and report patterns in data - 
was used to examine themes from the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I chose this 
method because it is flexible, comparatively simple and accessible for a first qualitative 
analysis, and compatible with different epistemological approaches (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). In thematic analysis the researcher is emphasised as playing an active role, for 
example themes do not emerge from the data set but are selected, interpreted and 
presented based on active decisions made by the researcher (Taylor & Ussher, 2001). I 
used a constructionist approach to thematic analysis to explore how views, realities and 
meanings result from a range of discourses existing within society (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). The study does not intend to make any generalizable claims about climate 
change beliefs, or to test any hypotheses; instead it aims to examine what these 
particular participants say should be done to reduce the degree of climate change and in 
particular what different actors should do.  
Analytic Procedure 
A theme captures something crucial in relation to the research question and 
ideally appears several times across the set of interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is 
the researcher’s judgement to decide on what counts as a theme. After completing 
transcription I printed and read all transcripts. During each reading the transcripts were 
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coded with preliminary summaries, comments and interpretations, noting language use, 
implicit assumptions, contradictions and frequent topics. Passages were extracted and 
collated with similar statements. The research supervisor similarly read and coded the 
transcripts. In subsequent meetings themes were compared and discussed. Relevant 
passages were then extracted from all interviews according to the new list of themes. 
The labels for themes remained flexible during the analysis, as some overlapped and 
interlinked. Particularly compelling extracts were chosen for illustration of a theme in 
the final results.  
Results 
Four themes were extracted from the interviews and are illustrated in bold; 
subthemes within these are indented. Ellipses indicate where passages have been 
omitted. Brackets explain what the participant is referring to or indicate non-speech 
utterances. Hesitations, ‘ums’ and ‘errs’, and repetitions were removed from the final 
write-up. To ensure anonymity participants’ names were changed.  
Representations of climate change: Uncertainty about its reality and severity 
Any discussion about what should be done about climate change inevitably 
touches upon people’s opinions of whether climate change is happening and whether it 
is caused by humans. In some cases participants jumped straight into suggestions for 
addressing climate change, but some delved into questions about the reality and severity 
of anthropogenic climate change. These discussions highlight the importance of the 
understanding of climate change, such as to what extent it constitutes a problem, as well 
as identification of its causes, which in turn are linked to views on how to address it. I 
will outline some of the most common and striking ways in which the cause and 
urgency of climate change was questioned. Although most of these have been identified 
in previous research it is important to note that uncertainty, scepticism and confusion 
about climate change are still prevalent. The subthemes relate to perceptions of climate 
change as cyclical, natural and inevitable, and to climate change as a future problem.   
Climate change as cyclical and natural. One common way in which some 
participants doubted the anthropogenic nature of climate change was by pointing 
towards the fact that climate has always changed and that climate change is natural and 
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cyclical as evidenced by previous ice ages. For example, Bea contrasted past changes 
with present changes and suggested that neither were caused by human activity. 
Bea: If you are talking about climate change as if in, like, the weather changing 
and things like that, I don’t know if there is enough evidence to say that it is 
changing dramatically, ‘cos there has been huge changes in our climate in the 
past which haven’t had anything to do with what we are doing, like the ice ages 
and things like that and they weren’t influenced by human activity, they were 
just natural occurrences. 
Following a similar line of argument Ryan debated the extent to which humans 
have an impact on climate change. Ryan’s line of reasoning combined the idea that 
climate change occurs naturally, with the acceptance that humans have some impact, 
while remaining sceptical of the extent of that impact. The extract illustrates the 
uncertainty some people feel, and how different discourses combine and are internally 
debated and negotiated. 
Ryan: Well the thing is, I don’t really believe, I do actually, but I just don’t 
believe in climate change that much. As in, I know it’s happening, but I’m not a 
100% sure it is human people who are, that is, the human race is responsible for 
the entire climate change … I do believe we should obviously, like, help the 
climate change. I mean, we are all one of the causes of climate change, carbon 
emissions, you know all that kind of thing, fuel footprint … Yeah so I think 
obviously it would be better for the environment. Carbon emissions are never 
good for the environment … It’s hard because I do believe in climate change, I 
do believe we are a cause of it but I’m also not sure how, how bad of a cause we 
are. So not, not clear … But if it (emissions) doesn’t have that much of a 
negative effect and if climate change damage is just going to repair itself as the 
earth does by itself most of the time, then maybe not (reducing emissions would 
not reduce the degree of climate change). 
Notably Ryan turned from a debate on causes of climate change to one on the extent of 
human contribution. The final point Ryan made related to the notion of cycles of 
damage and repair and that the earth could repair itself, as it has done in the past. While 
the first and more prominent point in scepticism is the idea of natural climate variability 
and cycles, this notion was sometimes accompanied by a more general and abstract idea 
about cyclical patterns of damage and repair. It is a conceptualisation that presents 
climate change as inevitable and suggests that it is meant to be. Climate change and 
destruction become part of a higher natural order.  
Jasmine: Climate change is sort of inevitable but I think we can slow down the 
effects of it … obviously I am not a scientist … but from what I can gather … 
the earth kind of has this sort of cyclical thing, you know, where you have an ice 
age or whatever and then it kind of like evolves and all of that … and it kind of 
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like goes around in cycles like that … people destroy themselves and then they 
build themselves up again … I’m not sure if that’s right but … It’s tricky 
because I don’t know if, you know, climate change has to happen, if the world 
has to kind of stop and then start again, I don’t know if that is kind of how, you 
know, it is meant to work, or if we can just carry on doing what we are doing, 
but obviously if we carry on doing what we are doing then it’s going to stop a lot 
sooner, if that makes sense (chuckles). 
Climate change as a future problem. Rather than questioning whether or not 
climate change is occurring or caused by humans, some participants did not experience 
it as urgent, because they saw it as a future problem. This stance indicates that even 
where there was an awareness of the potential damage caused by climate change, the 
understanding did not necessarily translate into high levels of concern or urgency, 
because the damage was seen as ‘only’ affecting people in the future. Alexander’s and 
Martin’s statements are noteworthy because, although agreeing on a need for action, by 
referring to climate change as a future threat, they simultaneously downgrade the 
urgency to act.     
Alexander: I am not sort of overly “oh climate change is a massive deal” kind of 
thing but probably better to do something about it now before it gets too late … I 
don’t think like it is a huge problem now but it will be in hundreds of years’ 
time, so it is better to get on top of it early. 
Martin: Well it depends on where you look, like, for us it is not really a problem, 
because obviously we are going to be dead before the, like, the earth actually 
feels the real ramifications of what we are actually doing, but I mean in like one 
hundred or two hundred years there will be so many, like London will be under 
water. 
In summary, the above examples illustrate some scepticism about the 
anthropogenic causes and current urgency of climate change. Although the responses 
presented are not new in the research literature, they are noteworthy because they 
highlight that the debate about the anthropogenic nature and level of urgency of climate 
change is still present. Further, it is relevant to outline some of the ongoing scepticism 
and uncertainty to demonstrate the context in which approaches to addressing climate 
change are sought.  
Responsibility and action on different levels  
In this section I present the actual suggestions for climate change mitigation that 
participants put forward for actors on different levels. The first three subthemes relate to 
actions which participants identified for each level (individual, governmental and 
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corporate). These subthemes are a direct result of the interview questions. The other 
subthemes relate to the relationship between different levels and the imperative of 
personal choice and the need for more information.  
Individual level. The interviews started with the very broad question of, “What 
do you think should be done in order to reduce the degree of climate change, if 
anything?”. Particularly noticeable was that one of the most common approaches 
mentioned in response was at the individual level, such as suggesting more recycling. 
Bea: There is a lot of things that could be done, making the planet more 
sustainable, like eventually we will run out of resources, so we need to recycle 
or reuse a lot more. 
Other popular suggestions related to changes in transport behaviour such as driving less, 
car sharing, cycling and using more public transport.  
Alexander: Probably encourage people to drive their cars less, would be my 
main point, I’d say. Cycle more, and it’s healthy lifestyle as well isn’t it, as well 
as reducing climate change. 
Even participants who were not convinced of climate change happening were 
supportive of these actions because they saw them as good for saving resources, 
reducing pollution more generally and improving health. Other suggestions for 
individual behaviour change involved the reduced usage of electricity (for example by 
turning off appliances) or switching to renewable energy providers, changing food 
habits, and sometimes flying less.    
Laurence: I mean on a personal level things like turning off lights, and you 
know, only boiling enough water that you are actually going to use, recycling, 
things like that, trying to maybe grow your own food and sort of cut down on air 
miles and stuff … not driving so much where you can walk, my parents and my 
sister are really into driving anywhere and everywhere, they drive to the gym, 
what’s the bloody point in that? You know what I mean, it is ridiculous. 
 Underlying suggestions for individual behaviour change was the sense that 
‘little’ changes add up to make a bigger difference and are therefore worthwhile. 
Danielle: Well, I suppose small things, like, I don’t know, recycling, and maybe 
cycling instead of using a car, things like that. Which all kind of adds up, to 
reduce your carbon footprint and stuff like that. 
Similarly Izzy suggested that there would only be some sort of impact from individual 
actions if several people started to engage. Notably, she also mentioned the different 
level of responsibility of individuals across countries, taking into account per capita 
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emissions. Izzy’s remark on differentiated responsibility was not commonly mentioned 
and illustrates an approach that not many participants seemed to be aware of.  
Izzy: I think when it comes to individual actions, if I just do it on my own then 
obviously that’s not enough, but then if people get educated and they start to 
change, and each one changes a little bit, it certainly will have an, some sort of 
impact, especially the ones like us who live in the West, because when it comes 
to the carbon footprint we kind of have, like even, I think even if China produce 
like more of CO2 in a massive country, but then if you divide it per capita then it 
is still much lower than the CO2 per capita of us in the West, so definitely if we 
try to, if everyone just put a little bit of effort into reducing energy consumption 
then it will make a difference. 
Governmental level. The UK government was largely viewed as having some 
responsibility to address climate change, as people in authority were seen to hold more 
power to act than individuals. 
Martin: I think it’s the role of government to make the big changes, not just the 
personal changes, they’re the ones that should be enacting stricter regulations on 
things, and they do do that to an extent, but obviously it is not working enough. 
Participants also tended to view the government’s role as that of enabling individual 
behaviour change, such as creating adequate infrastructure. 
Jasmine: I am not really sure, maybe kind of encouraging people to kind of take 
public transport more, maybe improving the public transport networks and 
things like that, to kind of encourage people to do it more. 
Laurence: They (government) should make it easier, somehow, I don’t quite 
know how, they should make it easier for people, they should encourage people 
to change their habits. 
The government was also seen as responsible for raising awareness through providing 
more information, campaigns and education, so that people act more pro-
environmentally (see the later section on the need for more information and education). 
Bea: They (the government) should be giving a lot more information about it 
(climate change) to people. And making it easier for people to do their bit, like 
recycling and stuff, just like telling people what they need to know, it’s like 
recycling in our area, I find it really hard to know what can be recycled, what 
can’t be, ‘cos there is not the information there to let us know.  
Izzy: I think, well, the government could have something implanted in like the 
national curriculum just, you know, on the citizenship part, that they make sure 
they teach something about climate change and that they give, you know, the 
most up to date and accurate information. 
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Several participants were in favour of increased government regulation and taxing of 
corporations. 
Gwendolyn: Maybe to curtail business, I think now I am more in favour of a 
state that if it can have a (role to) supress (stop) businesses, (from) just like 
destroying the complete planet basically. 
Laurence: Well not sure, if passing laws, banning it, you know, taxing energy 
companies to the hilt, I can’t see, you know, hitting them where it really hurts, I 
can’t see any other way around it. I mean you can always make laws banning 
that, but laws can be circumnavigated as well quite easily.  
The government was also viewed as responsible for investing in renewable energy, but 
participants were critical over the influence of companies and profits. 
Laurence: Governments could do a hell of a lot more, they are all, well it is very 
sort of, they are geared towards making trade deals and profits and it is all about 
the economy, to the expense of the environment … I mean, more investment 
needs to be put into renewable energy and stuff but governments seem, you 
know, they are so beholden to oil companies and to energy companies and they 
need to not be. I am not quite sure how that is achievable but, you know, they 
need to make the switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy basically. 
Elena: Well, first of all I think we should exploit the earth resources, like the 
energy from the sun, I don’t exactly know how to say it in English, but the 
energy from the sun and the wind, from the water as well, the ocean, I guess it 
has a lot of potential that we are just avoiding, because it is not, governments 
just don’t want to exploit that kind of resources, because it is not in their biggest 
interest, like oil and all that kind of energies that we are using nowadays. 
 In summary, government was seen as having a responsibility to intervene in 
order to ensure reduction of emissions and waste of natural resources. Participants 
suggested that the government should provide the infrastructure to make pro-
environmental behaviour change more practical for the public, raise awareness through 
increased information and restrict companies in their environmental damage, as well as 
investing in renewable energy to enable a shift away from fossil fuels. However, 
respondents also saw government as colluding with corporations and pursuing mainly 
economic interests.  
Corporate, business and industrial level. Corporations were perceived as 
holding a lot of responsibility, because they emit a lot of pollution and waste, and 
because they have more power.  
Jasmine: Well, I think they (businesses) probably, if we want to have real 
change it probably should start there. Because business leaders and, you know, 
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that kind of thing they have the actual, sort of, it is sad to say, but they have the 
power, and they have the influence to kind of change things. 
The concrete suggestions that participants put forward for corporations to change 
ranged from more abstract normative suggestions, such as being less greedy, to stating 
that they ought to somehow cut emissions (but often not mentioning how this would be 
achieved). Many participants proposed that corporations and industry could use more 
renewable energy. 
Tina: Well, (laughs), they (corporations) are the main energy users I guess, 
because of all the factories and stuff, so I guess they need to look at newer ways 
of getting energy that like are more environmentally friendly and they need to 
use it more than us, because they are using more energy than us, I guess. 
Some participants mentioned that corporations should recycle more, which is 
noteworthy because it may be that people are transferring ideas from what can be done 
on the individual level to the corporate level, instead of suggesting a more fundamental 
change to how corporations and industries function and produce.  
Charlotte: I used to be an intern in one of the companies in Pakistan and we had 
just started recycling, it was just something that we had to do. I mean we had to 
actually propose it to them, I know I am emphasising a lot on that (recycling), 
but it is such a basic thing that if you do it, (it) helps a lot, we have no idea how 
much it helps. So, I think corporations need to, as a take down from, you know, 
the authorities carry on with recycling and help their people recycle as much as 
they can. 
Corporations and business leaders were sometimes not viewed very favourably. 
Gwendolyn: I don’t know, it is kind of ridiculous, because a lot of businesses are 
doing this like green-washing thing. So business can say look we are doing 
loads, but actually it is a façade of doing, so I don’t really know where to begin. 
Henry: I don’t expect anything from big businesses. They are just going to do 
what they want to do unless somebody stops them. That is the thing with big 
companies, ‘cos they don’t have a soul, they don’t have, there is no even like 
human beings, it is just statistics, just numbers. That is the company. You know, 
we think that the company, the owner of the company is someone, is a monster, 
but it is not, it is just numbers. 
Although there was widespread scepticism towards corporate practices this did not lead 
most of those voicing the criticism to suggest protests against these corporations or any 
more radical changes. For example, although people thought that corporations should 
change and produce less emissions, pollution and waste, the proposed changes (such as 
self-regulation) were moderate relative to the damage caused. One participant suggested 
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that corporations should donate more money to protect rainforests (rather than 
suggesting that some industrial and corporate activity is responsible for deforestation in 
the first place).  
Alexander: Well, some corporations help donate money to sort of try and keep 
the rainforests from being chopped down, which is a big thing, companies could 
do more things like that and then industry could just obviously keep, you know, 
don’t produce too much pollution and try and regulate how much you produce, 
you know, so that it is not over-polluting the world.  
Additionally, corporations were also seen to need to lead and inspire, to research and 
innovate, and to produce efficient technologies to enable the public to be more 
environmentally friendly. 
Bea: They could be coming up with new ideas as to how we can combat climate 
change and making it easier for people, they keep making for example solar 
panels, they can make them more efficient to produce more energy for people, 
and people would be better persuaded to buy them if they were more efficient. 
So things like that.  
In summary, although some participants were fairly critical of corporations and 
their practices and identified them as responsible and powerful, they sometimes seemed 
to be at a loss regarding specific measures, and more fundamental changes were not 
often mentioned. 
Relationship between levels. In discussing different levels of responsibility and 
possibilities for action participants raised many points that touched on the relationship 
and interaction between levels (partly mentioned already). These points relate in part to 
the effectiveness of taking action on each level, as well as to how the specific dynamics 
between the individual, governmental and corporate levels influence inaction on climate 
change. 
Governments and corporations were often described as holding more power and 
resources than individuals to bring about larger changes.  
Danielle: I suppose it is easier for governments to make a bigger change, 
because they have far more power than an individual person, so it would be 
relatively simple to get them to kind of cut down on emissions and, I don’t 
know, other stuff that helps stop climate change.  
However, individuals were also seen to have a responsibility to act, because it is 
normatively the right thing to do. 
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Tina: Do I think I should (recycle more)? Yeah, because we all have a, like, 
responsibility to, like, sustain the world, like, we came into it and it was fine and 
now I think we should, like, we should be people who are looking after it as we 
are sort of here. 
Although individuals were perceived as less effective on their own, there was a sense 
that everyone can do their bit, every little matters, that doing something is better than 
nothing and that it requires a joint effort since, if more people take little steps, they 
achieve more. Individuals were also perceived as key players in influencing 
governments and corporations through their votes and consumer choice.  
Izzy: I think, well, obviously with the financial crisis they (government) have 
budget restraints and they may prioritise something over that, something that 
may appeal to voters more, like maybe they would try and address issues like 
benefits or unemployment, or well, depends, ‘cos it depends who’s in 
government and what the voters want and what-not, and what will upset the 
voters and what will keep them happy. If energy - if climate change is not a huge 
issue in the mind of the voters, they wouldn’t really care if the government does 
anything or not. 
Jasmine: I don’t know, just things like, you know, not using planes and buses so 
much, and just cycling, and things like that. It might kind of, if lots of people, 
lots of the population are changing the way they act, then it might get the, kind 
of, business leaders to think “oh, ok, well people are actually serious about this, 
maybe we should get on board too”. So maybe, kind of like mass mobilisation or 
something like that, I am not really sure how that would be achieved.  
People were sometimes seen as having influence on government and businesses through 
protests and boycotts. 
Henry: Yeah, so that they (government) legislate some laws against 
manufacturing things that will cause damage to the environment, so through 
targeting the government through some kind of protest action. 
Respondents also discussed structural factors that make fundamental change harder and 
less likely, such as those in power having no real interest in reducing fossil fuel use. For 
example, when asked whether he thought climate change needs addressing now one 
participant replied: 
Martin: Yeah, definitely, but it’s just, the people who have the power to stop it 
are the people who have the least a benefit from changing and the most benefit 
from keeping it the same.  
Elena: I think they (corporations) have, as the government, a huge role but they 
are just not interested by it, because it is not in their interest to spend. Of course 
BP wouldn’t like to fund renewable energies, if that would mean they would 
have less money for their oil. 
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Another structural issue that was mentioned related to the interconnectedness between 
corporations and governments and their priorities being profit and growth.  
Martin: I think like, I, there is so many things, I think the whole lobbying thing, 
I think the whole, how politics is influenced so heavily by corporations, I think 
that’s something that needs to like be removed, because obviously it’s having 
such a negative effect. 
Some participants described a vicious circle whereby if government did not provide the 
necessary education for people to be better informed, then voters would not prioritise 
climate change in their voting behaviour and governments would not address climate 
change because they focused on what would win votes. One participant indicated that 
mass mobilisation depended on people who had influence over the media, such as the 
government:  
Sarah: Whose responsibility or where do you see the mass mobilisation starting 
then? 
Jasmine: Government (chuckles), back to government again, or sort of, you 
know, people who have the ability to reach lots of people at once, TV stations, 
or radio, that kind of thing … probably kind of the people who can reach the 
masses, which sadly is probably going back to the business leaders and the 
government and things like that, it is like a vicious circle. It is really sad 
(laughs).  
The links between different levels of actors in effectiveness and interests create a 
complex net of relationships where change appeared difficult.  
The imperative of choice. One important theme that mainly related to people’s 
ideas about individual behaviour change was the imperative of choice. Several 
participants emphasised that any changes made would have to occur on a voluntary 
basis. Linked to this theme is the importance which some participants placed on the role 
for better information, whereby they assumed that better information would lead people 
to make better decisions.   
Bea: Everyone can do their own bit, you can’t really force people to take part, it 
has to be people’s own decision, whether they want to help. If people know the 
facts then people can make the decisions for themselves, what they want to do 
… I think people need to be more informed, if people know what all the 
information is, they can make better decisions, about what they want to do, 
about whether they want to help, ‘cos it would take everybody to do their bit to 
make a big difference.  
The connotation of vocabulary such as ‘help’ and ‘choice’ is one of ‘doing good’, as 
opposed to an action which should be a matter of course. On the one hand, the idea that 
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everyone can do their own bit and people can make their own decision entails an 
underlying individualism, whereby every individual should have the choice to change or 
not. On the other hand, the suggestion that everyone ought to decide individually is 
simultaneously problematized by Bea’s suggestion that it would require a collective and 
combined effort to make a big difference. Following a similar line of argument, it was 
suggested that people were less likely to get involved if they felt forced to do 
something.  
Charlotte: Like a business, if you are running a business don’t bring out a 
measure or a rule or something that has been imposed, don’t make the people 
feel like it is being imposed on them, if you are going to tell people “oh no, you 
have to recycle, or you have to do something and, you know, you have to drive 
cars like this or that”, people are not going to do it, tell them that they have a 
choice of doing it and what are the pros and cons for it … Simple things have to 
be put in place. Don’t impose them … you will see that you can make it a habit.  
The above statements suggest that simple and gradual changes are required, where 
everyone can make their contribution. Further, it is emphasised that people should not 
be forced and that rather it has to remain their own personal decision.  
Need for more information and education. As already apparent in the extracts 
related to the imperative of choice and government responsibility, a very common 
suggestion was the need for increased awareness through the provision of more 
information and education. The assumption is that if people are more aware and know 
more they will make better choices and change their behaviour.  
Tina: I think people need to be more aware of the problem and aware of how to 
help towards the problem, so like obviously people know about like reducing the 
amount of water they use and electricity, but I think more people need to be 
aware of it. 
Oliver: I think the most important thing at the moment is to stop, we should 
change people’s opinions, to inform them properly that, it (climate change) is a 
thing that is happening and it is not us that is going to be affected, it is going to 
be our children. And that it is a real problem and it will become the end of 
humanity and we should stop it as soon as possible. We should do everything 
that we could. 
Corporations were also suggested to play a role (although far less so than government), 
for example by better labelling of products and thereby enabling more informed 
individual consumer choices.  
Quinn: Obviously for people’s awareness, the signs (labels) on products, what’s 
the impact on climate change, this could change … Yes it is difficult to change 
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behaviour … but consciousness is obviously one part … For example, yes I 
think we need symbols maybe on products that are many, over the day (over the 
course of the day), every time you (are made) aware of the impact of your 
action. 
It was also argued that better information and education would gradually lead to a 
change in routines and thereby lead to a more fundamental and long-term change. 
Tina: I guess, like if you teach younger kids as they grow up, they will teach 
their kids to do the same, ‘cos I know my little brothers they have been taught 
about recycling and stuff in primary school and they are more aware than me of 
how to be more energy efficient, so I guess yeah, if you teach the younger 
generation how to incorporate into their routine then as they grow up the future 
generation will, I guess. 
Although so much importance was given to more information and education, some also 
mentioned that the topic of climate change and related pro-environmental behaviour has 
become worn-out, tedious and boring. Therefore a new angle to reengage people was 
seen as required. 
Kate: Maybe start educating people more? Although this is hard because at 
school we’ve all, it is just so repetitive, schools always hear the same thing, like, 
recycle otherwise you will pollute the planet, but maybe look at it from a new 
angle, but education to start with and then maybe some sort of reward system, I 
don’t know … it is hard, well education once again but, even I get bored of it, 
like, when I am told to do this, do that. 
In addition to government and better labelling of products by corporations, the media 
was also said to play an important role in increasing people’s awareness about climate 
change through further information. The media was sometimes criticised for its lack of 
urgency on climate change and for diverting people’s attention to other topics, such as 
terrorism and increasing support for the military.  
Sarah: Why do you think government isn’t investing more money in renewable 
energy and instead in things like military? (Picking up on something Elena said.) 
Elena: Why they are spending more money in military? Oh because it is what 
people see in the news, we don’t see how the South Pole is melting and how we 
don’t have glaciers anymore, but we see how many people have been killed in 
Afghanistan or this terrorist attack, so it is just a matter of advertising as well, 
and the news as well, they play a huge role in this. And of course with all this 
crisis and terrorism and the people scared of a war, the next war, big war, 
nuclear war, they don’t really care in the things they don’t see. So of course they 
will spend money into buying poppies for the military thing … they prefer to 
attract our attention to the matters that they want to tackle, like military. 
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The extent to which the imperative of choice to engage in ‘pro-environmental behaviour 
change’ was highlighted, relates back to the fact that individual behaviour change was at 
the forefront of people’s minds when asked about mitigating climate change. 
Information and education was seen as crucial to influence and enable people to make 
informed choices and thereby bring about said behaviour changes. Participants pointed 
towards government and the media as responsible for improving the access to, and 
provision of, information on climate change, i.e. as enablers of behaviour change.  
Opposing environmental and economic interests 
Another crucial theme in relation to addressing climate change was a tension 
noted between the role of the economy (such as economic growth and companies’ profit 
motives) and climate change mitigation. Although the extracts presented below do not 
constitute outright critiques of capitalism, they are in some cases reflective of people’s 
awareness and criticism of practices which characterise capitalist structures. In contrast, 
other extracts reflect the extent to which economic practices are taken for granted, how 
engrained certain economic discourses are and how economic and environmental 
interests have been constructed as mutually exclusive. The subthemes relate to 
economic costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation, prioritising the economy 
over climate change, the profit motive and supposed win-win solutions.  
Economic effects of climate change mitigation and adaptation. There was a 
discourse in which the economy and climate change mitigation were seen as conflicting 
because of perceived economic drawbacks to mitigation. For example, one participant 
noted a tension between continued economic growth and addressing climate change. 
She criticised high emission countries for sacrificing the well-being of future 
generations and poorer countries in return for short-term economic gain. She also 
acknowledged that some countries were already being affected, despite those countries 
not having high emissions and lacking the power to influence other countries. Her 
statement highlights an awareness of climate injustice, which was not often mentioned. 
Danielle: Say for example if the USA was going to try and do something about 
climate change it would have to cut down its production and emissions and 
everything and that would just be bad for the economy and I suppose because it 
wouldn’t see the benefits straight away, it’s just kind of thinking, “ah never 
mind, that’s for future generations to deal with, let’s just keep ploughing on with 
what we are doing now”. But then poorer countries are feeling the effects of 
climate change, but they can’t do much about it, because they are not putting 
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emissions out as much as bigger countries, bigger powers anyway (laughs). It’s 
a problem. 
While Danielle mentioned that climate change mitigation would be costly to the 
economy, Izzy highlighted the economic impact of the consequences of climate change, 
such as extreme weather events. She also described how climate change would affect 
countries differently. It is noteworthy that in relation to floods in the UK, Izzy 
mentioned the toll on the economy rather than how people were affected in other ways. 
The extract below is part of her response to the question about whether she thought 
enough was happening globally to actually address climate change. 
Izzy: I mean they could do more collaboration really, because like it affects 
people differently, it can make one country’s climate hotter, to the extent that it 
changes what you can grow, like your crops and that can affect your economy 
and in the other country it can cause, like, push natural disasters like storm and 
like unsettled weather, like floods, floods that we had in England that just broke 
out two weeks, one week ago, that was pretty bad and I am pretty sure the 
economy took quite a big toll in that. 
Prioritising the economy over climate change. It was sometimes suggested 
that climate change was not a priority because people had more pressing issues in their 
lives, such as the economy, getting a job and earning money. For the same reasons 
climate change was not seen as a core issue in deciding who to vote for.  
Kate: I think people would, that is not their priority considering how many 
problems there are nowadays, like the economy and stuff, they wouldn’t be like 
“oh yeah, I will vote for him, ‘cos he wants the environment to be protected” 
(laughs), I don’t think it would work … It is more people’s attitudes like, 
because they are so preoccupied by, I guess, more important things in their 
lifetime, they don’t really care about what is going to happen in two hundred 
years, because they don’t recycle or whatever. And it is fair enough, like if 
someone is in need of money they are not going to think “ooh, let’s recycle that 
would be better than getting a job”, like I don’t know. Too much on people’s 
minds. 
This extract illustrates two underlying assumptions. One assumption is the previously           
mentioned notion that climate change is a future problem. The other assumption is that 
economic and environmental interests are opposing and mutually exclusive. The 
statement indicates that the perceived opposition between the economy and the 
environment exists both on a personal level (recycle or work) and in relation to a more 
structural level (vote for the environment or the economy).  
The profit motive. The following extracts illustrate how some participants 
discussed the conflict between profit motives and environmental sustainability. This is 
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an extension of the above theme concerning the prioritisation of the economy over the 
environment. Several participants mentioned that corporations cared about profits and 
not about the environment and climate change. For example, Jasmine thought that 
business practices would have to change for there to be any real improvement, but 
mentioned that it would not be profitable.  
Jasmine: But it is tricky because you have got, you know, business interests and 
quite often they clash with you know environmental interests. It is quite rare I 
find to, kind of, find someone who is making money but also wants to save the 
planet as well … If we want to have real change it probably should start there 
(with businesses) … It is probably not that profitable, it is not necessarily in 
their interest, because they probably don’t get that much from it apart from, you 
know, saving the planet. Yeah, it is probably not on the list of priorities, the top 
of the list of their priorities. 
Jasmine’s comment that businesses would not gain much “apart from saving the planet” 
highlights how engrained the idea of profit is, to the point that it appears normal for 
businesses to seek profit even if the planet is destroyed in the process. Although 
corporations’ profit motive was sometimes viewed critically, change was seen as 
improbable. Danielle, for example, commented that corporations were all about profit 
and therefore less likely to care about climate change. In connection to this she 
suggested that it would be better if they could work differently, but she thought it might 
not be possible. 
Danielle: I suppose corporations again are all about the profit and just like the 
wheels of industry and chucking out all their products, so they are not going to 
be bothered about climate change at all. But I suppose in a perfect world it 
would be good if they could change the way they work to, I don’t know, use 
sustainable energy, things like that, maybe wind power or tidal power, but I 
don’t know how much that is possible. 
Her comments contrast the status quo of what is (corporations focus on profits) with 
what should be (in a perfect world corporations would change). Similarly, Phoebe 
suggested that corporations needed to change their priorities slightly (although the use 
of the word’ slightly’ implied that only a moderate change was required). It is also 
noteworthy that Phoebe stated that corporations “obviously” focused on profit, 
suggesting that it was common knowledge.  
Phoebe: I think obviously they (corporations) tend to focus heavily on things 
like profit and that’s their priority as opposed to what are we doing to the 
environment. So I think they need to, like, change their priorities slightly. 
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Ryan commented that it was “logical” for corporations not to sacrifice money in order 
to become greener, which illustrates the dominant reasoning pursued in the current 
economic system. 
Ryan: They (corporations) should definitely be investing in ways to make 
themselves greener. The only thing is, corporations would then lose a lot of 
money so I understand why they don’t, it’s logical. But they should be. 
His statement again highlights the contrast between what is seen as logical (making 
money) and what is normatively or morally considered the right thing to do (being 
green). This is also apparent in how Gwendolyn and Alexander noted a tension between 
how things could be ideally or theoretically, versus what was reasonable or realistic. For 
example, Gwendolyn listed some changes that corporations ought to undertake, such as 
generally reducing emissions, using less chemicals, recycling everything and when I 
asked her if that was “something we can expect corporations to do?” she responded in 
the negative.  
Gwendolyn: No, of course not. Yeah, so there is different levels, there’s, like, 
what ideologically, like, should they do and there is what can they reasonably 
do.  
Alexander: Yeah, I mean but it (significantly reducing emissions) would take a 
big effort, I mean realistically, I don’t think it could happen so that it would 
reduce it (climate change) a lot, but theoretically I think it could, if you get what 
I mean.  
In contrast to Ryan’s view of what he called “logical” (i.e. that corporations do not 
invest in becoming greener because they would lose money), there were some 
participants who did not see the priority given to money as logical. Their views 
demonstrate a contrasting discourse around profit and the environment. For example, 
Oliver gave the following response when asked about what governments around the 
world should do to reduce the degree of climate change. 
Oliver: I think they should all stop being a bit … maybe be a bit less ignorant 
and greedy and stop focusing things into short-term gains, like I think it is 
ridiculous to think that getting money from eco, like, it doesn’t seem logical to, 
like, trade in part of an eco-system for money, it just doesn’t seem like a long-
term, a long-term gain. Like, you’ll get money very, like, perhaps just find more 
sustainable ways I think to do it. It just doesn’t seem logical to me to chop down 
trees for money to then have no eco-system for something else. 
While most of the above extracts illustrate some extent of desire for change towards less 
environmental damage and, in some cases, towards a less profit-oriented world, many 
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participants viewed change as unlikely and their suggestions for change sometimes 
seemed constrained by the way things are, as change seemed unrealistic.  
Win-win solutions. A commonly proposed approach to solve the perceived 
conflict between the profit motive and climate change mitigation was a ‘win-win’ 
scenario in which profits could continue to be made in a sustainable way. The 
prevalence of these suggestions indicates the extent to which the need for profit is taken 
for granted and remains predominantly unquestioned. For example, Danielle, Laurence 
and Sophia suggested win-win scenarios in which corporations needed to be 
incentivised to reduce emissions and become more ‘sustainable’, while able to make a 
profit.  
Danielle: How many people can have access to these green powers, I am not 
really sure. So maybe more focus on that would be good, more technology in 
that area and then it could be, like, then maybe it wouldn’t make a difference to 
the big corporations. They could easily, cheaply, use that energy which is good 
for them for their profits, and also for the environment, so everyone wins, that 
would be good. 
Laurence: Again, like government, they (corporations) should lead and inspire, 
but their bottom line is the profit, so I mean at the end of the day, they have a 
legal duty to make a profit for their shareholders and they will do that the 
cheapest way possible, which is unfortunately usually the most environmentally 
unfriendly way possible, so, I mean, they need incentives as well … so that they 
can make a profit but still convert to more, greener, way of life. 
Sophia: I think they (corporations) should think about the waste management 
and their energy efficiency … because it is very difficult, they have to have 
some incentive to do that … They are like seeking profits so they should have 
incentives … otherwise it is very difficult to say that they have to be, have to do 
something. 
Rather than looking critically at the profit motive, the win-win approach seeks a 
solution that claims to address environmental issues while maintaining the economic 
status quo. The above statements appear to take profit-oriented corporations for granted. 
The win-win suggestions represent an attempt to reconcile the conflict between 
economic and environmental interests (mentioned above) without fundamentally 
questioning the economic system. 
Representations of individual and social change   
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This final theme encompasses two subthemes, the first of which touches on 
criticisms of the status quo and views on protest, while the second one relates to reasons 
for inertia.  
Views on structural change and protest. Some participants noted a conflict 
between economic interests and environmental protection but only very few concluded 
that the economic system needed to change. In contrast to the accepting stance of a win-
win scenario above, Martin argued that an alternative economic system would be 
required, demonstrating a more uncommon and marginal way of thinking. 
Martin: I think that our impact can only be reduced if there is, like, a global 
change in what kind of system we use for economics, ‘cos at the moment we are 
using a growth-based economy which is based on inflation. The more, more 
stuff we do, the more we are just trying to grow and grow and grow. And ‘cos 
there’s only a finite amount of resources on this earth … we’ll run out at one 
point … So basically, what we have to do is change from this kind of growth-
based economy to a more flat rate economy, so we are not trying to increase 
production all the time, we are trying to level it out, and in some areas reduce it. 
Martin later commented that he did not see change happening through ‘revolution’ and 
it remained unclear how the proposed economic shift would come about.  
Although less common, some participants pointed towards protest as a means 
towards more structural change. Elena commented that she was supportive of protests 
and people acting collectively to put pressure on and “push” the government and the 
media (although not as far as a revolution), but she added that she herself did not engage 
in protest. 
Elena: I think we don’t realise our real potential until we, until we speak up, I 
am not talking about the French revolution but we should do something else, 
yeah, definitely … In the sense of pushing a bit more, the government, in that 
kind of issues. But I guess this is really hypocritical because I am not doing 
anything anyway, but people as a whole, as a group, to push these organisations, 
that they have a bigger role and then push the government and the news and 
channels, internet. 
Gwendolyn mentioned revolution but saw it as highly unlikely or as potentially 
right-wing oriented and suggested that a change in people’s consciousness was required, 
but she was unsure about how that change could happen.  
Gwendolyn: Just to repeat that it is not something that I necessarily believe 
could actually happen, it would be awesome if it did but, like, I don’t know, 
when people talk about revolutions, but to me, like, political revolution, a) in this 
country I think a political revolution now would be a disaster because it would 
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be to the right … and there is no, like, systems in place, like, for people to eat 
the day after a political revolution happened, so, yeah, I’m kind of into this idea 
of a conscious - consciousness revolution, where people’s thinking just 
completely changes over night. How that is going to happen, I don’t know. 
In contrast, Henry proposed the need for protests that went to the heart of the 
manufacturing process. However, he thought this might be considered violent. He 
continued by questioning whether protests that might commonly be regarded as violent 
actually were violent when contrasted with the violence involved in environmental 
destruction. This clear invocation of environmental destruction as violent was unique 
amongst the participants I interviewed.  
Henry: I think, active protest, I have kind of like, there is a lot (of) people who 
have this kind of like, “yeah let’s protest, let’s do this, let’s do that”, but in the 
end you just, like, see them shouting and going home, carrying on with their 
lives, but, like, really active things … maybe things that would really cause 
some change, or like really, kind of, protest, that would let the company owners 
or the people in the government really think about doing change. That kind of 
protest can sometimes be seen as violent, but not as violent as they are, actually, 
they are violent … Going to, like, disrupt the actual manufacturing of those 
products. 
Drawing on the example of Germany and a longstanding protest movement 
against nuclear power, one participant highlighted that protests could be effective, 
implying that social movements were required.  
Quinn: It (nuclear power in Germany) has been banned now … it’s on the way 
to getting I think within 7 years there’s no more nuclear power stations. And this 
started in the 80s with the Green Party, so obviously this discourse which 
happened in the country (was effective). Now, this rule was by the Conservative 
Party (the ruling to phase out nuclear power occurred under Conservative Party 
leadership) so obviously this discussion from social movement and stuff helped 
to bring social change on a broad and national level. So I guess this social 
movement - discussion, discourse - helps. 
Some participants mentioned that a more radical change was necessary to 
address climate change, i.e. that it could not be done within the current paradigm. These 
participants’ ideas seemed to focus less on individual lifestyle change and more on a 
need for collective action and social movements. Participants’ ideas of protest, social 
movements and revolution discussed above were highly varied, including some doubt as 
to whether processes for larger fundamental change were even possible or realistic. 
Reasons for Inertia. As well as discussing structural barriers to change, 
participants named different reasons for their own inertia and other people’s inaction. 
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Scepticism or helplessness. Some reasons given for inertia were that people do 
not believe climate change is happening or that people do not know what to do. 
Gwendolyn: There is also a lot of disinformation, so I think more and more 
people are climate sceptics than there used to be and I think now that the issue 
has, kind of like, gone through people’s minds and, like, gone out again. Like, 
people see it as either ‘it is fake’ or they can’t do anything about it. Like most 
people think one of those two things. 
Lack of motivation or care. Another reason for inaction on climate change 
concerned the notion that people did not care enough, partly because they were not yet 
affected and because climate change was not seen as a huge problem. With regard to 
herself, Izzy mentioned that she was not that engaged with climate change, so there 
were some changes she was willing to make in her own life, but not to the extent of 
reaching out to other people.  
Izzy: Just, like, instead of taking the bus just cycle, just switching the lights off 
and insulating your house. But then if you are not an active person, if you don’t 
really care about the whole climate change issue - not because you are oblivious 
to it, but you just don’t think it is like a huge problem and you think that like it 
won’t affect you during your lifetime - then those people could just - because 
making the changes in your life is, has to be, an active choice, so you actually 
have to care about the issue quite a lot to actually carry out those actions, even 
though they are very little actions … I think, well, (what) I (would be) happy to 
do … is like change a bit of my lifestyle. But as to reaching other people and 
telling them to change, I think I am not passionate to that extent yet. 
Tina mentioned not being that motivated to change a routine.  
Tina: I guess I am not really motivated (laughs). Yeah, I am not really motivated 
to doing it. It is not, like, it’s just not in my daily routine, like, sometimes I will 
be, like, “oh that belongs in the recycling” and then I will put it there but 
sometimes I just like put it in the bin without even realising, because like it is 
not normal to me I guess. 
Some respondents noted that people did not care, because they were too comfortable.  
Elena: I just generally think that people just, I am sorry, but they don’t give a 
shit about the future. They just don’t think to what extent we are ruining 
everything and how fast it is going, because they have their laptops, they have 
their little bubble. 
The impression that many people did not care was sometimes related to feelings of 
pessimism that anything would change.  
Martin: Well, I do have quite a negative outlook on, like, the end results of all of 
this. But, I don’t know, I just don’t see it happening and I don’t see even within, 
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even within my course there’s people who don’t - there is not enough - people 
don’t really care enough, even within Ecology. 
Other priorities. There was also the notion that people are too busy and have too 
many other things to worry about, such as more immediate economic concerns.  
Martin: I mean, a lot of people have this idea that there can be this like big, sort 
of, revolution. But it’s not really going to happen, because people have too 
much, like, things to worry about already, without really starting some new kind 
of wave of something.  
Change as unrealistic. There was also a sense that change does not seem 
realistic or feasible, so that alternatives to the status quo seem impossible and unlikely. 
This was sometimes tied to the notion that some degree of climate change is inevitable. 
Talking of getting people to fly less, one participant commented the following:  
Jasmine: Ideally, I would just cut out everything and just, you know, get people 
to sail boats to places and stuff. But obviously that is not feasible, necessarily, 
but you know, ultimately, climate change is sort of inevitable but I think we can 
slow down the effects of it.  
Kate argued that it is unrealistic to think that as a society we could “go back” to 
the way things were (before the industrial revolution). Going back was the main 
alternative to the way things are now, that she mentioned. Thus, she (maybe 
inadvertently) seemed to accept the way things are (“it is just the way it is now”) rather 
than considering a third option for change.  
Kate: I think in order for something to actually change probably everyone would 
have to put their mind to it, so we are being a bit unrealistic in thinking we can 
change something. But I do think people should catch the train or bus more and, 
like common transport … Maybe we will be able to avoid catastrophes, but I 
don’t think we will be able to go back to how it was one hundred years ago, 
because of the whole industrial revolution thing, it is just the way it is now, like, 
we can’t go back.  
Inconvenience and laziness. Another reason for inertia that was mentioned 
concerned the convenience and benefits of what was considered the more 
environmentally damaging action, e.g., holidays being nice and transportation often 
being cheaper by plane. 
Jasmine: Yeah, I mean, ideally I wouldn’t fly anywhere. But, you know, fact is, 
holidays are nice and it is the easiest, cheapest way of getting to places, which I 
think probably is part of the root of the problem. Because flying is so cheap that 
people, you know, are more likely to use that than, sort of, longer methods of 
trains and boats and stuff. 
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In line with the reasoning that ‘pro-environmental’ actions were impractical and 
inconvenient, participants also suggested that people were too lazy to make the extra 
effort.  
Kate: Because some people are lazy so if there is, if, you know, there is a truck 
coming, for example, just have it (the recycling) outside of your door and they 
will come and you just help them load it onto your truck or whatever. Just a new 
way of recycling or whatever. Just something new - more practical - for people. 
‘Cos for me where I live, back at my parents, we can only recycle card and paper 
where we live and we have to actually go to Sainsbury’s, which is, like, five 
minutes away by car to recycle glass and whatever else and that is just annoying. 
So if someone actually drives to yours, like, they will actually ensure that you 
are giving them the right stuff and you are not mixing everything to start with.  
Nora: I think it’s a case of convincing people that it’s a real problem and tipping 
them over the edge of whether they can be bothered and how important it is. 
They need to be convinced that it is more important than being lazy. 
Laurence: I’m lazy, you know, if I am tidying up I just put everything in the bin 
bag and throw it out, if you know what I mean, it is pure laziness … You need 
everyone to do it, it needs to be a joint effort and it doesn’t seem like the 
majority of people are prepared to do anything. I mean, I include myself in that 
‘cos I am too lazy to recycle, so you see what I mean. 
The same participant suggested that laziness and inconvenience were linked to the fact 
that people did not really feel affected by climate change yet, which was another 
commonly mentioned reason for inertia.  
Sarah: Why do you think people aren’t prepared to do anything? 
Laurence: I guess they don’t believe any change will really happen in their 
lifetime, they will never see any change. You know, their life is geared so 
(much) towards convenience these days, anything that makes things a little bit 
more inconvenient, people aren’t really interested in, you know, until there is a 
major catastrophe and people do really feel like it can affect them, they probably 
won’t do anything. 
Lack of personal experience. The idea that it would require a catastrophe such 
as a natural disaster for people to feel affected, wake up and change was mentioned 
regularly. Several participants suggested catastrophes might be necessary as a catalyst 
for change to start action on mitigating climate change.  
Ryan: I mean, if something’s not affecting your life directly, you’re not going to 
change it because climate change isn’t affecting me directly … I mean there’s 
nothing bad happening to me because of climate change. Whereas, if there was 
then I’ll definitely change my lifestyle … But personally, I think you have got to 
show how it affects somebody themselves. Because if it doesn’t affect them, 
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then they’re not going to do anything about it. You have to show how it affects 
them personally. 
Jasmine: Probably more natural disasters to kind of wake people up. Obviously 
no one wants a natural disaster, but if that’s what is going to happen because of 
climate change, then I think that is the only thing that is going to, kind of, open 
people’s eyes to actually the fact that they need to change things in order to 
prevent this kind of thing happening. But until more of that happens, you know, 
you are not really going to see that much of a change, (on) a sort of day-to-day, 
and therefore I don’t think they’ll (businesses), kind of, be that willing to change 
things unless something drastic happens.  
Gwendolyn: Maybe there has to be some kind of social upheaval. Maybe 
because this country has been politically stable for such a long amount of time, 
people are so embedded in the way that things are. The way that they think that 
things need to be, maybe it needs some kind of natural catastrophe or social, 
really big social upheaval for there to be a shift in the way that people see things. 
Participants’ comments suggest that people are so established in the status quo that they 
would only react once they were directly affected by the consequences of climate 
change, i.e. that it required a natural disaster to bring about change. Catastrophe was 
mentioned as necessary based on the assumption that people were more likely to react if 
they personally experienced the effects of climate change in their own lifetime. This ties 
into the aforementioned discussion about the perception of climate change as a distant 
threat in terms of space and time. These comments underline the assumption that many 
people only act if climate change affects them and not out of concern for others, in other 
parts of the world or future generations.  
Discussion 
Four themes were the focus of the above analysis. The first theme - 
representations of climate change - related to participants’ uncertainty about the reality 
and severity of climate change. In the interviews several participants were not 
convinced that climate change was anthropogenic or that it posed an immediate global 
threat. Hobson and Niemeyer (2012) devised a diagram with components of climate 
change scepticism, where the nature of scepticism was classified into three categories: 
reality (is climate change real); causality (is it human induced); and impact (is it a 
problem). Participants who expressed scepticism about climate change in the current 
study mostly seemed sceptical about the cause and impact, as they questioned whether 
climate change was human induced and whether its impact was immediate. Some 
participants suggested that climate change posed a future problem, which taps into 
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Hobson and Niemeyer’s (2012) category of displaced scepticism. Drawing on Cohen’s 
(2001) typology of different forms of denial, Hobson and Niemeyer (2012) described 
interpretive denial in the case of climate change as follows: “Interpretive denial 
encompasses rationales like ‘it may be happening but is caused by natural cycles/is not 
that big of a deal’…” (p. 398). In the present study, participants also drew on previous 
ice ages and past natural changes to support the idea that changes had always occurred 
and were natural. The fact that past climatic changes occurred without human influence 
was taken to imply that current changes were not influenced by humans, which 
indicates a flawed understanding of causality. Furthermore, cyclical patterns like ice age 
retreat and expansion were used to suggest a higher natural order in which cycles of 
destruction and repair were meant to be or inevitable.  
A key question is what influences people’s understanding of climate change and 
also how that understanding affects people’s assessment of the required response. 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg and Howe (2012) found in their 
nationally representative sample of US citizens that political orientation influenced 
people’s level of support for different policies to mitigate climate change. Norgaard 
(2011) highlighted that greater understanding of climate change did not necessarily 
result in increased concern or concrete action. Similarly, in their Australian sample 
Leviston, Price, Malkin and McCrea (2014) found, that how sure people were that 
climate change is happening and how much they thought climate change will harm 
them, did not add a unique contribution to the prediction of pro-environmental 
behaviour (while, for example, personal relevance and feelings of ethical responsibility 
did). In the present study, despite differing beliefs about anthropogenic climate change, 
most participants agreed that some action to reduce emissions was required and often 
suggested similar measures. Those who were not convinced about anthropogenic 
climate change still argued that emissions were generally damaging for the environment 
and health, and should therefore be reduced.  
Stoddart et al.’s (2012) study showed that participants viewed individuals as a 
driving force to pressure government and also suggested lifestyle changes. Similarly, 
lifestyle change was repeatedly mentioned in the present study. Several participants’ 
primary response related to individual behaviour change and this was also the area for 
which participants had the most concrete suggestions for action. Further, it is 
noteworthy that participants focused on suggestions like recycling, but rarely mentioned 
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the need to reduce consumption in the first place. The heavy overall focus on an 
individualised approach is in line with authors who have suggested that pro-
environmental behaviour change campaigns could be problematic, as they fail to 
emphasise large scale systemic approaches and instead place the responsibility for 
change on individuals (e.g., Kent, 2009; Maniates, 2001; Norgaard, 2011, 2017; Shove, 
2010; Webb, 2012). For example, Norgaard (2011) argued that: “Americans are so 
immersed in the ideology of individualism that they lack the imagination or knowledge 
of alternative political means of response” (p. 192). The present interviews suggest that 
a lack of alternative political measures beyond individual actions may also apply in the 
UK. 
Government’s role was also related to individual lifestyle change, as the 
government was seen as an enabler and provider of information. Beyond that, 
suggestions for government action involved changing legislation, regulating 
corporations and investing in renewable energy. However, compared to the numerous 
specific suggestions put forward for individual behaviour change, the suggestions for 
government remained less specific. This tendency indicates that the public may be 
better versed in suggestions for lifestyle changes, which could be a consequence of 
more exposure to these kind of suggestions and a lack of information about other 
approaches. 
Many people in the present study agreed that government should play a crucial 
role in addressing climate change (see also Stoddard et al., 2012), pointing towards 
government’s increased power and impact. However, some participants were sceptical 
that the government would support pro-environmental change, because of its threat to 
economic growth. Also, several participants indicated that, although government ought 
to regulate corporations, this was unlikely because of government’s entwinement with 
corporations and lobbyists (see Kent, 2009). Further, participants were somewhat 
sceptical of corporations’ willingness to reduce emissions, although there was the sense 
that they should. 
The notion of individual behaviour changes was often accompanied by an 
emphasis on having ‘the choice’ to change and to ‘help’. The discourse of choosing to 
‘help’ the environment is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, ‘helping’ implies 
assisting someone else, as if the environment were detached from the participant herself 
and separate from humans’ and other animals’ well-being more generally (see Ingold, 
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2000). This is in line with Webb’s (2012) analysis that: “The demands of everyday life 
dominate over what can be compartmentalized as more distant concerns about an 
objectified external environment, treated as separate from human life and well-being” 
(p. 121). Secondly, in a different context it would not be classified as helping when 
someone reduces or stops a damaging action. For example, if person A was hitting 
person B, we would not tend to refer to A helping B when the hitting stops. The use of 
the term ‘helping the environment’ when someone decides to engage in less 
environmentally damaging behaviour suggests that the taken for granted ‘normal’ state 
of affairs is one of environmental destruction. If environmental pollution were not the 
norm, then reducing pollution would be expected, rather than treated as a good and 
voluntary deed.  
Perhaps the focus on choice and helping is indicative of the ways in which 
‘consumers’ are abstracted from the production process, as described by James and 
Scerri (2012):  
… individualism in the North is anchored in relatively heightened desires for 
unbounded lifestyles and autonomous choice. Persons there avidly choose from 
among what is on offer and consume in ways that are abstracted from the direct 
consequences of the capitalistic production–exchange relations which sustain 
their choices. (p. 226) 
Since the lifestyle of choice in the global North is based upon social and environmental 
exploitation elsewhere, the line of argument that focused on individual choice, even if 
unintentionally, shows little awareness of “climate justice”. Stoddart et al. (2012) 
described a climate justice approach as one that tries to address climate change while 
taking into account social justice:  
The notion of climate justice highlights the significant differences in the social 
groups who are most responsible for creating the problem (predominantly those 
in the global North) and those who will suffer the most severe consequences of 
climate change (predominantly those in the global South). (p. 53)  
People in the global South have not had the same options for choice in lifestyle and 
people affected by climate change will not have a choice either, yet there was little 
mention of this in the interviews. 
Participants’ emphasis on the choice to reduce one’s environmental impact 
might be reflective of a more general prevalence of choice narratives in Western 
societies. Maniates (2001) succinctly analysed how narratives of choice are sustained 
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through the presentation of options in the market place, when ultimately it is an illusion 
of choice, because crucial options such as good public transport are not available:  
The marketplace, for example, presents us with red cars and blue ones, and calls 
this consumer choice, when what sustainability truly demands is a choice 
between automobiles and mass transit systems that enjoy a level of government 
support and subsidy that is presently showered upon the automotive industry. 
(Maniates, 2001, p. 48, referring to work by Roodman, 1996)  
According to Kent (2009) the choice narrative is crucial, as neo-liberalism has produced 
concepts of rational individual responsibility for environmental issues which depend on 
notions of freewill and freedom of choice.  
The choice narrative is also closely tied to the importance that participants gave 
to providing more or better information as a means towards addressing climate change. 
This is in line with Maniates’ (2001) observations of his students. Further, drawing on 
the famous Dr. Seuss children’s story of The Lorax, the author examined how discourse 
around information is implicated in the individualised response:  
This response half-consciously understands environmental degradation as the 
product of individual shortcomings … best countered by action that is staunchly 
individual and typically consumer-based … It embraces the notion that knotty 
issues of consumption, consumerism, power and responsibility can be resolved 
neatly and cleanly through enlightened, uncoordinated consumer choice. 
Education is a critical ingredient in this view—smart consumers will make 
choices, it’s thought, with the larger public good in mind. Accordingly, this 
dominant response emphasizes … the need to speak politely, and individually, 
armed only with facts. (pp. 32-33) 
Although partly constrained by the questions used in the interviews, which will have 
guided participants’ responses, there was a dominant focus on government and 
individual responsibility, whereby government was required to better educate the public 
in order for individuals to make better choices. Further, in line with Stoddart et al. 
(2012), I also noted that the possible role of communities or international bodies was 
not touched upon. This is unlikely to be explained fully as an artefact of the interview 
schedule, since the opening question was broad and general. Additionally, as I asked 
about the role people saw for themselves and their friends and family, the formulation 
of the question did not preclude suggestions of acting collectively or as a community. 
Seemingly, international and collective approaches were at the margins of suggested 
responses.  
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Another theme in the interviews related to a contradiction between 
environmental and economic interests. Some participants described the environment 
and the economy as separate and conflicting entities. Participants identified a clash of 
interests between capitalist motives (corporations’ mandate to make profits and a 
growth oriented economy) and successfully tackling climate change. These 
contradictions have been discussed by authors such as Klein (2014) and Clark and York 
(2005). However, the aforementioned writers saw environmental destruction and social 
and economic injustice as inherently linked to capitalist production. They argued that 
therefore a fundamental shift in politics and economics could ensure both economic and 
social - as well as environmental - well-being. In contrast, the way in which participants 
framed economic and environmental interests resulted in a ‘false’ dichotomy, in which 
they had to choose between the well-being of one (the economy) or the other (the 
environment). One of the ways in which some participants attempted to resolve this 
contradiction between environmental and economic interests was to propose win-win 
scenarios, whereby profit motives and sustainability could be combined. This might 
result from a sustainability discourse appropriated by governments’ and corporations’ 
green-marketing strategies. This approach side-lines the legitimacy of corporations’ 
profit-margins and has found some acceptance in the public. These findings are in line 
with Maniates (2001) suggestion that win-win approaches dominate environmental 
politics. He described that a large array of technologies are presented as an 
environmentally-friendly and economically-smart means to a conflict-free transition 
(such as fuel-efficient cars).   
Some participants criticised the prioritisation of the economy over the 
environment, while others viewed it as understandable and ‘logical’. The latter kind of 
discourse, whereby profit and growth are treated as logical, relates to Harvey’s (2006) 
suggestion that political economic structures have come to be taken for granted:  
Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and has 
pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the 
point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way we 
interpret, live in and understand the world. (p. 145)  
There was little mention of any need for systemic change in economic production (as 
argued by e.g., Klein, 2014; Luke, 2008).  
A few participants did mention that they thought a larger scale change was 
necessary but, like others, they saw it as unlikely. The importance of believing that 
69 
 
 
 
alternatives are possible is highlighted by Maniates’ (2001) suggestion that ideas have 
power and that ideas are continually being separated as either realistic or idealistic: 
“Once labeled, what is taken to be impossible or impractical—“ idealistic,” in other 
words—can no longer serve as a staging ground for struggle” (p. 49). Several reasons 
were mentioned for inertia, such as lack of motivation, having other priorities and 
seeing change as unrealistic.  
One commonly mentioned explanation was the lack of personal experience of 
climate change impacts. In line with participants’ suggestions, personal experience and 
perceptions of local relevance has been noted by many authors as a potential variable in 
environmental views and engagement (Leviston et al., 2014; Macnaghten, 2003; 
Scannell & Gifford, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008).  
One of the limitations of this study is that it draws on a relatively small sample. 
Additionally, participants may have had different definitions and ideas of what certain 
terms (e.g., climate change, government, and corporation) mean, but this is not so 
problematic, as I was interested in their responses based on how participants use and 
understand these terms in everyday life. Future research could investigate how to 
increase awareness and support for climate change mitigation beyond the individual 
level; as well as questioning underlying economic assumptions. The question remains as 
to why people who express criticisms of the status quo, and suggest that ideally the 
world would be different, do not act on this. This too needs to be explored. 
In conclusion, there was overall support for climate change mitigation. Many 
suggestions related to individual behaviour change, but government and corporations 
were also seen as having responsibility. Participants identified complex relationships 
between different levels of intervention whereby, for example, individuals could 
pressure government, but government was also seen as having the obligation to inform 
the public better. Several participants were sceptical that corporations - whose priority it 
is to work profitably - would contribute to reducing emissions. In public debates and 
campaigns it may be important to discuss functioning alternatives to the current 
economic and governing systems, in order to expand approaches to climate change 
mitigation and make alternatives seem possible. Further, debates encompassing the 
economy, and social and environmental well-being need to be more widespread to 
counteract the narrative whereby they are constructed as separate and mutually 
exclusive. In climate change campaigns it is important not to present the environment as 
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something that needs protecting in and of itself, but to emphasise the interdependence of 
humans and the environment. Increased focus on climate justice is also required to 
expand notions of climate change mitigation beyond the expectation that it should be a 
matter of choice. It is vital to challenge existing strategies of climate change mitigation, 
which have often focused on individualised approaches, or the greenwashing of 
sustainable development (Luke, 2008) and have failed to reduce emissions while 
creating the illusion of action. 
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 - Chapter 3 - 
 Does the framing of individual action influence support for structural level change 
to reduce carbon emissions? 
Abstract 
Critiques of the focus on individual behaviour change to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., 
appeals to drive less) have suggested that the framing of this mitigation approach may 
detract attention and support from larger political and structural changes (e.g., 
improving public transportation infrastructure). Using an experimental design, three 
studies examined how support for structural level change might be influenced by 
focusing attention on the benefits of individual behaviour change compared to either the 
(lack of) impact of individual behaviour change (Studies 1 and 2) or to the presentation 
of beneficial structural level change (Study 3). Study 1 (N = 297) showed that 
participants who were required to think about the impact of individual behaviour 
change, compared to those who were presented with a positive individual behaviour 
change frame, were more supportive of prioritising the environment and were in 
marginally higher agreement about structural level actors’ responsibility for reducing 
emissions. Study 2 (N = 153) showed no significant difference between conditions in 
support for structural level change, but there was a difference between conditions on the 
level of agreement with the manipulation statement: participants agreed significantly 
more that individual behaviour change has a large impact than very little impact. Study 
3 (N = 264) demonstrated that participants in the condition which presented individual 
behaviour change positively, were more supportive of prioritising the environment, than 
were those in the positive structural level change condition. Participants in both 
experimental conditions were significantly more supportive of individual responsibility 
than those in the control condition. Participants seemed to react favourably towards 
messages that highlighted the impact of individual behaviour change (contrary to the 
intended effect of emphasising the lack of impact). Future research using different 
designs could further examine the relationship between focusing attention on individual 
behaviour change and support for structural level change.  
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Owing to emissions of greenhouse gases by humans (mostly caused by wealthier 
countries), anthropogenic climate change is already having effects on a variety of forms 
of life across the planet (IPCC, 2013). However, the question remains of how to 
effectively reduce emissions. One approach to reducing emissions (and thereby climate 
change) that sits neatly within a capitalist framework, is the attempt to encourage 
voluntary individual behaviour change. Some sociologists (e.g., Brulle, 2010; Kent, 
2009; Norgaard, 2011, 2017; Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012) have criticised the predominant 
focus on encouraging individual pro-environmental behaviour change, arguing for 
example, that it obscures the structural factors causing high emissions, as well as taking 
attention away from alternative mitigation approaches. The present studies examined 
the suggestion that focusing on individual behaviour change may divert people’s 
attention and support from the more structural level changes which need to be made in 
order to mitigate climate change.  
The individual behaviour change approach 
Individual behaviour change approaches are those that call on individuals to act 
differently in their everyday lives, such as engaging in recycling, switching off lights, 
turning down thermostat(s) and flying less. Amongst the most common behaviours 
which people (from a representative English sample) self-reported to engage in were 
recycling, reducing food waste, and reducing gas and electricity use at home 
(Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Defra, 2007). While certain 
behavioural changes will no doubt be required to mitigate climate change, it may be 
problematic to make individual behaviour change the focus of campaigns and 
information that not only promise to help ‘save the planet’ (e.g., Huffington Post, 2013) 
but may also detract attention from the social and economic structural conditions which 
lead to high carbon emissions.  
Consider the following example of behaviour change messaging. The United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) website has briefly explained the causes 
of climate change as follows: “The majority of greenhouse gases come from burning 
fossil fuels to produce energy, although deforestation, industrial processes, and some 
agricultural practices also emit gases into the atmosphere” (EPA, 2016a). Thus, there is 
an acknowledgement of broader structures and forms of production which contribute to 
climate change. The passage is followed by a suggestion to visit another section of the 
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website for more information on “what you can do to make a difference”. The latter 
presents easy and small changes that people can make:  
This site provides more than 25 easy steps you can take at Home, School, the 
Office, and On the Road to protect the climate, reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) pollution, and save money. Take action today! Small steps add up, if we 
all do our part. (EPA, 2016b) 
The proposed changes include using energy-efficient light bulbs and “driving smart”. 
The website also promotes ‘sustainable’ consumption, for example by suggesting that 
people look for “Energy Star”, an EPA label that demarcates energy-efficient products. 
This presentation of ‘solutions’ implies that addressing climate change can be achieved 
through easy and small steps by individuals at home or at work, rather than requiring a 
larger structural change that goes beyond lifestyle choices.  
Callison (2014) has discussed the example of the Live Earth mega-concerts, a 
large and expensive attempt to foster public awareness and engagement with climate 
change: “It was meant to energize the faithful and convince others to care and do 
something—even switching light bulbs from incandescent to longer life compact 
fluorescents (CFLs) counted as a responsible response to climate change” (p. 40). This 
underlines the question of what kind of actions people are supposed to, or are being 
encouraged to, adopt.  
Similarly, in a paper critical of traditional marketing strategies for environmental 
behaviour change, Corner and Randall (2011) gave the example of the UK 
governments’ Act On CO2 campaign. The latter included a television advertisement5 
which argued that over 40% of CO2 came from ordinary everyday actions (such as 
driving cars) and suggested that it was up to ‘us’ (individuals) to change, for example 
by switching off lights. The authors examined the question of impact and efficacy of 
individual actions: “…what does constitute a proportional response to climate change? 
… If a more substantive level of engagement is being sought from the public, then the 
efficacy of strategies for public engagement is of utmost importance” (p. 1013). 
However, the strategies employed by many companies continue to place responsibility 
on the individual, suggesting that taking shorter showers (for example Unilever, 2015, 
n.d.) is a way of addressing current environmental problems.  
                                                 
5 Bedtime Stories, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDthR9RH0gw 
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Criticisms of the individual behaviour change approach 
At the outset, it is worth briefly considering what the impact of individual action 
may be, given its widespread publicity. Firstly, there is the danger of individual 
behaviour change strategies not working because of rebound effects (also known as the 
Jevons Paradox [Alcott, 2005]), for example, that despite energy-saving devices people 
end up using the same amount of energy (Sorrell, 2010).  
Secondly, Webb (2012) has argued that: “Incremental behaviour change 
measures, aiming to promote ‘green consumerism’ within parameters of current 
consumption, are extremely unlikely to produce the radical reductions in energy demand 
which the UK’s Low Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government, 2009) envisages” (p. 
115). Similarly, Shove (2010) has contended that: “Contemporary policy documents 
bring an accumulated weight of behaviour-change literature to bear on a surprisingly 
limited set of goals that have to do with encouraging certain styles of purchasing (in 
which ‘green’ is the brand of choice) …” (p. 1277). Further, Kent (2009) has outlined 
how various campaign approaches portray climate change mitigation as simple steps 
that add up to make a difference and which imply that global targets for emission 
reductions can be achieved through these individual level actions; in fact, she suggests 
they will ultimately fail to do so, given the scale of climate change. In support of this 
argument, Tabi (2013) found that environmentally-aware people in Hungary did not 
significantly differ from environmentally-unaware people in their CO2 emissions from 
heating. The author suggested that efforts to engage in pro-environmental behaviour do 
not necessarily result in reduced emissions, because well-intentioned actions are 
sometimes offset by socio-structural factors, such as income and home size.   
Norms of attention 
Apart from falling short of what individual behaviour change supposedly sets 
out to achieve, another concern relates to the distraction from other approaches and 
shifting of attention: “When responsibility for environmental problems is 
individualized, there is little room to ponder institutions, the nature and exercise of 
political power, or ways of collectively changing the distribution of power and influence 
in society …” (Maniates, 2001, p. 33). Kent (2009) also argued that important 
opportunities for citizen-led action may be lost. Shove (2010) and Webb (2012) have 
criticised individual behaviour change campaigns for obscuring the role of government 
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and of economic structures, such as the continuation of a growth-based economy, in 
maintaining current levels of emissions. So, while the attention of responsibility is 
focused on the individual, political inaction towards serious reductions in emissions 
continues (Kent, 2009). 
The above points are related to the criticism of the individual behaviour change 
approach as a politically necessary strategy to maintain certain norms of attention and 
public distraction. Having one’s attention drawn to ‘A’ involves withdrawing attention 
(or keeping attention away) from ‘B, C and D’. Accordingly, Zerubavel (2006) has 
suggested that: “Power, after all, involves the ability to control the scope of the 
information others can access as well as what they can pass on and thus promotes 
various forms of forced blindness, deafness, and muteness” (p. 15). He has pointed out 
that there are “… different ways of controlling the scope of others’ attention, from 
formal censorship to informal distraction tactics” (p. 15). Drawing on Zerubavel’s work, 
Norgaard (2011) examined norms of attention in her analysis of perceptions of climate 
change in Norway. She stated that what individuals decided to ignore or attend to was 
influenced by social norms for interpersonal interaction (e.g., conversation norms) and 
the larger economic and political setting. Awareness was not just influenced by one or 
even several individual behaviour change campaigns, but related to a broader culture in 
which a limited toolkit of actions for climate change mitigation was presented.  
Consider the following example of what is not being talked about and changed, 
when the focus is on the individual. While government is taken almost entirely out of 
the frame, one of the polluters not on the reduction agenda is amongst the single largest 
institutional carbon emitters of the world: the US Department of Defense (Flounders, 
2009; Sanders, 2009). In Sanders’ (2009) words:  
…even if every person, every automobile, and every factory suddenly emitted 
zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head first and at full speed 
toward total disaster for one major reason. The military … produces enough 
greenhouse gases, by itself, to place the entire globe, with all its inhabitants 
large and small, in the most immanent danger of extinction. (p. 22) 
Nonetheless, upon US request, all measurements of military emissions were excluded 
from calculations of US greenhouse gas emissions, let alone restrictions, at the Kyoto 
Protocol meetings and any subsequent international climate agreements (Flounders, 
2009; Flounders, Sanders & Peries, 2014; Sanders, 2009). According to other accounts, 
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in 2014 the US government featured sixth on the top 100 greenhouse polluters index 
(Political Economy Research Institute, 2016).  
Contextualising individual actions  
A further shortcoming of approaches which focus on individual behaviour 
change is that even when they add context to the predictive factors of behaviour, they 
fail to examine how needs and wants evolve: “If people seem to be acting in 
environmentally damaging ways it may be a product of their attitudes and behaviours, 
but it may also be a function of the conditions in which those attitudes and behaviours 
are formed” (Uzzell, 2008, para. 12). An approach which locates the problem and 
solution to climate change within the individual fails to mention the societal structures 
influenced by political and economic decisions that reproduce these behaviours and 
disregards why people behave in the way they do (Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012). Norgaard 
(2017) pointed out that:  
Sociologists will counter that climate change is due to a complex set of 
interactions between our economic, political, cultural, and social institutions. 
Individuals participate in these systems, but individual understandings, values, 
actions, and choices are constrained by their cultural, economic, and political 
contexts. (p. 176) 
For example, the individual approach does not address the topic of economic growth, 
which is presented as an undisputable public good (Webb, 2012). If individuals were 
actually to reduce their consumption significantly this would currently cause economic 
problems. Webb (2012) maintained that any contradictions between sustainable 
consumption and neo-liberal capitalism are ignored in individualised approaches:  
Radically reducing energy demand, however, means cutting consumer-driven 
economic growth. Thus far, government policies have avoided confronting the 
tension, if not direct contradiction, between climate change policies, 
consumerism and growth. The problem has been constituted as a matter of 
‘greening’ individual consumer choice, through behaviour change techniques, in 
a self-regulating market where growth can continue. (pp. 111-112)  
Distraction from other approaches 
By construing and focusing the ‘solution’ to environmental problems as a matter 
of individual behaviour change and choice, other approaches to climate change 
mitigation are obscured (Kent, 2009; Maniates, 2001; Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012). For 
example, Schor (2005) suggested that given that Western ways of living are 
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incompatible with sustainability and equity: “… inhabitants of the global North can and 
should opt for a new economic and social vision based on quality of life, rather than 
quantity of stuff, with reduced worktime and ecological sustainability at its core” (p. 
48). Therefore, as Shove (2010) pointed out, it is important to note that the individual 
behaviour change strategy is not a neutral or objective theoretical approach, but a 
political one: “…in that it obscures the extent to which governments sustain 
unsustainable economic institutions and ways of life, and the extent to which they have 
a hand in structuring options and possibilities” (p. 1274). Additionally, Maniates (2001) 
pointed towards the potential for individualisation to distract from collective levels of 
engaging in change: “Individualization, by implying that any action beyond the private 
and the consumptive is irrelevant, insulates people from the empowering experiences 
and political lessons of collective struggle for social change …” (p. 44).   
Conceptualisation of the individual 
It has been argued that dominant neo-liberal thinking rests on a particular 
conceptualisation of the individual and society, where: “Society is reduced to the sum of 
rationally self-interested individual choices, each seeking to maximize short-term gain” 
(Webb, 2012, p. 111). The individual behaviour change approach sits comfortably 
within the idea of humans as rational information-processing decision makers (Seyfang, 
2009). Any notions of structure, collective and interaction between people is pushed to 
the background. Thus, one issue with the individual behaviour change approach is that it 
locates the origin and solution to environmental degradation within the individual. 
Feelings of helplessness 
Returning to the example of the EPA mentioned at the outset, there is an 
apparent discrepancy between the level identified for the causes of climate change, such 
as energy production, deforestation, industrial processes (i.e. structural level factors) 
and the suggested actions of driving less and changing lightbulbs (individual level 
factors). Kahan (2012) proposed that individual action has little impact: “For members 
of the public, being right or wrong about climate-change science will have no impact. 
Nothing they do as individual consumers or as individual voters will meaningfully 
affect the risks posed by climate change” (p. 255). Not surprisingly, Norgaard (2011) 
noted feelings of helplessness in the public (in Norway and the USA) and discussed the 
role of emotions in the context of individualism. She quoted a student’s frustration after 
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receiving information about climate change at a US University conference, while being 
left with inadequate suggestions for action:  
We’d hear all this information and get all riled up, and then they’d be, like, 
‘contact your legislator,’ and I’d be, like, ‘Aw, really? …’ That’s, like, where I 
feel the most helpless; it’s like I know all this stuff, I have all this information, 
[but] what the hell do I do with it? … Yeah, I can write my congressman a letter, 
but in all honesty … I am not sure that one person can make such a difference. 
(Norgaard, 2011, p. 191)  
Norgaard (2011) placed this in context by suggesting that: “… in the United States the 
general sense of helplessness that comes from facing such a large problem as climate 
change is exacerbated by the pervasive culture of individualism …” (p. 191) as well as a 
lack of insight into the workings of the political system and people’s ability to actually 
effect change. Similarly, Kent (2009) summarised that feelings of helplessness are an 
important factor in explanations given for why people’s stated values and actions do not 
necessarily seem to align: “… people feel that they lack the ability or sense of 
empowerment to undertake actions that will ‘make the difference’ on climate change.” 
(Kent, 2009, p. 143). Therefore, in the present studies it was expected that information 
which highlights the lack of impact of individual behaviour change, will make 
individual behaviour change appear less beneficial and attractive. In contrast, structural 
level change may seem more beneficial and attractive, because it might be seen to have 
a more significant impact. 
Diffusing responsibility 
In contrast to claims that the framing of climate change as a collective 
responsibility diffuses responsibility and reduces the incentive for individual action 
(compared to framing it as individual responsibility) Obradovich and Guenther (2016) 
predicted the opposite. They looked at how highlighting the causes of climate change as 
either individual or collective responsibility affected donations towards supporting a 
wildlife conservation organisation’s climate change efforts. They found that amongst 
members of the environmental organisation and amongst the public, those who were 
required to write about collective responsibility for climate change, were willing to 
donate significantly more money (if they were to win the prize draw) than were those in 
the individual responsibility and control conditions. Additionally, a follow up study 
with members of the general public showed that this effect persisted two days later. In 
another experiment the authors asked how likely participants were to reduce their own 
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climate change causing behaviours in the future and found that those in the collective 
responsibility condition showed higher intentions than those in the individual 
responsibility condition. These findings suggest that highlighting options for structural 
changes to climate change mitigation will not necessarily diffuse responsibility, but may 
even increase people’s motivation to support change (in line with the collective 
responsibility framing).  
The present research 
The research reported here examined how the presentation of ways to reduce 
emissions influences support for structural level change. The extent to which a focus on 
individual behaviour change might attenuate support for structural level change was 
investigated.  
Study 1 
In one condition (beneficial individual action), participants were required to 
think about engaging in a list of eleven pro-environmental behaviours compared to not 
doing so (e.g., turning down the thermostat versus not turning down the thermostat). It 
was expected that presented with only two options (engaging in a pro-environmental 
action or not), participants would be encouraged to think of individual behaviour change 
in a positive light, because engaging in these behaviours would seem more favourable 
than not engaging in them. This is based on the idea that ‘every little helps’ and that 
small actions to reduce emissions are better than no action at all. 
 In the second condition (action impact) participants were required to think 
about the impact of the same eleven individual behaviours. Asking participants about 
the impact of one behaviour performed by one person was expected to highlight in 
people’s minds the lack of impact that these behaviours might have and make their 
attitude towards these actions less favourable. Consequently, they were expected to 
view structural changes more favourably because such changes would appear to have a 
larger impact than would individual behaviour change.  
The third condition involved no manipulation (control).  
It was hypothesised that (1) participants in the action impact condition would be 
more supportive of prioritising the environment over the economy than would 
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participants in the beneficial individual action condition (because the former would be 
made more aware of the ineffectiveness of individual action and – consequently – they 
would be more supportive of the need for structural change); 
(2) participants in the action impact condition would be more likely to attribute 
responsibility to structural level actors than would participants in the beneficial 
individual action condition (because the former would be more aware of the 
ineffectiveness of individual action and of the need for involvement of structural level 
actors); 
(3) participants in the beneficial individual action condition would be more 
likely to support individual level responsibility than would participants in the action 
impact condition (because the former would be more aware of the benefits of citizens 
engaging in ‘pro-environmental’ behaviour changes);  
(4) participants in the action impact condition would have higher intentions to 
engage in political action than would those in the beneficial individual action condition 
(because the former would be more aware of the need for political change). 
Method 
Participants 
During a second year undergraduate Psychology practical class, 2976 students 
(247 females, 50 males; age M = 20.09 years, SD = 1.54 years) participated in the study 
as part of their course. They were of diverse nationalities (210 British, five had dual 
nationality and 82 had other nationalities). All participants were naïve to the aims of the 
study.  
Materials  
Participants first completed an extended theory of planned behaviour 
questionnaire (predicting intentions to lead a lower carbon life)7. The results for that 
                                                 
6 Originally there were 298 participants, but the responses from one participant were 
excluded since the participant arrived late, while the rest of the class was already being 
debriefed.  
7 The questionnaire had a brief introduction, stating: “There is widespread consensus 
that the use of fossil fuels has contributed to global climate change. In the face of 
climate change many people have been thinking about how to lead lower carbon lives. 
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section of the questionnaire will be reported in a separate paper. The second part of the 
questionnaire consisted of an attentional focus manipulation (three conditions) followed 
by a series of dependent measures. 
Attentional focus manipulation. Beneficial individual action condition (n = 
102): In this condition participants were asked “Which one of each of the following 
pairs of behaviours is better for a person to engage in, in order to reduce climate 
change? (tick either ‘A’ or ‘B’ for each pairing)”. Participants were then presented with 
eleven pairs of behaviours, e.g., “A. Turning down the thermostat where they live”, “B. 
Not turning down the thermostat where they live”.  
Action impact condition (n = 91): In this condition, participants were asked 
eleven questions about the impact of the same pro-environmental behaviours as in the 
beneficial individual action condition, e.g., “If a person turns down their thermostat 
where they live, how much impact do you think that particular action will have in 
reducing climate change?”. Response scale options ranged between “no impact at all” 
(1), “negligible impact” (2), “very little impact” (3), “little impact” (4), “a lot of impact” 
(5) and “a huge impact” (6). The scale was intentionally biased towards suggesting that 
individual action has little impact (four response options) rather than individual action 
having a lot of impact (two options). Additionally, the latter two response options were 
phrased strongly, so that participants were not provided with a middle ground option to 
suggest individual action has “some” impact. It was expected that with this response 
scale bias, participants would be more inclined to choose a statement indicating that 
individual behaviour change has little impact – the aim of this condition.  
Control condition (n = 104): There was a control condition in which participants 
received no manipulation and were only required to complete the dependent variables.  
Dependent variables. There were four dependent variables. Measures were 
constructed from the mean of the constituent items, except for one variable which 
                                                 
This includes using less energy in the home, cutting down on transport that uses fossil 
fuels, buying fewer products or buying products that involve less energy use. Different 
people will prefer different ways of living a lower carbon life. And some people won't 
want to make any changes! What do you think about living a lower carbon life from 
now?”  
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consisted of only one item. All responses ranged from “Very strongly disagree” (1) to 
“Very strongly agree” (7) on Likert-type scales. Items were reverse coded as necessary. 
Support for prioritising the environment (α = .83). In order to assess 
participants’ support for prioritising the environment, they were asked “To what extent 
do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”, followed by seven statements 
about prioritising the environment, e.g., “Protection of the environment should be given 
priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth”, or “The government should 
introduce green taxes to discourage actions that harm the environment”. One of these 
items was removed as it had low correlations with all other items (all rs < .36) and its 
removal increased overall scale reliability. Items for this scale were adapted from ICM 
poll questions and an article reported in the Guardian newspaper (Confino, 2014; 
Glover, 2008) and from Gallup poll questions (Jones, 2011; Swift, 2014). 
Structural and individual level actors’ responsibility. Participants were then 
asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following should do more to 
reduce climate change?” They were presented with a list of five different actors: “The 
[UK government] should do more to reduce climate change” and the same question for 
corporations and industry, their member of parliament, their local council (structural 
level actors’ responsibility, α = .89) and individual citizens (individual responsibility). 
This scale was adapted from survey questions by Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Feinberg and Howe (2012). 
Political action intentions (α = .89). Participants were asked about their 
agreement or disagreement with six statements concerning their intentions to engage in 
a list of six actions addressing macro-level change, such as “I intend to take part in a 
protest or demonstration about an environmental issue”. This measure was adapted from 
the Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno and Jeffries (2012) scale of pro-environmental action. 
Finally, participants reported their age, nationality and gender. 
Design and Procedure 
An online questionnaire study was employed. The online link randomly assigned 
participants to one of the three conditions. The independent variable was the attentional 
focus manipulation with three levels. At the beginning of the questionnaire, participants 
were asked for their consent and informed that they could withdraw at any point without 
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any further consequences. The study took approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. 
The study had ethical approval from the relevant Research Ethics Committee. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
To test for any systematic differences between conditions, the distributions of 
gender, age and nationality across conditions were examined. There was no significant 
association between condition and nationality8, χ²(2) = 0.13, p = .935, Cramér’s phi = 
.02, condition and gender, χ²(2) = 0.06, p = .981, Cramér’s phi = .01, or between 
condition and age, F(2, 294) = 0.54, p = .584, r = .06.  
In order to check the effectiveness of the manipulation in the beneficial 
individual action condition, the percentage of participants agreeing with each action was 
examined. This showed that most participants (> 75% for all actions) agreed that it is 
better for a person to engage in the action rather than not, in order to reduce climate 
change (table 1). For the action impact condition the distribution of answers showed 
that on average 75% agreed with one of the four responses indicating little impact, 
while 25.1% agreed with one of the two responses indicating larger impact (table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 A binary variable was created, with one group consisting of British and Irish 
participants and the other group consisting of all other nationalities, including those who 
indicated holding dual nationality.  
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Table 1. Percentage agreement in the beneficial individual action condition.  
Which one of each of the following pairs of behaviours is 
better for a person to engage in, in order to reduce climate 
change? 
Engage Not engage 
Turning down the thermostat where they live  98.0 2.0 
Switching off appliances that aren't in use where they live 100.0 0.0 
Switching to a renewable energy provider 99.0 1.0 
Eating little or no meat 83.3 16.7 
Eating few or no dairy products  75.5 24.5 
Buying and cooking only what is needed to avoid food 
waste 100.0 0.0 
Reusing, recycling, repairing or borrowing more often 
(rather than buying new) 100.0 0.0 
Flying less often 95.1 4.9 
Cycling more often 99.0 1.0 
Taking public transport more often 88.2 11.8 
Buying ‘local’ food more often 98.0 2.0 
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Table 2. Percentage agreement with how much impact each action will have in reducing climate change in the action impact condition. 
How much impact do you think that particular action will 
have in reducing climate change? 
No impact 
at all  
Negligible 
impact  
Very little 
impact  
Little 
impact  
A lot of 
impact  
A huge 
impact  
If a person turns down their thermostat where they live 4.4 29.7 25.3 31.9 8.8 0.0 
If a person switches off appliances that aren't in use where 
they live 
4.4 19.8 29.7 31.9 14.3 0.0 
If a person switches to a renewable energy provider where 
they live 
2.2 7.7 14.3 40.7 30.8 4.4 
If a person eats little or no meat from now on 12.1 25.3 18.7 27.5 13.2 3.3 
If a person eats few or no dairy products from now on 13.2 29.7 20.9 25.3 9.9 1.1 
If a person buys and cooks only what is needed to avoid food 
waste from now on 
6.6 15.4 16.5 34.1 23.1 4.4 
If a person reuses, recycles, repairs or borrows more often 
(rather than buying new) from now on 
0.0 7.7 14.3 40.7 27.5 9.9 
If a person flies less often from now on 3.3 17.6 9.9 36.3 30.8 2.2 
If a person cycles more often from now on 3.3 4.4 17.6 39.6 34.1 1.1 
If a person takes public transport more often from now on 4.4 7.7 17.6 39.6 27.5 3.3 
If a person buys ‘local’ food more often from now on 5.5 11.0 27.5 29.7 22.0 4.4 
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A one-way ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of condition on support for 
prioritising the environment, F(2, 294) = 2.32, p = .100, r = .12.9 The planned contrast 
indicated that participants in the action impact condition showed significantly higher 
support (M = 5.08, SD = 0.84) than did participants in the beneficial individual action 
condition (M = 4.82, SD = 0.98), t(294) = 2.05, p = .042, r = .1210 (table 3). This 
supports Hypothesis 1. 
Since there was no a priori prediction regarding the difference between the 
control and experimental groups, a post-hoc test was employed. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 
test revealed no significant difference between either the control and beneficial 
individual action condition (p = .254), or between the control and action impact 
condition (p = .862, control M = 5.02, SD = 0.85). 
A one-way ANOVA on structural level actors’ responsibility showed no 
significant overall effect, F(2, 294) = 1.95, p = .145, r = .11. The planned contrast 
showed that participants in the action impact condition indicated marginally higher 
agreement with structural level actors’ responsibility (M = 5.79, SD = 0.70), than did 
participants in the beneficial individual action condition (M = 5.59, SD = 0.83), t(294) = 
-1.92, p = .056, r = .1111. This supports Hypothesis 2.  
A one-way ANOVA on support for individual responsibility, showed no 
significant overall effect, F(2, 294) = 0.76, p = .469, r = .07. Further, the planned 
                                                 
9 The planned contrasts were conducted despite the overall F only being marginally 
significant, as Howell (1997) argued that follow-up tests and their significance levels 
were established without regard to the overall F and are thus adequate for comparing 
between group differences.  
10 For support for prioritising the environment there was significant skew and kurtosis 
in the beneficial individual action condition, skewness z = -3.14, p = .002, kurtosis z = 
2.82, p = .005. Because transforming data can also be problematic and the F-ratio is a 
robust test (Field, 2009), it was decided not to transform the data. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
did not mirror precisely the ANOVA results, as there was no overall marginally 
significant effect between conditions, H(2) = 2.71, p = .259. However, the Mann-
Whitney test supported the t-test results, showing a marginally significant difference (1-
tailed) between the experimental conditions, U = 5254.50, p = .057. 
11 There was significant skew and kurtosis in the beneficial individual action condition 
for structural level actors’ responsibility, skewness z = -5.06, p < .001, kurtosis z = 
6.60, p < .001. The Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the ANOVA results, showing no 
significant overall effect of condition, H(2) = 2.383, p = .304. Further, the Mann-
Whitney test supported the t-test results, showing a marginally significant difference (1-
tailed) between the experimental conditions, U = 5226.00, p = .064.  
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contrast revealed no significant difference between the two experimental conditions, 
t(294) = -1.11, p = .268, r = .0612, (beneficial individual action M = 5.76, SD = 0.94, 
action impact M = 5.91, SD = 0.87). This does not support Hypothesis 3.  
Finally, a one-way ANOVA revealed no overall effect on political action 
intentions, F(2, 191.04) = .35, p = .70413, r = .05. The planned contrast showed no 
significant difference between the two experimental conditions, t(190.14) = 0.69, p = 
.494, r = .05, (beneficial individual action M = 3.90, SD = 1.24, action impact M = 4.02, 
SD = 1.18). This does not support Hypothesis 4.  
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) by condition for each 
dependent variable.  
 
                                                 
12 There was significant skew in all three conditions for individual responsibility, in the 
control condition, skewness z = -2.84, p = .005; in the beneficial individual action 
condition, skewness z = -4.15, p < .001; and in the action impact condition, skewness z 
= -3.07, p = .002. There was also significant kurtosis in the beneficial individual action 
condition for the same variable, kurtosis z = 6.60, p < .001. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
confirmed the ANOVA results, showing no significant overall effect of condition, H(2) 
= 1.71, p = .424. Additionally, the Mann-Whitney test confirmed the t-test results, 
showing no significant difference (1-tailed) between the experimental conditions, U = 
5074.50, p = .115.  
13 Welch’s F-ratio is reported as Levene’s test was significant showing that 
homogeneity of variance was violated F(2, 294) = 3.13, p = .045. 
 Beneficial individual 
action 
Action impact Control 
Support for prioritising 
the environment 
4.82 (0.98) 5.08 (0.84) 5.02 (0.85) 
Structural level actors’ 
responsibility 
5.59 (0.83)  5.79 (0.70) 5.73 (0.72) 
Individual 
responsibility 
5.76 (0.94) 5.91 (0.87) 5.89 (0.95) 
Political action 
intentions 
3.90 (1.24) 4.02 (1.18) 3.89 (1.00) 
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Correlations between manipulation task responses and dependent variables  
Correlation analyses were conducted in order to examine the relationship 
between participants’ score on the manipulation task and their response to the dependent 
variables.  
For the beneficial individual action condition the sum of each participant’s 
agreement that engaging in the individual behaviour change is better than not doing so, 
was calculated. A higher score indicated a higher number of choices that engaging in 
the actions was better to reduce climate change than not engaging in them. There was a 
significant positive correlation between participants’ total beneficial individual action 
score and each dependent variable, as follows: support for prioritising the environment, 
r = .34, p < .001, structural level actors’ responsibility, r = .36, p < .001, individual 
responsibility, r = .28, p = .005, political action intentions, r = .28, p = .005. This 
suggests that the more participants chose options that were better for a person to engage 
in to reduce climate change, the more supportive they were of individual and structural 
level change.  
For the participants in the action impact condition, the sum of their responses 
was calculated to obtain a total impact score. The higher their score the more they 
agreed that the behaviour changes would have an impact in reducing climate change. 
This score was then correlated with each dependent variable. The total impact score 
correlated significantly with support for prioritising the environment, r = .27, p = .011, 
marginally with agreement on structural level actors’ responsibility, r = .19, p = .065, 
significantly with support for individual responsibility, r = .26, p = .012, and 
significantly with political action intentions, r = .48, p < .001. Contrary to the 
expectation that participants in the action impact condition would be reminded of the 
ineffectiveness of individual actions, the correlations suggest that it was in fact those 
participants who believed more strongly that individual behaviour change has an 
impact, who were more supportive of all kinds of changes. This indicates that the 
difference between the experimental conditions which was found on support for 
prioritising the environment and structural level actors’ responsibility might have been 
driven by participants’ high belief in the effectiveness of individual action in the action 
impact condition. Participants in the action impact condition were significantly more 
supportive of prioritising the environment and marginally more in favour of structural 
level actors’ responsibility, than were participants in the beneficial individual action 
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condition. Something about making salient the impact of individual action (contrary to 
the intended manipulation effect of highlighting the lack of impact) seems to have 
influenced support for prioritising the environment and for the responsibility of 
structural level actors. This was relative to participants who were presented with the 
option of indicating whether it is better for a person to engage in individual behaviour 
change than not doing so.  
Discussion 
In line with the first hypothesis, the findings showed that participants 
encouraged to think about the impact of individual actions (action impact) were 
significantly more in favour of prioritising the environment than were participants 
required to think about engaging in individual actions compared to not doing so 
(beneficial individual action). Consistent with the second hypothesis, participants in the 
action impact condition were also marginally more supportive of structural level actors’ 
responsibility than were participants in the beneficial individual action condition. 
Contrary to the third and fourth hypotheses, there was neither a significant difference 
between the two experimental conditions on support for individual responsibility nor on 
political action intentions.  
However, unpacking the direction of the effects within each condition showed 
that the manipulation did not have the intended effect in the action impact condition. 
Rather than highlighting to participants the ineffectiveness of individual behaviour 
change, participants might have been nudged to consider the positive impact of 
individual actions. This suggestion is in line with the correlations showing that 
participants who believed more strongly in the impact of individual behaviour change 
(than those who indicated a lower impact) were significantly more supportive of 
prioritising the environment, scored marginally higher on structural level actors’ 
responsibility, scored significantly higher on individual responsibility and scored 
significantly higher on political action intentions. For the beneficial individual action 
condition, participants who agreed more often that it is better for a person to engage in 
behaviour change to reduce climate change (than not doing so) agreed significantly 
more with prioritising the environment, individual and structural level actors’ 
responsibility and showed higher political action intentions. It seems that people with 
higher compared to lower individual impact scores were driving the difference 
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between the two experimental conditions. One possible explanation for these findings 
could be that those who were overall more supportive of climate change mitigation 
were simply more in favour of all kinds of action, i.e. they believed in the impact of 
individual behaviour change, as well as being supportive of structural level change. 
Distribution of support for different kinds of individual level actions 
The pattern of responses in both experimental conditions is noteworthy. 
Somewhat surprising is the prevalence and distribution of beliefs in a relatively high 
impact of individual behaviour changes. For example, in the action impact condition, 
‘reusing and recycling’ received the highest percentage of agreement that it would have 
a huge impact, compared to a lower percentage of agreement that a person flying less 
would have a huge impact in reducing climate change. Further, in the beneficial 
individual action condition, ‘reducing dairy and meat consumption’ received the least 
support as actions to reduce climate change, despite meat and dairy consumption’s 
important contribution to greenhouse gas emissions (Eshel, Shepon, Makov & Milo, 
2014). Graça, Calheiros and Oliveira (2014) suggested that various moral 
disengagement strategies were involved in maintaining the practice of meat 
consumption. The present findings could be taken to suggest that people are not quite 
aware of the kinds of factors and behaviours driving greenhouse gas emissions. 
Whitmarsh (2009) found that less than a third of participants took action because of 
concern over climate change. Amongst those who did, the most popular action was 
recycling, rather than direct energy conservation behaviours. Consistent with the notion 
of the social organisation of attention (Zerubavel, 2006) these findings might be related 
to a possible greater emphasis placed on recycling in attempts to encourage individual 
behaviour change. 
 One of the limitations of this study is that the action impact manipulation was 
not successful in inducing participants to view individual behaviour change as 
ineffective. Similarly, the beneficial individual action manipulation might also have 
been unsuccessful in making individual behaviour change seem more positive. Further, 
the wording in the action impact condition might not have been clear about whether it 
referred to just one person engaging in the action once, or whether it referred to a lot of 
people engaging in the action (that is, some participants might have given higher impact 
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ratings because they interpreted the question as relating to a lot of people engaging 
regularly in the action).  
Study 2 
Given that the manipulation in Study 1 did not have the intended effect of 
encouraging participants to view individual behaviour change as ineffective (in the 
action impact condition), a more straightforward manipulation was used in Study 2, 
making use of the provision of ‘information’. The rationale behind Study 2 was similar 
to that in Study 1, only that in Study 2 participants in the experimental conditions were 
presented with a short paragraph arguing either for a large impact or very little impact 
of individual behaviour change on reducing climate change. There was also a control 
condition with no manipulation text. Further, some additional dependent variables were 
introduced, in order to further examine the effect of the manipulation on e.g., support 
for government intervention. It was predicted that participants in the very little impact 
condition (compared to participants in the large impact condition) would be more 
supportive of government intervention, more supportive of economic and political 
change, in stronger agreement on the intersection between environmental and social 
well-being, more supportive of prioritising the environment, more in favour of structural 
level actors’ responsibility, less supportive of individual citizens’ responsibility, higher 
in political action intentions and lower in individual behaviour change intentions. 
Method 
Participants 
First year Psychology undergraduate students took part in return for course 
credits. After excluding nine participants who completed the study twice, 153 (121 
females, 31 males, 1 other; age M = 19.75. years, SD = 5.33 years) participants 
remained. All participants were unaware of the aims of the study.  
Materials 
Participants were provided with general information about what the study 
involved and asked for their consent. Initially, they reported their age, name and e-mail 
address. 
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Information manipulation. Depending on condition, a short paragraph was 
presented suggesting that individual behaviour changes have a large impact or very 
little impact in reducing national greenhouse gas emissions or participants were 
provided with no information (control).  
Large impact (n = 60): “There are many ways in which people can help reduce 
climate change, for example by recycling, turning down their thermostat, driving and 
flying less and buying local food produce. These behaviour changes have been shown to 
have a large impact in reducing national greenhouse gas emissions.” 
Very little impact (n = 46): “There aren’t many ways in which people can help 
reduce climate change, it is not as simple as recycling, turning down their thermostat, 
driving and flying less and buying local food produce. These behaviour changes have 
been shown to have very little impact in reducing national greenhouse gas emissions.” 
Control (n = 47): No text was provided. 
Participants were asked to confirm whether or not they had read the text 
carefully and were informed that they would be asked questions relating to the short 
paragraph that had been presented to them.  
Dependent Variables. There were eight dependent variables. Participants were 
asked to what extent they agreed with a set of statements; responses were measured on a 
seven point Likert-scale ranging from very strongly disagree (1) to very strongly agree 
(7). Measures were constructed from the means of the constituent items. Items were 
reverse-coded where necessary. 
Support for government intervention (α = .75). Participants were asked about 
their support for thirteen governmental measures in the UK aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example “Increased government spending on improving 
public transport within towns and cities”. Higher scores indicated stronger support for 
government level change. 
Support for economic and political change (α = .81). This scale consisted of five 
items measuring support for economic and political change to address climate change, 
e.g., “I believe the economic system needs to change in order to reduce climate change”. 
Intersection between environmental and social well-being (α = .65). Four 
statements measured participants’ agreement about the connection between 
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environmental, economic and social issues, e.g., “I believe that economic, social and 
environmental problems can be addressed together”.    
Support for prioritising the environment (α = .84). The same scale as in Study 1 
was employed. One item was removed due to low correlations with all other items and 
because its removal increased the overall alpha. 
Structural and individual level actors’ responsibility. The same items as in 
Study 1 were used with several items relating to structural level actors’ responsibility 
(α = .86) and one item assessing individual responsibility.  
Political action intentions (α = .84). The same scale as in Study 1 was used. 
Individual behaviour change intentions (α = .79). Twelve statements were 
presented relating to participants’ intentions to engage in individual behaviour change, 
e.g., “I intend to improve the insulation where I live”. 
Participants were then asked whether the information they had received at the 
beginning of the questionnaire stated that people’s behaviour change had a large impact 
or a very little impact in reducing national greenhouse gas emissions, and to what extent 
they agreed with the statement they had received. Finally participants recorded their 
gender and nationality.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants signed up to the online study through a Psychology recruitment 
database and followed a link which randomly allocated them to one of the three 
conditions. The study took approximately 15 minutes to complete. The independent 
variable was the information factor with three levels. Participants took part in their own 
time from wherever they had access to the internet. The study had ethical approval from 
the relevant Research Ethics Committee. 
Results 
To examine whether there were any systematic differences between conditions, 
chi-square tests (on gender and nationality) and an ANOVA (on age) were conducted. 
There was no significant association between either condition and gender χ² (2) = 0.11, 
p = .967, Cramér’s phi = .03, condition and nationality (British and Irish compared to all 
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other nationalities or dual nationalities) χ² (2) = 1.88, p = .398, Cramér’s phi = .11, or 
condition and age, F(2, 150) = 0.30, p = .739, r = .06. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each dependent variable to examine if 
there were any differences between conditions. There was no significant overall effect 
for any of the dependent variables: support for government intervention, F(2, 150) = 
0.08, p = .920, r = .03, support for economic and political change, F(2, 150) = 0.42, p = 
.659, r = .0714, intersection between environmental and social well-being, F(2, 150) = 
0.26, p = .774, r = .06, support for prioritising the environment, F(2, 150) = 1.86, p = 
.159, r = .16, structural level actors’ responsibility, F(2, 150) = 0.47, p = .624, r = .0815, 
individual responsibility, F(2, 150) = 0.44, p = .643, r = .0816, political action 
intentions, F(2, 150) = 0.28, p = .754, r = .06, individual behaviour change intentions, 
F(2, 150) = 0.51, p = .603, r = .08. Further, planned contrasts between the two 
experimental conditions and post-hoc tests revealed no significant differences (all ps > 
.05, see table 4 for all means and standard deviations).17 
                                                 
14 For support for economic and political change there was significant kurtosis in the 
very little impact condition, kurtosis z = 1.96, p = .050. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed 
the ANOVA results, showing no significant overall effect of condition, H(2) = 0.34, p = 
.845. Further, the Mann-Whitney test confirmed the t-test results, revealing no 
significant difference (1-tailed) between the experimental conditions, U = 1425.00, p = 
.387.  
15 For structural level actors’ responsibility there was significant skew and kurtosis in 
the very little impact condition, skewness z = -7.05, p < .001, kurtosis z = 16.31, p < 
.001 and in the control condition, skewness z = -2.35, p = .019, kurtosis z = 2.91, p = 
.004. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the ANOVA results, showing no significant 
overall effect of condition, H(2) = 1.42, p = .492. The Mann-Whitney test also 
confirmed the t-test findings, revealing no significant difference (1-tailed) between the 
experimental conditions, U = 1378.00, p = .495.  
16 There was significant skew and kurtosis for individual responsibility in the very little 
impact condition, skewness z = -6.02, p < .001, kurtosis z = 9.89, p < .001, and in the 
control condition, skewness z = -3.12, p = .002, kurtosis z = 2.33, p = .020. A Kruskal-
Wallis test confirmed the ANOVA results, showing no significant overall effect 
between conditions, H(2) = 0.09, p = .956. A Mann-Whitney test also confirmed the t-
test results, showing no significant difference (1-tailed) between the experimental 
conditions, U = 1339.50, p = .389.  
17 At the end of the questionnaire participants were asked what the text stated which 
they had read at the beginning. A new data set was created excluding those participants 
who did not correctly identify which condition they were in (excluding n = 20). When 
the analyses were conducted on this data set the overall pattern was similar, in that there 
were no significant differences between conditions for most of the dependent variables. 
Only the support for prioritising the environment variable was marginally significant 
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) by condition for each 
dependent variable. 
 
To examine the extent of participants’ agreement with their respective 
manipulation text, a t-test was conducted, which showed that participants in the large 
impact condition (M = 5.27, SD = 1.55) agreed significantly more with their text, than 
did those in the very little impact condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.53), t(104) = 7.35, p < 
.001, r = .5818. Table 5 displays the distribution of level of agreement with each text.  
                                                 
F(2, 130) = 2.49, p = .087, r = .19. The planned contrast between the experimental 
conditions was not significant t(130) = -1.02, p = .310, but Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test 
showed a marginally significant difference between the very little impact condition and 
the control condition, mean difference = 0.41, p = .072. Participants in the very little 
impact condition (M = 5.34, SD = 0.84) were more supportive of prioritising the 
environment over the economy than were those in the control condition (M = 4.94, SD = 
0.80), while the large impact condition lay in between the two (M = 5.16, SD = 0.87).  
18 There was significant skew and kurtosis in the large impact condition on level of 
agreement with the manipulation statement, skewness z = -4.88, p < .001, kurtosis z = 
 Large impact Very little 
impact 
Control 
Support for government 
intervention 
4.76 (0.62) 4.74 (0.51) 4.79 (0.67) 
Support for economic and 
political change 
5.07 (0.88)  5.18 (0.99) 5.01 (0.87) 
Intersection between 
environmental and social 
well-being 
4.67 (0.84) 4.68 (0.96) 4.78 (0.84) 
Support for prioritising the 
environment 
5.03 (0.95) 5.28 (0.88) 4.94 (0.80) 
Structural level actors’ 
responsibility 
5.75 (0.68)  5.70 (0.98) 5.60 (0.75) 
Individual responsibility 6.08 (0.70)  5.91 (1.15) 5.98 (0.99) 
Political action intentions 4.05 (1.04) 4.19 (0.97) 4.05 (1.08) 
Individual behaviour change 
intentions 
4.71 (0.79) 4.87 (0.72) 4.79 (0.84) 
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Table 5. Percentage agreement with the manipulation statement for each experimental 
condition.  
 Large impact (n = 60)  Very little impact (n = 46)  
Very strongly disagree 5.0 17.4 
Strongly disagree  5.0 19.6 
Slightly disagree  5.0 32.6 
Neither disagree nor agree 0.0 13.0 
Slightly agree 26.7 8.7 
Strongly agree 45.0 6.5 
Very strongly agree 13.3 2.2 
 
Correlations were conducted for each condition separately, in order to examine 
the relationship between participants’ agreement with the statement in their respective 
condition and their scores on each dependent variable. For the large impact condition, 
there was one significant correlation: between level of agreement with the manipulation 
statement and agreement with the intersection between environmental and social well-
being measure, r = .27, p = .034, whereby participants who agreed more strongly that 
individual behaviour change has a large impact, agreed more strongly with the 
connection between environmental and social issues. For the very little impact condition 
there was a marginally significant negative correlation between agreement with the 
manipulation statement and support for prioritising the environment, r = -.26, p = .082, 
whereby participants who agreed more strongly that individual behaviour change has 
very little impact, agreed less that the environment should be prioritised over the 
economy. Further, the more participants agreed that individual behaviour change has 
little impact, the less they agreed that it is structural level actors’ responsibility to do 
more, r = -.34, p = .022. The stronger participants agreed that individual behaviour 
                                                 
2.80, p = .005. A Mann-Whitney test confirmed the t-test results, showing a significant 
difference (1-tailed) between the experimental conditions, U = 458.50, p < .001.  
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change has very little impact, the less they agreed that individual citizens should do 
more to reduce climate change, r = -.51, p < .001. Participants who agreed more that 
individual behaviour change has little impact, scored lower on intentions to engage in 
individual behaviour change, r = -.35, p = .017. All other correlations were non-
significant (all ps > .05). 
Discussion 
There were no significant differences between conditions on any of the 
dependent variables, showing no support for the hypothesis that people in the large 
impact of individual action condition would be less supportive of structural level 
change. There was a significant difference between conditions on agreement with the 
manipulation statement, whereby participants in the large impact condition showed 
higher agreement than those in the very little impact condition. The latter finding is 
noteworthy in itself as it suggests that individual actions were viewed as having a 
crucial impact in reducing climate change. It is possible that participants in the very 
little impact condition were not convinced by their manipulation statement (as they 
showed less agreement with the statement). These findings might indicate how 
pervasive the idea is that individual behaviour change can make a difference.  
Correlation analyses were conducted in order to unpack the relationship between 
level of agreement with the manipulation statement and each dependent variable within 
each condition. Contrary to the hypotheses that participants presented with information 
arguing that individual behaviour change has very little impact would overall be more 
supportive of structural level change, the correlations tended to show the opposite 
pattern.  
It may be more effective to contrast a positive message about individual 
behaviour change with a positive message concerning structural level change, in order 
to contrast two positive framings and present an alternative to individual behaviour 
change, rather than just attempting to raise doubts about the effectiveness of individual 
behaviour change.  
Study 3 
Study 3 compared the presentation of information in support of structural level 
change to the presentation of information in support of individual behaviour change. 
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Can information arguing for structural level change to mitigate climate change lead to 
higher support for structural level change, relative to information that is favourable 
towards individual behaviour change? It was predicted that participants receiving a text 
that is positive about structural level change would be more supportive of structural 
change, than would those reading a text that is positive about individual behaviour 
change. Many of the same dependent variables were used from Study 2. It was 
hypothesised that participants receiving information in favour of structural level change 
(compared to those receiving information in favour of individual behaviour change) 
would be more supportive of government intervention, more supportive of prioritising 
the environment, show higher agreement with structural level actors’ responsibility, 
show lower agreement with individual responsibility, be more supportive of economic 
and political change, score higher in political action intentions and lower in individual 
behaviour change intentions.  
Method 
Participants 
Second year undergraduate students (N = 264) participated in the study as part of 
a Social Psychology module (213 females, 49 males, 2 other; age M = 20.41 years, SD = 
2.70 years). They were unaware of the aims of the study.  
Materials 
Participants were informed about what the study involved and asked for their 
consent. They were asked for demographic information, including their gender, age and 
nationality.  
Information manipulation. Participants were presented with information 
suggesting either that people’s pro-environmental behaviour (individual action) or that 
structural level change (structural change) is crucial in making the difference to 
reducing climate change, or they received no information (control).  
Individual action (n = 94): “Climate researchers maintain that people engaging 
in pro-environmental actions is crucial in making the difference to reducing climate 
change. These kinds of actions include recycling, turning down thermostats and 
switching off unused devices, using less electricity, eating less meat, and flying and 
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driving less. For example, figures show that 8% of the total electricity used in UK 
homes comes from appliances left on standby, which is the equivalent of around two 
power stations’ worth of electricity each year.”19 
Structural change (n = 85): “Climate researchers maintain that structural 
changes are crucial in making the difference to reducing climate change. These kinds of 
transformations include government investment in renewable energy production while 
reducing fossil fuel extraction, cheaper and improved public transport and funding for 
insulated housing. For example, for the first time this summer renewables made up over 
a quarter of the UK’s power mix. All the clean technology being built meant renewables 
became the second largest electricity source.”20 
Control (n = 85): Participants received no text.  
Participants were asked to confirm that they had read the text (yes/no) and 
notified that they would be asked questions in relation to the text.  
Dependent variables. The questionnaire had seven dependent variables. 
Participants indicated their level of agreement with a variety of statements on seven 
point Likert-scales, with responses ranging from very strongly disagree/oppose (1) to 
very strongly agree/support (7). Measures were constructed from the means of the 
constituent items and items were reverse coded as necessary. 
Support for government intervention (α = .71). A similar scale as in Study 2 was 
employed, except that five repetitive items were removed to make the measure more 
concise.  
Support for prioritising the environment (α = .82). This was the same measure 
that was used in Studies 1 and 2 (except that the item which was removed from the 
analyses in the previous studies due to low correlations, was excluded from the measure 
from the start). 
                                                 
19 The last sentence of the manipulation text in the individual action condition was 
based on information provided by Aldred (2007, referring to figures from the Energy 
Saving Trust).  
20 The last sentence for the structural change manipulation text was based on 
information provided by the campaign group Ten Ten (n.d.). 
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Structural and individual level actors’ responsibility. The same measures as in 
Studies 1 and 2 were used (structural level actors’ responsibility, α = .79). One item 
measured individual responsibility. 
Support for economic and political change (α = .75). The same measure as in 
Study 2 was used.  
Political action intentions (α = .86). The same measure as in Studies 1 and 2 was 
used.  
Individual behaviour change intentions (α = .77). The same measure as in Study 
2 was used. 
Participants were then asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the 
text that they had received in their respective conditions. The text was reproduced for 
them.  
Design and Procedure 
 The study took place during the students’ practical class in which they 
completed an online questionnaire. Participants were asked to follow a link which 
randomly allocated them to one of the three conditions. The study took approximately 
15 minutes to complete. The independent variable was the information manipulation 
with three levels. The study received ethical approval from the relevant Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to see whether there were any systematic 
differences between conditions. There were no significant associations between 
condition and gender, χ² (4) = 2.56, p = .635, Cramér’s phi = .07, between condition and 
nationality (British and Irish compared to all other nationalities, including dual 
nationalities), χ² (2) = 1.87, p = .393, Cramér’s phi = .08, or between condition and age, 
F(2, 150) = 0.30, p = .739, r = .06. A series of one-way ANOVAs was carried out to 
examine the overall effect of condition on the dependent variables.  
There was no overall significant effect of condition on support for government 
intervention, F(2, 261) = 0.57, p = .566, r = .07. There was also no significant 
difference between the experimental groups, t(261) = 0.98, p = .330, r = .06. Tukey’s 
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HSD post-hoc test revealed no significant differences between the control and either of 
the experimental conditions (p > .05, see table 6 for all means and standard deviations). 
There was a marginally significant overall effect of condition on support for 
prioritising the environment, F(2, 261) = 2.38, p = .094, r = .13. The planned contrast 
between experimental conditions showed a significant difference, t(261) = 2.16, p = 
.032, r = .1321, whereby participants in the individual action condition (M = 5.43, SD = 
0.85) agreed more that the environment should be prioritised over the economy than did 
those in the structural change condition (M = 5.15, SD = 0.89). This is contrary to the 
expectation for Hypothesis 2. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test showed no significant 
difference between the experimental and control conditions (p > .05). 
There was a marginally significant overall effect of condition on agreement with 
structural level actors’ responsibility, F(2, 168.33) = 2.36, p = .09722, r = .13. The 
planned contrast showed no significant difference between the experimental conditions, 
t(163.10) = 1.57, p = .119, r = .12. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test revealed no significant 
difference between the control and experimental conditions (p > .05). 
There was a significant overall effect of condition on agreement with individual 
responsibility, F(2, 261) = 4.18, p = .016, r = .18. The planned contrast showed no 
significant difference between the two experimental conditions, t(261) = 0.56, p = .579, 
r = .0323. Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test showed a significant difference between the 
individual action and control condition, mean difference = 0.29, p = .017, whereby 
people in the individual action condition (M = 6.33, SD = 0.63) agreed more strongly 
that individual citizens should do more to reduce climate change, than did those in the 
                                                 
21 The data were significantly skewed in the individual action condition for support for 
prioritising the environment, skewness z = -1.98, p = .048. A Kruskal-Wallis test 
confirmed the results from the ANOVA, showing a marginally significant overall effect 
of condition, H(2) = 5.71, p = .058. Further, a Mann-Whitney test confirmed the t-test 
results, showing a significant difference (1-tailed) between the two experimental 
conditions, U = 3195.50, p = .011.    
22 Levene’s test was significant showing that homogeneity of variance was violated F(2, 
261) = 3.83, p = .023, so Welch’s F-ratio was used. 
23 There was significant skew and kurtosis for individual responsibility in the structural 
change condition, skewness z = -4.81, p < .001, kurtosis z = 7.55, p < .001. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the ANOVA results, showing an overall significant effect 
of condition, H(2) = 6.95, p = .031. Further, the Mann-Whitney test confirmed the t-test 
results, showing no significant difference (1-tailed) between the experimental 
conditions, U = 3872.50, p = .347.  
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control condition (M = 6.04, SD = 0.79). There was also a marginally significant 
difference between the structural action and control condition, mean difference = 0.24, 
p = .081, with participants in the structural action condition (M = 6.27, SD = 0.71) 
agreeing more strongly that individual citizens should do more to reduce climate 
change, than did participants in the control condition.  
There was no significant overall effect of condition on support for economic and 
political change, F(2, 261) = 1.64, p = .197, r = .11. There was no significant difference 
between the experimental conditions, t(261) = .07, p = .947, r = .00424, or between the 
control and experimental conditions (p > .05).  
There was no significant overall effect of condition on political action 
intentions, F(2, 261) = 0.19, p = .827, r = .04. The planned contrast showed no 
significant difference between the two experimental conditions, t(261) = .584, p = .560, 
r = .04. The post-hoc test revealed no difference between the control and experimental 
conditions (p > .05).  
There was no significant overall effect of condition on individual behaviour 
change intentions, F(2, 261) = 1.18, p = .308, r = .09. There was no significant 
difference between the experimental conditions, t(261) = 1.44, p = .151, r = .09, nor 
between the control and experimental conditions (p > .05).  
                                                 
24 The data showed significant kurtosis for support for economic and political change in 
the individual action condition, kurtosis z = -2.03, p = .042 and in the control condition, 
kurtosis z = 2.56, p = .010. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the results from the 
ANOVA, revealing no overall significant effect of condition, H(2) = 2.75, p = .253. 
Additionally, a Mann-Whitney test supported the t-test results, showing no significant 
difference (1-tailed) between the two experimental conditions, U = 3885.50, p = .376.    
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) by condition for each 
dependent variable. 
 
An independent samples t-test showed no significant difference between the two 
experimental conditions on level of agreement with the manipulation text in the 
respective conditions, t(177) = 1.10, p = .271, r = .0825 (individual action M = 5.63, SD 
= 1.06, structural change M = 5.46, SD = 0.98).  
In order to examine the relationship between participants’ agreement with the 
text in their respective condition and their responses to each independent variable, 
correlations were conducted separately for each condition.  
                                                 
25 There was significant skew and kurtosis in the individual action condition for level of 
agreement with the manipulation text, skewness z = -5.06, p < .001, kurtosis z = 4.55, p 
< .001. A Mann-Whitney test did not mirror precisely the t-test results, showing a 
marginally significant difference (1-tailed) between the two experimental conditions, U 
= 3511.50, p = .069.    
 Individual 
action 
Structural 
change 
Control 
Support for government 
intervention 
4.95 (0.59) 4.85 (0.77) 4.87 (0.67) 
Support for prioritising the 
environment 
5.43 (0.85) 5.15 (0.89) 5.26 (0.80) 
Structural level actors’ 
responsibility 
6.03 (0.55) 5.88 (0.67) 5.84 (0.70) 
Individual responsibility 6.33 (0.63) 6.27 (0.71) 6.04 (0.79) 
Support for economic and 
political change 
5.12 (0.77) 5.12 (0.84) 4.92 (0.84) 
Political action intentions 4.27 (1.12) 4.18 (1.11) 4.20 (1.01) 
Individual behaviour change 
intentions 
4.79 (0.81) 4.62 (0.82) 4.76 (0.77) 
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In the individual action condition there was a marginally significant positive 
correlation between participants’ agreement with the manipulation text and support for 
prioritising the environment, r = .18, p = .090, whereby participants who agreed more 
that individual action is crucial in making the difference to reducing climate change, 
were more supportive of prioritising the environment. Further, a significant positive 
correlation showed that participants who agreed more with the manipulation text, also 
agreed more with structural level actors’ responsibility, r = .25, p = .014. The more 
participants agreed with the manipulation text, the more they agreed with individual 
responsibility, r = .33, p = .001. Participants who agreed more with the text, also 
showed higher political action intentions, r = .27, p = .008. Finally, those who agreed 
more with the manipulation text, showed higher individual behaviour change intentions, 
r = .26, p = .013. All other correlations were non-significant (all ps > .05). 
For the structural change condition there was a significant positive correlation 
between agreement with the text and all dependent variables, except for the two items 
that related to individual responsibility and individual behaviour change intentions. 
Those who agreed more with the text, scored higher on support for government 
intervention, r = .23, p = .035; support for prioritising the environment, r = .26, p = 
.017; structural level actors’ responsibility, r = .24, p = .029; support for economic and 
political change, r = .37, p = .001; political action intentions, r = .26, p = .018. In 
contrast, the correlation between agreement with the manipulation text and individual 
behaviour change intentions, r = .18, p = .097 was marginal and there was no 
significant correlation with agreement on individual responsibility, r = .008, p = .945.  
Discussion 
This study demonstrated a marginally significant difference between conditions 
on support for prioritising the environment, with higher agreement that the environment 
should be prioritised over the economy in the individual action condition than in the 
structural change condition (contrary to Hypothesis 2). The only other significant 
differences were between the control and both experimental conditions. Participants in 
the individual action and the structural change condition (although for the latter the 
difference was marginal), showed higher agreement that individual citizens should do 
more to reduce climate change, than did those in the control condition. It is notable that 
participants in both experimental conditions agreed generally that individual citizens 
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should do more to reduce climate change, but did not score significantly higher than 
participants in the control condition on the intention to engage in political action or 
individual behaviour change.  
It is also noteworthy that participants in the structural change condition agreed 
more strongly on individual responsibility compared to the control condition. This may 
suggest that the manipulations had an effect on support for individual action on climate 
change irrespective of which level of intervention was suggested in the text. It could be 
that participants required to think about climate change mitigation strategies simply 
became more supportive of any kind of action and did not distinguish between 
individual and structural levels.  
General Discussion 
In Study 1 participants in the action impact condition were more supportive of 
prioritising the environment and marginally more in favour of structural level actors 
doing more to reduce climate change, than were those in the beneficial individual action 
condition. The correlations indicated that this difference might have been driven by 
participants with higher impact scores, as they scored higher on the dependent variables. 
The correlations showed that it was participants who had higher impact beliefs and 
those who chose more often that engaging is the better action compared to not engaging 
in a particular behaviour, who were more supportive of prioritising the environment, 
more in favour of structural level actors’ responsibility for reducing emissions 
(marginal in the action impact condition), in higher agreement with individual 
responsibility and had higher political action intentions.  
In Study 2 there were no overall significant effects of the condition on the 
dependent variables. However, participants agreed significantly more with the 
manipulation statement indicating that individual behaviour change has a large impact 
than with the statement indicating that individual behaviour change has little impact. 
Those who viewed behaviour change to have a large impact also agreed more with the 
interconnection between environmental and social well-being, while those who agreed 
more that individual behaviour change has very little impact were (marginally) less 
supportive of prioritising the environment, and less supportive of structural and 
individual level actors’ responsibility and showed lower individual behaviour change 
intentions. This suggests that those who viewed individual behaviour change as less 
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effective were less in favour of both structural and individual responsibility in reducing 
climate change. 
In Study 3, participants in the individual action condition were significantly 
more supportive of prioritising the environment than were those in the structural 
change condition. It seems that an emphasis and higher agreement on the impact of 
individual action (Study 1) and receiving information on the importance of individual 
action compared to structural change (Study 3), significantly influenced participants’ 
agreement that the environment should be prioritised. Also notable for Study 3 is that 
participants in both conditions (individual action and structural change) were 
significantly and marginally significantly (respectively) in higher agreement that 
individual citizens should do more to reduce climate change (individual responsibility), 
than participants in the control condition. The correlations showed that the more 
participants agreed that individual action is crucial to reduce climate change, the more 
they were supportive of prioritising the environment (marginally), structural and 
individual level actors’ responsibility and the higher were their intentions to engage in 
political action and individual behaviour change. Further, the more participants agreed 
that structural change is crucial to reduce climate change, the higher they scored on all 
dependent variables. The only exceptions to this were the dependent variables which 
related to the individual level (i.e. participants had marginally higher individual 
behaviour change intentions, but there was no significant correlation with individual 
responsibility).  
The results of these studies seem to suggest that participants viewed individual 
actions to be quite beneficial in reducing climate change, as in Study 2 participants 
agreed more that individual behaviour change has a large impact rather than very little 
impact. Past research from one survey showed that the more concerned respondents (of 
a nationally representative sample in the USA) believed that: “… if the actions they are 
personally taking were widely adopted throughout the modern industrialized world, it 
would significantly reduce global warming” (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, 
2009, p. 13). Additionally, highlighting the value of individual behaviour change made 
participants more supportive of prioritising the environment than did highlighting the 
value of structural level change (Study 3). Further, participants’ estimate of the impact 
of a particular action was noteworthy, as they viewed, for example, a person’s increased 
recycling to have more impact than a person’s reduction in taking flights (Study 1).  
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In the above studies there was little support for the prediction that focusing on 
the benefits of individual behaviour change would reduce support for structural level 
change, when compared to presenting individual behaviour change as ineffective or 
compared to the positive framing of structural level change. However, this could be due 
to the design of the studies, rather than a lack of the existence of such a pattern, since 
the manipulation might not have been successful in inducing a particular focus on one 
form of change over the other, or the dependent variables might not have been adequate 
for testing support for structural level change (as further discussed below).  
It could be that the present findings were influenced by participants’ general 
environmental values, whereby participants who were more concerned about climate 
change might simply have been more supportive of any kind of action (irrespective of 
the individual or structural level). Past research has found that anthropogenic climate 
change denial and scepticism tends to be higher in more right-wing compared to more 
left-wing leaning people (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Klein, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011a; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b). Therefore, those who are more pro-environmental 
may not only be more supportive of individual behaviour change (e.g., recycling more), 
but also more supportive of structural level changes (reforms in line with left-wing 
ideas). Thus, in the present research, it would have been beneficial to control for 
participants’ prior environmental and political views. 
A possible explanation for the findings that participants were overall favourable 
towards individual behaviour change and showed widespread agreement that it has a 
large impact, could be that it is due to participants’ general exposure to positive 
messages in society about individual behaviour change. Alternatively, people may be 
motivated to retain a view of the effectiveness or impact of individual action in order to 
maintain a sense of ‘agency’ or ‘power’. As Norgaard (2011) suggested, people do not 
only experience helplessness in regards to their own ability to reduce emissions, but 
also experience “a lack of confidence in the political system” (p. 191) to successfully 
reduce emissions. If people are sceptical about the ability and effectiveness of the 
political system, then it could be more reassuring to hold on to a belief in individual 
level impact. 
Although these studies set out to examine the broader question of whether 
focusing on individual behaviour change may divert attention and support away from 
structural level change and government responsibility (Kent, 2009; Shove, 2010; Webb, 
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2012), it is questionable whether this can be achieved in one (or even several) studies. 
The expectation that one block of information may change people’s views is 
questionable, especially given that the individualised approach is not just present in 
specific behaviour change campaigns, but constitutes a broader culture, long-term 
societal processes and continual exposure to certain messages (as discussed in the 
introduction), which is difficult to mimic or manipulate in a simple experimental study. 
Another limitation of all three studies is that one of the dependent variables juxtaposes 
the economy and the environment as two separate issues, with one needing to be 
prioritised over the other. This is a problematic framing which mirrors that of political 
public discourse where spending questions are commonly framed as ‘either’ / ‘or’ 
debates. This kind of presentation obscures the fact that environmental and economic 
decisions are entwined and that they can be addressed together, rather than requiring a 
choice of priority. For example, Klein (2014) has argued that restructuring the economic 
system and modes of production could occur in tandem with the reduction of 
greenhouse gases, whereby social and environmental well-being could be enhanced. 
Therefore, future studies would be advised to use dependent variables that do not pit the 
economy against the environment. Moreover, the dependent variables might not have 
successfully tapped into views on structural change or governmental action.  
Kent (2009), Shove (2010) and Webb (2012) amongst others, have argued that 
individual behaviour change campaigns lay the responsibility for addressing climate 
change on the individual. Future research could investigate how the use of 
individualism in behaviour change campaigns influences attention towards government 
responsibility and support for structural level change. Future research could also 
investigate whether people who believe more strongly in the impact of individual 
behaviour change are supportive of certain types of structural change, as opposed to 
others. They may support governmental change which enables individual behaviour 
change: for example, by increasing the availability of recycling banks or public 
transport. Participants may not be thinking of structural level change in terms of taxes to 
corporations or even more fundamental changes to the economic system, such as 
moving away from a growth-based economy.  
Future research could also try to unpack questions raised from the current 
findings, such as examining why certain behaviour changes are seen as more impactful. 
For example, are participants more likely to judge the behaviours they engage in 
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themselves to be more impactful than those behaviours they do not engage in? Under 
what circumstances do people become more supportive of structural level change and 
how does it relate to individual behaviour change? Is it, for example, the case that 
participants who hold stronger pro-environmental values are simply more supportive of 
both individual and structural change?  
In conclusion, although these studies found little support for the notion that 
individual behaviour change framings distract attention from, or reduce support for, 
structural level change, this could be due to the design of the research. Questions still 
remain as to the kinds of discourse and policy agendas that an individual behaviour 
change approach reproduces. The emphasis here is not to propagate a continuation of 
high consuming or wasteful lifestyles in Western countries, but instead a reassessment 
of effective mitigation strategies. This will necessitate a critical look at the structural 
context. 
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- Chapter 4 - 
“It never rains in California”: Understanding of drought as a natural and social 
phenomenon 
Abstract 
Since 2012 California has been experiencing an exceptionally severe drought resulting 
in a variety of social impacts. In response to suggestions that inaction on climate change 
is due to its temporal and spatial distance from ‘the West’, I examine how people in an 
industrialised country responded to the local expression of climate change in the case of 
the California drought. During ten weeks of fieldwork in late 2015 I conducted 77 
interviews with people in urban and rural areas of the state. In this chapter the analysis 
focused on how people experienced the drought, in isolation of views on climate 
change. The first three themes that were discussed related to people’s understanding of 
the drought as physical changes in ‘nature’, which varied depending on their 
conceptions of normality, on the location and on their emotional responses. Theme four 
examined how some people interpreted the drought as a social and political 
phenomenon (not as a purely physical one) for example in terms of water issues being 
related to financial motives. The fifth and final theme explored experiences of the 
drought that have been marginalised. Examining perceptions of drought (even if the 
focus is not on climate change narratives) can enhance our understanding of how people 
relate to changes in their environment and how this may influence views on climate 
change.  
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It never rains in California – there is even a song about it. Words to this effect 
were uttered by one Californian, indicating that lack of rain and drought conditions were 
not so unusual (as the song by Albert Hammond was taken to suggest), but others 
disagreed. In this chapter I examine how some people in California experienced the 
drought at the end of 2015.  
Water is the essence of life. How do people, who have been living in a land built 
on dreams of individual liberty, abundance and pushing back limits, react when they are 
confronted with discussions indicating the threat of water scarcity? The case of 
California is especially noteworthy because of the cultural context in which the drought 
is occurring. The USA - and California in particular - has been constructed as a place 
where everything is possible, where there are few limits (natural or social). As Reisner 
(1986) examined in Cadillac Desert, several towns and cities in the south-western 
United States were built in deserts, in direct defiance of nature’s hostility. Given this 
setting the drought in California presents a reminder of a lack of water in that region and 
of humans’ dependence on their natural environment.  
One reason sometimes given for inaction on climate change mitigation is the 
idea that the effects of climate change are (supposedly) distant in time and location 
(presumably from ‘the West’) and are therefore not tangible and immediate (Giddens, 
2011; Swim et al., 200926; Weber, 2006). This assumption has stimulated research into 
how people’s beliefs about climate change are affected by personal experience of floods 
and droughts (e.g., Capstick et al., 2015; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf & 
Hmielowski, 2012) and into their mitigation and adaptation behaviours (e.g., Blennow, 
Persson, Tomé & Hanewinkel, 2012; Whitmarsh, 2008).  
Leiserowitz et al. (2012) found that 69% of a nationally representative sample in 
the United States (and 71% of those living in the western US) somewhat agreed or 
strongly agreed that global warming was affecting the weather in the United States. 
Further, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, Howe and Rosenthal (2013) showed that 55% of their 
Californian sample agreed that they had personally experienced the consequences of 
                                                 
26 The authors concretely stated: “The likelihood of seriously and noticeably adverse 
events as the result [sic] global warming is bound to be small for the foreseeable future 
for many regions of the world” (p. 22). 
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global warming and 19% said global warming would cause a great deal of harm to them 
personally.  
However, a Gallup poll in the USA in 2010, showed that 67% of the sample, 
maintained that climate change would not seriously threaten them or their way of life in 
their lifetime (while 32% thought it would [Newport, 2010]). In light of this Ruddell, 
Harlan, Grossman-Clarke and Chowell (2012) proposed that: 
This sentiment may suggest that in a wealthy, industrialized, and urban society, 
most people who respond to telephone surveys are buffered from the immediate 
and severe effects of climate change by technological adaptations in the built 
environment (e.g., indoor heating and cooling systems, food storage capacity). 
(p. 583)  
The authors examined whether urban residents in Phoenix showed sensitivity to climatic 
change and whether their experience-based knowledge overcame other factors, such as 
influences from social networks, institutions, ideology and campaigns, in informing 
their opinions of climate change. They found that different social demographic 
characteristics predicted perceptions, whereby women, minorities, politically liberal, 
older people and long-term residents were more likely to report that the temperature was 
getting a lot hotter over time in Phoenix. Further, temperature in a given neighbourhood 
showed a modest correlation with the mean neighbourhood perception of temperature 
change. Ruddell et al. (2012) concluded that participants were sensitive to temperature 
change and that experience-based knowledge closely matched scientific evidence of 
local temperatures. Most importantly, however, at the neighbourhood scale the strongest 
predictor of perceived relative temperature was the neighbourhood’s temperature, while 
social demographic characteristics were not significant. This suggests that at a more 
local scale, factors such as ideology, gender or age are trumped by the personal 
experience of temperature change. Similarly, Evans et al. (2015) examined the 
relationship between the occurrence of drought and the public’s views on water supply 
and climate change-related water issues in the southern United States. Survey responses 
were spatio-temporally matched to short and long-term drought events. The authors 
found that local conditions of drought significantly predicted participants’ concern 
about water supply and climate change in relation to water. Specifically, long-term 
drought conditions influenced concern over current and future water supply as well as 
future drought likelihood, while short-term drought conditions predicted opinions about 
future drought likelihood and global warming related precipitation changes.  
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Similarly, Armah et al. (2015) found that coastal Tanzanian people’s perception 
of temperature increase matched the scientific time series for the same period and the 
authors suggested that in the case of incomplete or absent meteorological records, local 
climatic change perceptions could be employed to supplement scientific evidence. 
Notably, the authors found differences in perceptions depending on demographic 
variables, such as age, location and education. For example, older people who lived in 
rural parts of Tanga were more likely to report temperature to be cooling rather than 
warming, compared to younger respondents living in urban parts of Dar es Salaam. Due 
to differences across locations Armah et al. (2015) recommended increasingly orienting 
climate policy locally. The authors concluded their findings by challenging the notion 
that climate change is not relevant to daily life: 
It is often suggested that achieving public engagement with climate change is 
difficult because it is not a matter that is relevant to people’s daily lives or 
concerns. The results of this study challenge this assertion. During the past 
decade, climate change has become much more than an environmental issue. It 
is a global challenge whose repercussions are felt in all facets of our society. (p. 
148) 
In line with this suggestion, Capstick et al. (2015) found that after the Winter 2013/2014 
floods in the UK, 26% of respondents (of a nationally representative sample living in 
flood affected areas) indicated that their level of concern over climate change had 
increased over the last 12 months. Sixty-nine percent of respondents reported their 
concern remained about the same and 4% said it had decreased. Amongst the most 
common reasons stated by those with increased concern were directly observable 
occurrences, such as reference to heavy rain and/or floods (26%), as well as changed 
weather patterns and extreme weather (25%).   
Despite the increase in research on local climatic change perceptions, there has 
been less qualitative work, especially in affluent countries such as the USA. Affluent 
countries arguably have a larger responsibility to reduce emissions, given both their 
historical and current contributions to emissions and the unequal distribution of effects 
between more and less affluent countries (Klein, 2014; Norgaard, 2011). These 
circumstances are also acknowledged by the conferences of the parties’ (COP) adoption 
of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” (Koch, 2011, p. 146). 
Therefore, studying US citizens’ experience of climate change is particularly relevant 
given that (a) perceptions and experience have been argued to influence concern about 
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and action on climate change (Armah et al., 2015; Blennow et al., 2012; Swim et al., 
2009) and (b) the USA, as one of the (historically and currently) highest per capita 
carbon emitters, also holds more responsibility to reduce emissions.  
Qualitative research may extend insight into people’s experience of local 
climatic change by focusing in-depth on individuals’ perceptions and responses. Several 
qualitative studies of drought experience have been conducted in Australia (e.g., Alston, 
2006; Anderson, 2009; Pearce, Willis, Wadham & Binks, 2010), while the present 
research was conducted in the US.  
In this chapter I focus on Californians’ understanding and experience of the 
drought. This approach is similar to the approach taken by Pearce et al. (2010) who 
studied people’s perceptions, attitudes, emotions and related responses to drought in 
outback south Australia. In the next chapter I will look at how the experience of drought 
related to people’s views on anthropogenic climate change.   
The case of the Californian drought 
Since 2012 California has been experiencing an exceptionally severe drought 
(Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014). There are various definitions of drought depending on 
whether one’s approach is for example hydrological, meteorological, agricultural or 
socioeconomic (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985). One definition drawn upon by Mann and 
Gleick (2015) which took into account that societal factors interact with physical factors 
suggested that:  
In the most general sense, drought originates from a deficiency of precipitation 
over an extended period of time--usually a season or more--resulting in a water 
shortage for some activity, group, or environmental sector. Its impacts result 
from the interplay between the natural event (less precipitation than expected) 
and the demand people place on water supply, and human activities can 
exacerbate the impacts of drought. Because drought cannot be viewed solely as a 
physical phenomenon, it is usually defined both conceptually and operationally. 
(National Drought Mitigation Center, n.d.) 
Although the supply of water is contingent on social, political and economic decisions 
about its use and distribution, there are nonetheless noteworthy physical changes in 
California, as detailed below.  
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This drought is driven by simultaneous low precipitation and extreme27 high 
temperatures (AghaKouchak, Cheng, Mazdiyasni & Farahmand, 2014) and is 
unprecedented in at least the past 1200 years (Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014). In 
particular, 2014 and 2015 were the warmest years on record in California (NOAA, n.d.). 
Unique circumstances in the modern history of California resulted from the combination 
of increased demand and diminished surface water availability due to reduced 
snowpack, streamflows and reservoir levels (Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014). Further, the 
observed drying (Damberg & AghaKouchak, 2014) was predicted to continue with drier 
and warmer climate trends in the future (Cayan et al., 2010). Cook, Ault and Smerdon 
(2015) also suggested that risk of extreme drought, influenced mainly by heightened 
temperatures, was increasing in the western United States, irrespective of precipitation 
trends.  
It is important to note that California is a characteristically dry state and that 
droughts are: “… a fundamental feature of the climate of western North America” 
(Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014, p. 9017). Over the 20th century parts of the western 
United States witnessed extended dry episodes, yet the 2012 – 2014 period surpassed 
the previous droughts in the mid-1970s and late-1980s (Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014). 
There is evidence that the present drought is linked to anthropogenic climate 
change (Cook et al., 2015; Diffenbaugh, Swain & Touma, 2015; Mann & Gleick, 2015) 
and California’s Governor Brown has publicly acknowledged this evidence (Knowles & 
Durisin, 2015). As a consequence of news coverage, for some members of the public 
there will be an awareness of a link between drought and climate change, or if they 
remain sceptical, at least the presence of a debate. Further, the drought has had 
significant impacts, as noted in the Governor’s executive order:  
… the severe drought conditions continue to present urgent challenges 
including: drinking water shortages in communities across the state, diminished 
water for agricultural production, degraded habitat for many fish and wildlife 
species, increased wildfire risk, and the threat of saltwater contamination to 
                                                 
27 Extreme weather events and extreme climate events (for ease referred to jointly as 
climate extremes) have been defined as: “The occurrence of a value of a weather or 
climate variable above (or below) a threshold value near the upper (or lower) ends of 
the range of observed values of the variable.” (SREX, cited in Leonard et al., 2014, 
p.116).  
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fresh water supplies in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay Delta … (Executive 
order B-29-15, Brown, 2015, p. 1)  
On 1st April 2015 Governor Brown issued an executive order enforcing state-wide 
mandatory reductions in urban potable water use by 25% (State Water Resources 
Control Board [SWRCB], n.d.). The timeframe for reductions was originally set from 
June 2015 through February 2016 relative to the water used in the same months in 2013. 
Since California continued to experience severe drought in January 2016 the emergency 
regulations were extended through October 2016 (SWRCB, 2016). Each water district 
had autonomy over how to achieve this cut and districts’ reduction rates were adapted 
according to the existing residential per capita usage. Thereby, districts with lower 
usage had to reduce their consumption less and districts with higher usage had to reduce 
it more (with cuts ranging between 8-36%). The mandate prohibited, for example, the 
application of potable water to driveways and sidewalks, to outdoor landscapes if it 
caused runoff or within 48 hours of rainfall, to clean vehicles (unless using a shut-off 
device) and restaurants could only serve water upon customer request (SWRCB, n.d.). 
Regarding residential indoor usage, the state’s “Save Our Water” campaign provided 
various reduction recommendations such as shorter showers, using washing machines 
only for a full load and recycling dishwater for use on houseplants (Save Our Water, 
n.d.). Even if these changes do not sound significant, they pose a relatively contrasting 
relationship with water than that of the more common abundance and wastefulness in 
Western societies. 
Why drought narratives matter 
Nisbet (2009) highlighted the importance of the framing of climate change and 
making it relevant to people’s existing worldviews for it to result in public engagement. 
Abbott and Wilson (2015) suggested that an understanding of societal reactions to the 
notion and reality of climate change was necessary and would be enabled by the 
examination of lived experience. Further, they argued that people’s communication 
about their experience (for example in an interview) was not just a process of reflection, 
but that the articulation of experiences was part of the meaning making process and 
became part of the experience itself: “We are the product of the stories we tell about 
ourselves and how these may or may not be modified through communication and 
engagement with others” (p. 5). Thus the representation of drought, how people 
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conceptualise, talk and feel about it is important in order to understand how people are 
experiencing and producing the meaning of extreme climate events.  
Abbott and Wilson (2015) also highlighted the variety of experiences between 
rich and poor people and between affluent and less affluent countries in relation to 
extreme weather events. Taking the example of hurricane Katrina they illustrated the 
extent to which the context of economic, social and cultural factors influenced people’s 
experience. They pointed towards the intersection between social and environmental 
vulnerability, so that: “… even if you live in the richest country on the planet, insecure 
livelihoods, weak education and poor housing combine to make greater the negative 
impacts of extreme weather events” (p. 7). Historical and current power imbalances 
evidenced in a variety of social injustices form the societal structure in which people 
face anthropogenic climate change. This points towards the importance of examining 
predominant narratives and the factors that influence and mediate people’s 
understanding and experience of extreme weather events. 
Drawing on three case studies Alston (2006) highlighted women farm-workers’ 
experiences of drought in Australia in 2003 and drew attention to the way in which they 
were particularly affected by drought and by the government’s lack of financial support. 
The author criticised the prevailing presentation of drought being focused on the impact 
it had on the landscape and the decrease in agricultural production, while failing to 
acknowledge - and therefore intervene in - the hardships faced by farm-working 
families and especially women. Further, Alston (2006) noted that women farm-workers 
took on responsibility and feelings of guilt for the lack of well-being in the family. 
Thus, the research highlighted the role that dominant narratives and presentations of 
drought played in shaping understanding and responsibility, as well as individual and 
political responses to drought. The author drew on Foucault’s work (1980, cited in 
Alston, 2006) to argue that “discourses help construct reality and hence shape relations 
of power” (p. 157).  
Apart from the differences in who is affected, there is a question relating to the 
extent to which the drought is perceived as normal (because of previous droughts) or 
whether, due to its extremity and imposition of mandatory water cuts, it is perceived as 
disruptive. Given that in affluent countries people (at least of the middle and upper 
classes) are more used to discourses of abundance and growth than to discourses of 
scarcity, there is arguably the potential for a disruption of everyday life. Habermas 
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(1984, cited in Abbott & Wilson, 2015) in discussing the question of what makes us 
human, pointed towards the importance of our ability to both labour, reflect on and 
(most importantly) challenge and shape society. The ability to labour referred to the 
manipulation of the material conditions under which we live, such as “our ability to 
transform our physical environment or ‘nature’ for productive use” (p. 181). The second 
point of challenging and shaping society, is particularly relevant in the face of climate 
change. To what extent may physical disruptions and discussions about the drought 
facilitate a communicative rationality that can lead to challenging the social and 
economic system? 
Beck’s (1992) theory on risk society may be helpful in understanding how risk is 
perceived and mediated by science. Beck (1992) defined risks as usually invisible 
radioactivity, toxins or pollutants that often induce irreversible harm on plants, animals 
and people. Risks are established through causal interpretations and are therefore open 
to interpretation:  
They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within 
knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and 
construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in 
charge of defining risks become key social and political positions. (p. 23)  
It is only through science that many people know about anthropogenic climate change. 
With the exception of numerous indigenous communities, lots of people do not rely on 
knowledge of their local environment in order to survive, which can increase reliance on 
Western science to perceive and learn about long-term shifts in climate. This gap 
between direct experience and scientific evidence creates the room for social and 
political contestation. Although the drought is more perceptible to direct experience 
(than for example sea level rise) it is still mediated by other factors such as 
understanding of science and presentation in the media. Within this gap a variety of 
understandings and explanations for the drought can emerge and are worth examining.   
In this chapter I therefore scrutinise how people understood, interpreted and 
experienced the drought. I investigate what kind of changes people noticed and what 
their experiences of those changes were. The key research questions were: What does 
drought mean to people living in California? What are some of the factors that influence 
their experience? 
 
128 
 
 
 
Method 
From 25th September to 8th December 2015 I conducted fieldwork on the 
drought in California. For reasons of anonymity I will not mention the names of smaller 
places and have changed people’s names. I visited a range of places from large coastal 
cities to smaller towns in the north, south and east of California, as well as in the 
Central Valley. In total I interviewed 77 people (using a voice recorder) who I had 
contacted either by e-mail or approached on the street, in cafés, on the bus, in the library 
or other public spaces. Thus, the sample consisted of people to whom I had easy access. 
I asked people if they had time to talk about the drought and most of them were happy 
and willing to do so28. I used a semi-structured interview plan which I followed loosely 
from memory and adapted spontaneously according to the direction of the conversation. 
To begin, people were usually asked whether they thought there actually was a drought 
or not, and if so, whether it was affecting them. I tended to ask people what they 
thought was causing the drought, or whether it was related to climate change towards 
the end of the interview. The interviews lasted from anywhere between five minutes to 
one hour. Apart from the voice recorded interviews I had many off-the-record 
conversations about drought and other topics that offered a glimpse into the daily lives 
of people living in California. Additionally, I kept a field diary to record observations 
and followed news coverage of the drought in the period of my visit. By e-mail I 
contacted people who worked in water-related jobs, such as water utilities or fire 
fighters. Overall I spoke to people of many different professions, including teachers, 
street cleaners and gardeners. I did not ask participants to report demographic 
information (such as age or race) because this would have seemed intrusive in the 
informal and conversational setting of the interviews. Occasionally participants made 
reference to such demographic information, for example mentioning their occupation, in 
which case I took note of it.  
By conducting my research in another country to my own (the USA rather than 
England or Germany) I had the benefits of being an ‘outsider’, allowing me to observe 
                                                 
28 I acknowledge that this method of data collection was enabled by my appearance (that 
of being a white woman) which meant that people were largely open to engaging with 
me when I approached them in public spaces. 
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different cultural practices, taking fewer customs for granted and being able to ask 
‘naive’ questions.  
Analytic approach 
All interviews were transcribed (by myself and three assistants) including false 
sentence starts, repetitions and most fillers like ‘um’, ‘err’, and ‘you know’, most of 
which were however removed from quotes reported in this chapter. The coding and data 
analysis were flexible and informed by, but not exclusive to, thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Employing a broadly contextualist method, I examined how individuals 
make sense of their experiences, while taking into account how these meanings and 
experiences relate to the larger social context (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
I coded the transcripts in NVivo to help me organize the data. Using an 
inductive approach, I was primarily driven by the data, rather than a pre-existing coding 
frame or theoretical preconceptions. Nonetheless my analysis will invariably have been 
influenced by my previous reading: “Categorising is … an interactive process in which 
priority is given to the data, but understanding is inevitably facilitated by previous 
understanding” (Elliott & Timulak, 2005, p. 154).  
Reading and rereading the transcripts, I coded them into meaning units, which: 
“… are usually parts of the data that even if standing out of the context, would 
communicate sufficient information to provide a piece of meaning to the reader” (Elliott 
& Timulak, 2005, p. 153). The meaning units could range in length from a sentence to a 
paragraph. They were organised into themes and subthemes. Some text passages were 
double coded into various themes. I selected and combined themes that related to and 
complemented each other into separate chapters, although not all themes were 
incorporated. I acknowledge the active role I took as a researcher, in which I identified 
themes, selected which were of interest and presented them to the reader, i.e. themes did 
not passively ‘emerge’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Although I organised meaning units 
into themes, I did not discard quotes that were dissimilar to others. Distinctiveness was 
also important in guiding my analysis, in line with Elliott and Timulak’s (2005) stance 
that:  
… no data should be left out in this step, because idiosyncratic aspects of the 
phenomenon can inform the study in interesting ways. After all, qualitative 
research is interested in the different aspects of the examined phenomenon; 
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therefore, it should not discard some of them just because they are infrequent. 
(p. 155) 
To improve the validity of my results I triangulated, i.e. double checked and compared 
my findings across different sources and methods, such as media coverage, interviews 
and observations. In the following analysis the extracts I provide are illustrative 
examples. My description and interpretation of them is also informed by what other 
people said and by what I observed. However, it is up to each reader to decide whether 
my interpretation is convincing or not.  
Results 
It is important to note that the analysis presented in this chapter is primarily in 
relation to people’s perception of drought, irrespective of views on climate change. The 
aim is to provide an insight into how people understood local changes, while in the next 
chapter I examine how people related local changes to climate change.  
Themes are marked in bold and subthemes are indented. The use of three dots 
indicates that a passage from the interview has been removed and words in brackets 
explain what the participant meant.  
Ideas of normality 
One theme related to people’s ideas of what is ‘normal’, concerning for example 
rain patterns, snowfall, lake and river levels. These ideas involved certain conceptions 
of nature, which often had to do with nature as non-human, i.e. as separate from 
humans. Nature was conceptualised as weather, the landscape such as lakes, trees and 
mountains, and contrasted to the human-built environment, such as cities. The idea of 
what constituted normality also had a temporal aspect, since people needed a 
comparison with what was ‘normal’ in the past, for example: “The mountains were 
barren and normally it should have been just packed and white” (Anna). Notions of time 
were also involved in claims about droughts as being natural and cyclical (recurring 
over time) and therefore ‘normal’.  
When I spoke to Jake who originally came from the East Coast, he noted that 
people in Los Angeles (LA) were used to not having water, that water had always been 
brought into the city from somewhere else and that therefore nothing had really changed 
with the drought. 
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Jake: It’s weird, when you talk to people that have lived here all their lives, 
they’re kinda like, “yeah, whatever”. 
Sarah: They’re not bothered? 
Jake: Well, “we’ve never had water”, so like, I guess they’re kinda used to it … 
it just it never rains here, and they’re used to that and they get their water from 
somewhere else and always have … if you look around there’s nothing different, 
I mean, it’s all watered plants down here so. 
Establishing an idea of what is normal is necessary as a baseline comparison for 
noticing and outlining change both in terms of landscape and access to water. In the two 
examples above, Anna’s comment presents her idea that previously and normally the 
mountains should have been covered in snow at that time of year. She noticed a change 
in landscape which she classified as unusual. In contrast Jake’s response demonstrates 
that because Los Angeles “never had water” (i.e. it is brought in) the relative absence of 
the city’s own water had become normal. Therefore the drought did not necessarily 
present a different state of affairs or cause for concern. People ‘knowing’ that the region 
was dry and their being used to it meant that the drought condition did not pose an 
‘abnormal’ comparison.  
Location: Inside versus outside of the city 
As touched on above, location influenced the level of exposure to changes in 
weather and the landscape that people experienced, which in turn influenced feelings of 
the drought being ‘real’ or ‘abstract’. People in cities sometimes noticed changes in 
weather, but overall people in rural areas tended to be more immediately surrounded by, 
and aware of, both changes in weather and landscape. Direct experience and the media 
served as sources of information on the drought. 
The role of weather in cities. In the Bay Area some people commented on the 
weather being warmer, on changes in the timing of seasons, like the summer starting 
earlier and lasting longer and above all, they noted the absence of fog in San Francisco, 
which was described as feeling mysterious and being characteristic of the city. This 
illustrates how one of the ways city dwellers experienced ‘nature’ or ‘the outdoors’ was 
through weather. It suggested that the weather defined a place and how people related to 
it – giving the place a certain feeling and creating a ‘place identity’. Further, weather 
and climate patterns are important to place identity because they influence what people 
can do, such as recreational activities. Agriculture is also weather dependent and plays a 
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big role in California. Anna described the noticeable changes in warmer weather, but 
suspected that people in her city did not feel the effects as much as people in other 
places. 
Sarah: So do you think people within San Francisco feel affected by the drought 
or not really? 
Anna: I mean, I feel like in a way yes, because the weather is so much nicer, I 
mean this kind of warmth that you’ve experienced day after day, after day, after 
day, is really unusual so, but, I don’t know if people think it’s the drought or if 
it’s climate change, or if they just are like “well”, they don’t, they’re just, they 
don’t care. But I don’t feel that we have this, like we have to (tighten) our belts 
as much as like southern California or maybe other places. 
 Observing changes in landscape. Other experiences of the drought related to 
observed changes in landscape. People who lived in rural areas or towns tended to 
describe changes in their immediate surroundings. One town in the north of California 
lay in a region that has historically had abundant water, as it was surrounded by 
mountains and lay at the source of springs and a river. People in this region had a close 
tie to water and mention of the pristine water source tended to come with a sense of 
pride and appreciation. The extract below illustrates an idea of what was normal in that 
area in the past. 
Rod: I mean here in this town, I don’t know if you know the water system, but it 
comes out of the springs on the mountain and it never sees the light of day until 
the water comes out of the tap and there is no filtration and there is no 
chlorination and it is spring fed. I don’t know if you’ve tasted it, but it’s really 
good water, so we’ve had a really good deal here for a long, long time.  
However, here too water was running low and people talked about the local springs 
running dry: 
Rod: So, for instance, we have the springs on the mountain, but then because 
there has been a drought the last four years, in the previous three years we have 
two wells and they had to turn the wells on, and last year the wells weren’t, 
between the wells and the springs it barely kept up with demand.  
Thomas: We definitely see some of the springs that have shallow aquifers, 
they’re starting to dry up seasonally. (One) spring which is just up here in the 
mountain, it’s in a campground situation, it hasn’t flowed for like the last two 
years. There’s other ones, you know, which we could point out.  
Since that particular town relied on some of these springs for its water supply, people 
living there were able to closely follow water running low. This was different from 
places like LA, where water is shipped in from further away and people were less 
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closely in touch with their water source. However, in that town in northern California 
people also still had water coming out of their taps, so although they knew of direct 
changes in their surrounding landscape, they were not experiencing water shortage 
themselves.   
Drought as abstract: In the city people do not feel affected. People felt 
affected by the drought on differing levels depending on location. For example, in larger 
cities people were more likely to know about the drought from the media rather than 
from direct experience. Larissa in San Francisco said she only knew about the drought 
from the news and that she did not personally feel affected. She believed the news 
although she had no direct experience of the drought. 
Sarah: Do you think that there is a drought happening? 
Larissa: Umm, yes I do. But I only know that because, I read it in the paper and 
see it on the news.  
Sarah: Right. So it’s not like you personally feel anything different? 
Larissa: I don’t personally feel anything different. I mean, I believe it, you 
know, but like I said, it doesn’t really, it hasn’t really affected me so much. 
A similar point was made by Geoffrey in the same city:  
Geoffrey: I’m thinking most people in the cities are only aware of it (drought) 
from the media, but they haven’t faced any true dilemma … I think anyone 
whose livelihood depends on water, is gonna be more affected. Here, we’ve 
been asked to please stop using water.  
Although people had been asked to reduce their water usage, it is noteworthy that some 
people in the city did not experience this mandate as a way in which the drought 
affected them. In the same city, Layla also stated that despite the water reduction 
measures, she sometimes forgot about the drought and that in the city people were 
“isolated” and did not understand the “seriousness”. 
Layla: You know those measures are happening but I just feel like, even 
personally for me, like sometimes I forget there is a drought, and then there’s a 
little bit of rain and I’m like “oh we need more” and then, I don’t know, I think 
we are pretty isolated from like people who are actually experiencing drought, 
like people who really don’t have water coming out of their tap … just places 
that really aren’t the city. But yeah, I know that there are places that actually felt 
that, like, struggle and I feel like we are not a group of people who have actually 
really like experienced it, so we are not really understanding the seriousness of it 
at all.  
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Similarly, Deborah in LA described that there was an intellectual but not a practical 
awareness of the drought, and she suggested that one reason for this was because 
everyday life was still continuing as ‘normal’. So not only were ideas of what 
constituted normal weather patterns or landscapes important, but ideas of normal daily 
life also shaped people’s experience of the drought, pointing towards the influence of 
social cues on people’s response. Because everyone else was continuing as usual, little 
disruption was experienced. Deborah outlined her perception of a disconnect from 
nature and the ‘reality’ of drought which was being reported. 
Deborah: We have been quite aware through the media of the drought issue, we 
don’t feel any, we haven’t seen any difference in terms of every day of our lives 
and so it’s just an intellectual awareness but it’s not a practical awareness. 
That’s how it feels, that we’re just hearing about it, they’re scaring us about it 
but we are not, you know, it’s not affecting like our everyday life. Which can be 
disconcerting because you kind of go on with your life like everything is normal 
and you know, at what point will we feel the impact, you know, that’s the 
question.  
Related to Deborah’s question about when people would feel the impact, Arthur thought 
that it had to get to the point where water was not coming out of the taps anymore. 
Arthur: If you go outside the city … you can see it’s just burnt up, everything is 
so brown and dry and hot and so you kinda see it when you leave the city … San 
Francisco people I think are aware and conscious and they, a little bit, try to do 
stuff to cut down on water but, I don’t think people are making that big of a deal 
of it … because we turn on our taps, we get water (laughs) so you know, people 
don’t want to change their behaviour I don’t think, people don’t want to, you 
know, deal with reality, you know that we have a very populated world and, 
overpopulated you could say, nobody ever thinks or talks about that, you know 
so, if things are inconvenient a lot of times, I think as Americans we just kinda 
turn a blind eye and do whatever we want and don’t worry about the 
consequences to others so much maybe. 
Arthur suggested that in San Francisco the drought is not ‘a big deal’, but that people do 
try and reduce their water use a little. People are not yet being inconvenienced so he 
argued they did not want to deal with ‘reality’, indicating that people held drought at a 
distance. He also implied that overpopulation was part of the problem, but that 
inconvenient topics were collectively ignored. Later, Arthur also commented that 
“people need to feel it before they react”, indicating that the situation was not yet bad 
enough to cause more of a reaction.  
Several of the above extracts highlight that some people said they did not feel 
affected by the drought because they still had water coming from their taps. This 
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suggests that they equated drought with water shortage. Since they did not experience 
direct water shortage, they took it to mean that they were not affected by the drought. 
However, the institutional definitions of drought (mentioned in the introduction and by 
Chleo who worked for a water utility company [discussed later]) do not suggest that 
residents will necessarily experience running out of water.  
Because of the way water infrastructure is organised, Tom argued that people 
have water until it runs out completely. The implication is that people do not feel 
impacted because they do not experience a gradual decline in water availability.  
Sarah: Do you feel like the drought has personally affected you? 
Tom: No, it’s living in a city … (the water is) all piped down here, so we have 
been living, the city has been living unnaturally since the beginning so, as long 
as there is enough water in the reservoir, and the reservoir is low, but you know 
the way the system is set up is that you either have water or you don’t, it’s not 
really a question of degree. 
In the following interview with Kyle, who ran a hostel in a recreation area in eastern 
California, he mentioned that the drought in general had affected tourism because of the 
lack of snow throughout the years.  
Kyle: Everything tourist related, restaurants, accommodation, rentals, tour 
guiding …  really everybody, and everybody knows somebody who works in 
that business, so if it didn’t affect them directly, it’s also, in turn, I don’t have, 
well, hypothetically, I don’t have as much money, because I’m not making 
money here, so I can’t spend it on other things in town. So it affects the entire 
economy. 
Yet, even in this area, Kyle later stated that people (including himself) weren’t being 
directly affected. I had asked him whether people talked about the drought.  
Kyle: It’s talked about a lot, but it’s also ignored a lot. It’s the sort of thing that, 
it doesn’t always interest people that much, because it doesn’t affect them 
directly, so it’ll be put, just like you know all other dilemmas in the world, on 
Facebook and things like that, and in the paper and in the media, but really when 
it comes to like, I have never had a conversation with someone this lengthy at 
the hostel and thousands of people come here every year. So I mean, it’s not 
something that is affecting me so directly that it needs to be discussed all the 
time, yet, if you listen to people who are really talking about it and discussing 
the facts, it is pretty dire, in a lot of situations, certain counties, certain cities, 
and if it persists the way it is, it’ll be, you know, it’ll affect lots of people 
drastically … But, I don’t know, for the time being people just kind of see what 
happens, just kind of wait it out, I guess.  
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Kyle’s comments might at first seem slightly contradictory, but they indicate that the 
drought is strangely present as well as ignored (people talked about it a lot and also 
ignored it; people were and were not affected). People posted about the drought on 
Facebook, but did not talk about it in lengthy conversations. In other interviews as well, 
there was sometimes the sense that the drought was affecting other places (Kyle said 
“certain counties, certain cities”) or at least, that it was worse elsewhere and might get 
worse in the future. So, although people knew about drought to an extent, and even if 
their local area was being affected, some people still seemed to experience drought at a 
distance.   
 Tom commented that climate change and drought is “too big an issue to connect 
with”, implying that drought remains intangible even when people are surrounded by it. 
Tom: Climate change is so huge … it’s too big an issue to connect with, even 
drought, you know, I mean drought I guess you could say “oh I can have shorter 
showers” and everything, and in that way you can connect with it, but beyond 
that.  
One person also mentioned the role of science as a mediator of people’s interaction with 
the world and as contributing to people not feeling so affected. 
Lennard: We feel like we are untouchable, totally, “it won’t affect us” …  and 
the reason we’ve been able to feel that way is ‘cos of science, and now when 
science tells us we have to change people want to, you know, not do it.   
There was a sense that people in cities only noticed the drought when they left the city, 
e.g., through seeing changes in landscape. This suggests that people did not view the 
urban environment as natural, almost as though being in a city cut them off from 
‘reality’.  
Emotional responses 
 Seeing the changes in the natural environment evoked different emotional 
responses, especially fear. Changes in ‘normal’ landscape and weather patterns were 
widely perceived as scary. However, there were also attempts to remain optimistic and 
hopeful by seeing positive sides to the drought.  
 Fear. Several people responded emotionally to the drought, describing the 
changes they were seeing for example as being “scary”. Anna discussed a visit to her 
friend in a mountainous region in eastern California.  
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Anna: A couple of years ago I went to see my friend in the east of California, 
and I think it was the first winter that it was really warm and not much snow and 
we were, we did something and I just looked at the mountains, we couldn’t go 
skiing because it wasn’t enough, and we just like went for a walk or something, 
and I just was like “wow this is really scary” because the mountains were barren 
and normally it should have been just packed and white and, so yeah it’s, it 
makes me scared at least for this area of California.  
The absence of snow felt “scary” to Anna, suggesting that when she saw the changes in 
landscape there was not just an intellectual understanding of the drought. Anna went on 
to describe a more recent experience of the same area. 
Anna: When I went up to see her, you know a week ago, it had rained, you know 
that all day Saturday and then the next day we went for a walk and she was like 
“Oh wow” we walked by the river and she was like “Oh the river’s actually kind 
of flowing again” which she was happy about, she was like “Oh”, ‘cos I guess it 
hadn’t really been flowing, so … and I was like “wow, that’s kind of crazy”.  
In this instance going for a walk was one way in which Anna described noticing the 
drought through interacting with and experiencing her surroundings. Realising that the 
river had stopped flowing seemed “crazy” to her, language which again suggested that it 
was something out of the ordinary. Seeing the river flow again was a surprise and 
source of happiness for her friend (a sort of nostalgic happiness, which compared the 
current state of the river to past states of the river).  
 Willow described the drying of a lake which she noticed on a car journey from 
San Francisco up through northern California. 
Willow: So there is most definitely a drought happening. Today on the drive up I 
passed Lake Shasta, Lake Shasta is not a lake anymore. We have seen a decrease 
over the last couple of years, but this is, it basically looked like a dried up 
meadow with a tiny, tiny stream coming to it. There is barely any water there at 
all, there is most, most definitely a drought. Rain is such a rare occurrence, I 
think it’s only really happened a few times since I’ve lived here, like a bit of 
drizzle sure, but like actual rain, rain doesn’t, doesn’t really happen very often. 
And it feels very miserable and scary actually, yeah. 
Willow also expressed her emotional responses, stating that the lack of rain felt 
“miserable and scary”, comparable to words used by Anna. This extract illustrates how 
people use their direct personal experience of seeing, for example, a dry lake bed or the 
lack of rain, to inform and confirm their understanding of the occurrence of a drought 
(the certainty of which appears to be reinforced by Willow’s emotional reaction). This 
points towards the difference between cognitive and emotional forms of knowledge.  
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 Concern was also raised specifically in relation to the future. For example, 
Lennard in the Bay Area mentioned his concern over future water issues.  
Lennard: It kind of scares me, that’s like the future, like water’s going to be a 
real big deal out here. 
Tom (also in the Bay Area) described that there was a widespread sense of foreboding, 
indicating that fear and worry were common rather than isolated experiences. In 
response to my question whether people were feeling impinged in their freedom in 
relation to the mandated water reductions Tom answered: 
I haven’t heard that, I mean I think people generally, there’s a sense of 
foreboding around here, like this isn’t right, and this is a real concern, and things 
could get worse and we are all very worried about it. 
 Optimism29. While several people referred to the changes as “scary”, Thomas, 
who worked for the Forest Service (so was a government employee) in a northern 
Californian town, weighed up the pros and cons of the drought.  
Thomas: On the positive side, there’s more recreational opportunities in terms of 
camping, hiking, that sort of thing. On the downside, skiing has really suffered 
… (One ski resort) had a very limited season this last year, they only opened for 
I think like two or three weeks and that is a big wintertime economic boom to 
the community … it has a domino effect where they’re not making money, their 
employees are not making money, all the little businesses in town like especially 
the restaurants, not so much the grocery stores, but the restaurants, they’re not 
making money, we’ve actually seen a few that have closed up, which is 
unfortunate. So there is an economic effect from the drought … But, on the 
positive side, the town didn’t have to spend any money on snow removal 
(laughing). And nobody here had to shovel snow for the first time in a long time, 
which is back breaking intensive work when you’re trying to shovel out your 
driveways and stuff … So there’s positives and negatives, is what I would say.  
One question is to what extent his weighing up of the pros and cons is an attempt at 
being balanced and neutral in his views on the drought - a kind of scientific approach 
often appealed to in Western democratic values. Thomas’ cost-benefit analysis and level 
                                                 
29 Optimism is not necessarily classed as an emotion here, but it is a contrasting reaction 
to the otherwise unpleasant emotional responses such as fear. Optimism could be argued 
to be an emotion management strategy in order not to experience an unpleasant 
emotion. Norgaard (2011) examined optimism as an attempt to manage information and 
uncertainty: “… I described how too much information evoked community members’ 
feelings of uncertainty, and so the information was carefully managed. The strategy of 
controlling one’s exposure to information reflected the emotion norm of optimism. 
Educators and activists themselves had to be careful not to become overwhelmed in 
order to continue their work” (p. 127).   
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of optimism is striking, given that he described the local economy as being seriously 
affected, as well as previously mentioning nearby springs running seasonally dry. 
Despite these effects he is still able to be fairly nonchalant about the drought and to see 
positive sides to it. He did not remark on any unpleasant emotions, which may be partly 
due to the perceived benefits he outlined.  
Understanding the drought as a social and political phenomenon  
Despite the majority of people stating that they believed there was a drought, 
there were some people who thought there was more to the drought than just a lack of 
water due to physical changes in nature. Their contestation varied from the argument 
that there was no drought at all, to milder versions suggesting that there was also a 
political side to the drought. This highlighted that people did not understand the drought 
purely in terms of natural and physical changes, but also pointed to a social component, 
concerning the demand and distribution of water. This understanding of drought is in 
line with the definition mentioned in the introduction (which acknowledged social 
factors). 
As discussed above, in some cases the notion that there was still water and that 
life continued as ‘normal’ meant that people only had an “intellectual awareness” of the 
drought. However, in other cases the absence of a direct water shortage led people to 
conclude that there was actually no drought. A woman who worked for a water utility 
company in eastern California voiced her frustration at people not believing in the 
drought because they confused water shortage with drought. 
Chleo: Because one of my biggest frustrations this summer up here is, there has 
been people in this community who have said multiple times throughout the 
summer that we are not in a drought … and I just want to scream because you 
don’t know what the definition of drought is then (laughs) because … one of the 
things I’ll tell you is that we are not in a situation of a water shortage. We have a 
very stable water supply, and ah, so that a lot of people up here they know that 
… and they confuse water shortage with drought. It’s like, well, they are often 
related but they are not the same ... But if the drought continues then we 
probably will be looking at a water shortage.  
One person in LA argued that there was no drought because LA was being supplied by 
the Colorado River which he said was not about to run out and that California had 
always been dry. He suggested that there were political motives for creating the, in his 
opinion, fictive drought in order to make money (as water would become more 
valuable).   
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 Several other people suggested that the drought was exaggerated and used by 
politicians for ulterior motives and that “it’s being exploited” (Rod), although they did 
not argue that the drought was being ‘made up’.  
 A similar line of argument has been followed for climate change more generally, 
suggesting that it is used to further certain political agendas. Specifically, it has been 
argued that climate change is a left-wing attempt to increase government intervention 
and regulation of corporations and individual freedom (Klein, 2014). One Republican 
Party member made this point very explicitly.  
Martin: For the advocates of extreme response to global warming the grabbing 
of a drought to further their, I’ll call it political agenda is contrary to science … 
people will try to draw that connection (between drought and climate change) … 
but it’s for a, what I’ll call political purpose to get to cause action on the part of 
people. It’s not because of a rational, you know, intellectually constructed logic 
(laughing) … there is an undercurrent of ideological political thought that would 
like more governmental control … over people … it’s the government using this 
CO2 emissions thing to determine where people are gonna live and how they’re 
gonna drive and what kinda house they’re gonna live in … So, it’s an intrusion 
of the government into personal liberty.  
 Another example of people contesting the political nature of the drought was 
highlighted by signs along the roads in the Central Valley (the agricultural centre of 
California). The highways were lined with signs that were critical of Governor Brown’s 
approach to the drought. They were visible to anyone who drove through California and 
their presence was common knowledge. Rose referred to the signs as implying that the 
water crisis was being created by the government (although she personally did not agree 
with this interpretation). 
Rose: I’m trying to remember exactly what the signs say, but they imply that 
politicians have created the water crisis and that we need to get them to stop it. 
And there are signs that, quite a few of them up and down the freeway, right, 
because that’s where there’s a lot of agriculture, right by the freeway, and there 
will just be these signs posted “government caused water crisis” you know, 
“stop”, you know, “water equals jobs”, all through, so somebody is putting up 
those signs, more than one person.  
This contention around the drought and water distribution may well be more extreme in 
the agricultural epicentre because of the larger amounts of water required for agriculture 
and because of possible differences between some Republican farmers and the 
Democratic governor. 
141 
 
 
 
However, the political handling of water allocation was also criticised from a more left-
wing perspective by Rod who worked for a water related non-profit organisation. 
Rod: Consumptive water rights claims are five times more than the available 
water supply in a normal water year … what that means is that California is in a 
perpetual drought, regardless of how much it rains, there is always a claim for 
more water than exists, so if we build more dams and reservoirs they are going 
to be empty in the fourth year of drought, just like all the other reservoirs, 
because the claims are so great, and so until California does an accounting of 
how much water is actually available and who is entitled to it, there is always 
going to be a demand for more water than exists and we are always going to be 
living beyond our means.  
Rod in particular had a lot of knowledge about water issues, due to his work, and was 
very critical of the State government’s handling of water, including a specific measure 
the state was funding. When I asked him why that was happening he replied: 
Rod: Because of money, because politicians are owned by the big corporations, 
for instance, there’s a big, very wealthy people, Stewart and Lynda Resnick, 
they live in Beverly Hills, they are billionaires, you’ve heard of POM 
International? … the Resnick’s have the largest citrus and pistachio farms in the 
state … Californians in the cities were told to cut their water consumption on 
average of 25% because of the drought, (but) the state is allowing people like the 
Resnick’s and others to continue to plant permanent crops like almonds in areas 
with poisoned ground, over-drafted groundwater, where the ground is actually 
sinking because they are pumping so much water … and there’s no constraints, 
they’ve put no controls on, or no prohibition in … And again it’s a classic 
example of the corporations and the wealthy people buying the politicians and 
the common person does not have the resources to the politicians or the courts to 
change this. It’s a very, very corrupt system and it’s very discouraging. 
Although Rod’s knowledge is very particular, this extract illustrates the awareness that 
some Californians had of large scale water use and the state’s involvement with ‘big’ 
agriculture. Some people in cities were also sceptical of the political handling of the 
drought. Felicia (Bay Area) told me that her water prices had increased and wondered 
what the actual figures of water availability were at the reservoir that supplied her area, 
since it was one of the largest.  
Felicia: We have the largest water supply … I think there’s some political … 
agendas involved, yes, I do. I used to believe, oh yes, we’re in a major drought, 
but I think that it’s more than that … I do, now, what are my bases for that? I 
mean, my water rates have increased 30% … my question is, I never see the 
numbers that are being used at (the water reservoir). We have the largest water 
source right here … so I am wary of the political sense of what is happening.  
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Others thought it was implausible that the drought was literally being created by 
politicians or corporations, but agreed that they might use the situation for profit.  
Betty: It’s not raining, we know it isn’t. It isn’t a scam from the government that 
it’s not raining … I don’t think corporations are that smart. I think, if the rain 
stops they’re like “ok, maybe we can raise rates”. They’re sort of, they’re the 
jackal of what’s happening outside, but they’re not the cause of it.  
How the drought is understood is important because narratives and interpretations 
influence people’s view on the appropriate response. One example of this is how 
different water interests were sometimes constructed as opposite and mutually 
exclusive. For example, there was the pitting of environmentalists (and ‘the fish’) 
against the interests of farmers and the interests of cities. In response to the question of 
what he thought should be done to better prepare for droughts in the future, Martin 
proposed increasing storage capacity, but said that this would conflict with 
environmentalists. 
Martin: And that (increasing storage) runs into the environmentalists who really 
want to restore pristine valleys and not be as concerned about people … We’ve 
got this inherent conflict between agriculture and the cities and the environment, 
whether you help the fish … and let the rivers run free in order to help the fish, 
or whether you hold them back and help the people and of what you hold back, 
how much goes to the cities and how much goes to the farmers, so it’s really that 
three-fold argument. 
Martin’s assumption was that there is not enough water for everyone (water scarcity) 
and therefore he saw an ‘inherent conflict’ in water distribution. He was in favour of 
prioritising farmers and cities and increased storage, which would damage the free flow 
of rivers and thereby fish. The different understandings of the natural and social aspects 
of the drought had consequences because they led to different proposals for solutions, 
ranging from increased storage, e.g., dams, across desalination and restructuring of 
water allocation, to reducing the influx of people, i.e. immigration. These contrasting 
claims concerning the cause of, and solutions to the drought highlighted the political 
nature of what is sometimes framed and understood as a merely physical phenomenon.  
 Finally, another example of contestation of the handling of the drought related to 
the individualised approach of water conservation. Willow suggested that individuals 
were being targeted as the culprits for bad water practices when she thought that 
fracking and ‘big’ agriculture made the real difference (as also mentioned above by 
Rod). This point illustrated that even if people did not see the drought as created by 
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politicians, there was sometimes an awareness of the individualisation of water 
conservation (similar to the individualised approach to climate change mitigation 
discussed in previous chapters).  
Willow: When you drive around highways in California it’s really common to 
see signs saying like “we’re in a drought - conserve water”, you know “turn that 
tap off when you brush your teeth” really basic kind of suggestions which imply 
that individual people are the main cause for bad water practices, for 
unsustainable water practices is another way of saying it, and so, this kind of 
information is promoting the idea that all you have to do is change your habits 
and daily life and then we won’t be in this problem, which completely 
disregards the fact that farmers, and agriculture, are the biggest industry that is 
utilising most of the water in California, and then things like fracking, you 
know, there’s so many big industrial causes, I think would need to change. 
People are very much being targeted to kind of imply that that’s the root cause 
and that they have kind of autonomy over that, which is just such an illusion. 
Marginalised experiences of the drought  
 There were effects and experiences of the drought which were not commonly 
acknowledged or mentioned. There were some people who were being affected more 
severely, but with whom I had little contact and whose predicament seemed to receive 
little attention. For example, there were low-income, mostly Latino/a, farm-working 
communities in the Central Valley who had actually run out of water. This raised 
questions over sources of information, such as news coverage of water-related issues in 
California. Two women working for a water utility company in a coastal city mentioned 
the water problems in the Central Valley, which existed prior to, but were exacerbated 
by the drought. Lucy pointed towards the land and water usage in agriculture, thereby 
highlighting that lack of water was not purely due to physical fluctuations in nature, but 
depended on social practices. 
Lucy: In the Central Valley people don’t have access to safe drinking water … 
their groundwater is contaminated … people have to drink bottled water. They 
don’t have the luxury of going to their tap to drink … California, one of the most 
developed economies of the world … people don’t have access to safe drinking 
water … it goes back to how water has been used, land uses. 
Further, one of the springs that was going dry seasonally (mentioned by Thomas) is a 
sacred site for one of the Native American tribes (personal communication, Norgaard, 
2016). Another example in the way in which Native Americans were impacted by the 
drought was the decline in salmon populations due to low water levels and water 
management practices by the state. One person mentioned this aspect.  
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Rod: On the Trinity and Klamath rivers we have Indian tribes over there that 
have rights to catch half of the fish, so if those fish go extinct, you’re talking a 
cultural change to those tribes. 
Longstanding rituals and daily practices are not buffered or mediated by taps (i.e. town 
and city infrastructure) but this aspect was rarely mentioned by participants. Factors 
such as location, infrastructure, social status and sources of information influenced how 
people were affected by and understood the drought.  
Discussion 
 In this chapter I have examined people’s understanding of environmental 
change. The recent drought in California was used as an example of how people 
experienced and interpreted local expressions of anthropogenic climate change. People 
understood the drought in California both as a physical change in nature (e.g., less rain) 
as well as related to the social and political organisation of water. An idea of normality 
was important to understand change: people compared the drought to what they 
regarded as normal weather, water and landscape conditions. While people in cities 
were able to perceive a change in weather, they were more removed from changes in 
landscape. Furthermore, because the drought was less visible and there was still water 
coming out of the taps, people in larger cities tended to describe that they had an 
intellectual, but not a practical awareness of the drought. There were also some 
emotional responses to the changes: fear, for example. In addition, various people were 
suspicious regarding the political handling of the drought, showing how the drought was 
socially contested. Finally, there were certain narratives and impacts of the drought 
which were not widely mentioned or reported, such as the exacerbation of water 
availability in the Central Valley for farm-working communities and the effects on 
Native people’s livelihood.  
Ideas of normality 
Ideas of normality and perceptions of time are especially relevant since the time 
scales on which long-term changes in climate take place may be outside of the timespan 
perceivable to many humans. The passage of time can influence people’s interpretation 
of what is normal, such as older people having experienced previous droughts and 
therefore potentially being less inclined to see those droughts as unusual (see chapter 5). 
In relation to perceptions of time Norgaard (2011) noted that:  
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Although there are many reasons why thinking about the consequences of 
climate change is not part of daily life in Bygdaby [code name for a town in 
Norway] one of them is clearly the disjuncture between the sense of time 
necessary to observe climate change or make its consequences seem ‘real’. 
Although this experience of the world appears and feels ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’, 
perceptions of time are in fact socially produced. (p. 114) 
For example, she mentioned environmentalists’ critique of Western societies’ short-
term thinking as partially responsible for long-term environmental risks, such as in the 
case of nuclear waste. She contrasted this with the Iroquois Nations’ reputation for 
basing decisions on how they would impact people seven generations down the line. 
Perceptions of normality and change depended on location. On the one hand 
some people described changes in landscape compared with what it was like ‘normally’, 
indicating that people perceived a shift in their surroundings, in which drought 
constituted the ‘not normal’. On the other hand, some had been socialized into knowing 
that (especially the south of) California was dry and that there was little water, i.e. 
normalising the absence of water. Consequently, there was a narrative in certain places, 
such as LA, that made the absence of water seem normal. The idea of normality had 
already been constructed to adapt to dry conditions in California. At the same time and 
contrary to the narrative of California as dry, people experienced water coming out of 
their taps and sometimes saw green, watered landscapes. Thus, it could be argued that 
the way cities are built renders the lack of water and dryness invisible. This is in line 
with Ruddell et al.’s (2012) suggestion (quoted in the introduction) that some people are 
buffered from the direct impacts of climate change through the built environment. The 
combination of city infrastructure and narratives that rendered California’s dryness to be 
normal, seem to result in a situation where people can continue to have and see water 
without feeling threatened by a discourse of lack of water. 
In relation to Habermas’ (1984, cited in Abbott & Wilson, 2015) theory of 
communicative rationality it would appear that drought and related social impacts are 
sufficiently buffered and normalized in particular parts of the state, to circumvent a 
significant disruption of everyday life or challenges to the social system. Despite the 
state-wide reduction in urban potable water use by 23.9% compared to 2013 levels 
(Kostyrko, 2016) this research indicated that several Californians did not register a 
severe interruption in daily life.  
Location and perceived distance of drought 
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In some areas of California people observed changes in their immediate 
environment, for example in weather patterns and the landscape. Almost everyone 
agreed that in the last few years there had been noticeable changes, which ranged from 
the loss of ‘luxury’ recreational activities (such as skiing), to the loss of water sources 
(springs and wells running dry). These findings are in line with research showing that 
people in various parts of the world, including the USA, were sensitive to changes in 
their environment, such as in temperature (Armah et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015; 
Ruddell et al., 2012). Several previous studies have also noted the importance of 
location in influencing perceptions of drought and other local environmental changes 
(Armah et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2010; Pearce et al., 2012). 
Consistent with Armah et al. (2015), the present findings challenge the 
suggestion that inaction on climate change is due to its distance in time and location30. 
Climate change is not inherently far off or distant (in time and space) but perceptions of 
distance are socially created (Gamson, 1992; Zerubavel, 1997, cited in Norgaard, 2011). 
For example, one participant noted that people did not want to deal with reality, because 
they did not want to change their behaviour and thus turned a blind eye. This is in line 
with suggestions by Norgaard (2011) and Zerubavel (2006) that collective silence and 
ignoring occur on the societal, not just individual level. Norgaard (2011) suggested that 
this was an active process: “… holding information at a distance is actually an active 
strategy for people as they negotiate their relationship with climate change” (p. 121). 
Even the more local, i.e. ‘close’ example of drought was not consistently 
perceived as close, relevant and real because these perceptions were mediated by other 
factors. Several aspects were mentioned as to why some people only experienced the 
drought intellectually and did not feel affected (such as cities’ water infrastructure). 
These findings stand in contrast to suggestions by Evans et al. (2015) that:  
It is, for example, logical that those respondents who live in areas with lower 
levels of annual precipitation would tend to express greater worries about water 
supply, as the water supply in drier regions tends to be more complicated, 
expensive, and insecure than in areas with plentiful rainfall. (p. 203) 
                                                 
30 For example, Weber and Stern (2011) stated: “The main causes of climate change 
(greenhouse gases) are invisible, its impacts are geographically and temporally distant 
for most Americans, and, as discussed below, its signals are hard to detect (Moser, 
2009; National Research Council, 2009)” (p. 317). Although there is likely some 
validity to this argument, it is important to also acknowledge the social production of 
distance, concern and threat.  
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Despite surrounding dryness, people in LA, for example, still had access to water and 
did not report being more concerned about the drought than did people elsewhere. 
Accordingly, precipitation and temperature changes do not appear to be linearly related 
to concern about drought or access to water, but are mediated for example by 
infrastructure and ideas of ‘the normal’. Norgaard (2006) found that although people in 
a town in Norway were aware of global warming and were experiencing changes in 
climate: “… global warming was an abstract concept that was not integrated into 
everyday life” (p. 373).  
Perceptions of risk 
Apart from some Californians noticing changes in their immediate environment 
and linking them to climate change (see chapter 5) there are also examples of 
individuals and societies acting despite there being a distance to a perceived risk, both 
in the case of climate change (Isenhour, 2013), distant wars or future health concerns. 
This means it is crucial to examine the social production of distance and of what 
constitutes a risk in society (Beck, 1992; Zerubavel, 2006), a prime example being the 
attention given to terrorism. ‘Distance’ does not seem to define level of threat, per se, 
and does not necessarily define action or inaction. It is socially influenced perceptions 
of risk which render a potentially distant or not distant phenomenon into a concern. This 
relates to Beck’s (1992) theory on risk society, as there is a high reliance on science as 
mediator of phenomena, such as climate change. This creates a disconnection between 
claims made as a result of scientific discovery and direct experience, which for example 
often cannot establish causality (Beck, 1992). This gap in turn leaves room for social 
and political interpretation of a phenomenon, such as defining the level of risk. The 
social contestation of drought and climate change is one such example.  
Emotions 
Experiential learning is associated with holistic, affective responses that are 
quick, intuitive and automatic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2004). Abstract 
and technical information such as statistical accounts, in contrast, involve more 
cognitive effort and are less compelling (Epstein, 2008). More recently the role of 
emotions has gained attention in research on climate change communication and risk 
perception, affirming that emotions are important for practical and moral decision 
making (Roeser, 2012). 
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In line with previous research on emotional reactions to environmental change, 
some participants described emotional responses to the drought (Ford, 2016; Norgaard, 
2006, 2011; Pearce et al., 2010; Petrasek MacDonald, Harper, Cunsolo Willox, Edge & 
Rigolet Inuit Community Government, 2013). For example, there was some indication 
that people reacted emotionally to the visual experience of a changing landscape, which 
served as confirmation of what they already ‘knew’ about the drought from the news.  
Norgaard’s (2011) work in Norway showed that there were a variety of emotion 
management strategies that people used to regulate and control unpleasant emotions 
towards climate change while failing to produce serious action. Maintaining optimism 
while facing local snow depletion, seasonally dry springs and negative effects on the 
local economy, may be an example of such emotion management strategies.  
While some climate change messaging has used fear as a way of trying to move 
people towards engagement, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) found that although 
fearful representations of climate change may attract attention, they are ineffective in 
generating motivation for action. Instead the authors suggested that imagery which is 
not threatening and that relates to people’s daily emotions and preoccupations is a more 
engaging strategy. However, people cannot be protected from an unpleasant emotional 
response when they personally notice changes in their natural environment. The 
question remains whether fear is similarly ineffective in spawning engagement when it 
occurs in this real world setting, or whether it may after all become a motivator for 
action.  
Sources of information  
Several people mentioned knowing about the drought through media coverage, 
highlighting that people not only relied on their direct experience, but also on media to 
gain understanding of the drought. Gamson (1992) examined the influence of 
experiential knowledge (e.g., personal experiences and those of close others), popular 
wisdom (e.g., shared knowledge in a particular subculture) and media discourse, on 
people’s constructions of proximity and meaning of an issue. In some cases all three 
factors were present to influence Californians’ perceptions of drought. Gamson (1992) 
described that whether or not an issue touches people’s daily lives is not an intrinsic 
property of the issue, but depends on the meaning the issue has for people. He argued 
that personal relevance of an issue varied with the context. People living in a city who 
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neither personally saw the changes in landscape, nor felt personally affected, described 
feeling “isolated” from the drought. Hearing about it on the news did not necessarily 
suffice to make it ‘real’ or ‘close’. This illustrates how if only one of Gamson’s (1992) 
factors applied it was not enough to make a given phenomenon feel close or real, 
although people still reported believing it on an intellectual level.  
Social construction of scarcity and environmental issues 
Some people defined the drought in part as a political and social phenomenon, 
rather than a purely environmental one. This relates to Selby and Hoffmann’s (2014) 
critique of the dominant presentation of water ‘scarcity’ as arising out of either 
overpopulation or as a result of economic goods being inherently scarce. Although the 
authors were not discussing the case of California, some of their points were consistent 
with topics raised by several Californians. Some Californians did suggest water scarcity 
was linked to an increasing population. But others questioned how scarce water in 
California really was, and how water was being used and distributed (as opposed to 
assuming that water was inherently scarce).  
In line with some people’s suspicions about how the drought might be exploited 
by politicians for their own political aims, Lubell (2014) stated: “… perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of drought politics is how it stimulates political and policy change … 
And California politicians have a tradition of using drought as a political tool for 
pushing favored policies” (para. 9). The findings regarding the social contestation of 
water management and some Californians’ awareness about the influence of political 
decisions on water availability, is in line with the notion that water management is 
inherently political (Mollinga, 2008). Discourses of natural scarcity may be one way of 
depoliticizing and naturalizing a conflict, rather than looking at its social and political 
origins (such as power relations which influence access to resources and distribution). 
As some participants suggested, there are social and political practices, including water 
storage, allocation and usage (e.g., agriculture) which affect water availability.  
The way in which drought was framed was important because it influenced how 
it was responded to, publicly and politically. Gamson (1992) noted the impact of 
omissions on the framing of an issue: “Systematic omissions make certain ways of 
framing issues extremely unlikely” (p. 6). For example, not many people (only those 
who worked with water-related or environmental organisations) seemed to know about, 
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or mention, low-income farm-working communities’ water problems or the effects of 
water practices on Native communities. This is particularly relevant in line with 
Zerubavel’s (2006) work examining collective silence and omissions, since attention 
influences perceptions of relevance and response.  
Limitations 
 One limitation of this research is that I did not interview any Native American 
communities and only a few people in the Central Valley. However, I did not make this 
a central aspect of my research. The focus was not on the impact of the drought, but 
rather at how people with relatively more resources and power responded to it and how 
it would affect their views on climate change. Another limitation is that because of the 
way I divided up my chapters (which draw on the same fieldwork), I separated the 
understanding of drought (chapter 4) from the analysis of its relationship to views on 
climate change (chapter 5). This decision may have created a deceptive representation 
of a lack of talk about climate change in the present chapter. It should therefore be noted 
that in the interviews climate change was also discussed and these findings are 
presented in relation to drought in the following chapter.  
Future research 
Future research could investigate how certain communities are being affected by 
drought more so than others, because of how the drought interacts with social 
inequalities and what consequences this has for political action. Additionally, it could 
be worth investigating how perceptions of drought influence people’s water usage. 
There are questions relating to how information and knowledge that come from news 
and scientists, supplement people’s lived realities and behaviour. Future research could 
also examine the relationship between gender and emotional responses to extreme 
climatic events. Some emerging research indicates that risk perceptions, including 
climate risk, are gendered, such that women generally are slightly more concerned about 
climate change than are men (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz & Grover, 2008; McCright, 2010). 
Norgaard (2006) also noted that although emotion management strategies seemed to be 
employed across the community, she found these techniques more commonly used by 
educators, men and public figures. 
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 I have presented here some of the ways in which some people in California 
made sense of the environmental change occurring around them in the form of the 
recent drought. The drought was understood both as physical changes in nature and as 
related to the social and political organisation of water. Further, it was evident that 
certain narratives and impacts were less known, such as those concerning Native people 
and low-income Latino/a communities. Location and media coverage influenced how 
people interpreted the drought and those different interpretations had consequences in 
terms of the solutions that were proposed and supported. 
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- Chapter 5 - 
No drought about it? The influence of personal experience on views of climate 
change 
Abstract 
The research reported here examined how people (n = 77) living in California 
experienced the drought in late 2015 and to what extent they thought it was linked to 
climate change. Interviews were conducted in different parts of California, including 
large northern and southern coastal cities as well as rural areas. The reasoning common 
to people who believed that there was a link between the drought and climate change 
ranged from relating it, for example, to an increase in temperatures, to reduced rainfall 
or to science. In contrast, people who did not believe that there was a link between the 
drought and climate change tended to draw on past droughts and cyclical climate 
patterns as well as invoking science. Participants did not say that the drought brought 
about a change of mind about climate change; rather it seemed that people either already 
did or did not believe in climate change and accommodated the drought into their 
existing worldviews. Future research could examine how perceptions of drought and 
climate change relate to adaptation and mitigation approaches.   
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Both lay and academic explanations for inaction on climate change31 have raised 
the notion that its consequences are distant in time and space. It is argued that the causes 
and impacts of climate change are intangible and lack immediacy and therefore fail to 
stimulate understanding, concern and action (for further discussion see e.g., Giddens, 
2011; Moser, 2010; Weber & Stern, 2011). While this explanation may be partially 
helpful in understanding public and political inaction on climate change, there are some 
shortcomings to this way of thinking: other crucial factors also need to be taken into 
account. Firstly, both poorer and richer countries in many parts of the world are already 
being affected by the consequences of climate change (IPCC, 2012, 2014). However, it 
is important to acknowledge that people will be affected to different degrees by, and 
have different levels of defense against, the effects of climate change and extreme 
weather events due to socio-economic factors. As the IPCC (2012) pointed out: 
“Individuals and communities are differentially exposed and vulnerable based on 
inequalities expressed through levels of wealth and education, disability, and health 
status, as well as gender, age, class, and other social and cultural characteristics” (p. 7). 
Secondly, perceptions of distance to climate change are socially created (Norgaard, 
2006, 2011). Thirdly, beliefs about and action on climate change are highly politicized 
(Klein, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b).  
Anthropogenic climate change and extreme climate events 
Ungar (2000) outlined the cultural production of scientific understanding, 
concern and response to different topics, such as comparing the ozone hole to climate 
change. The author argued that the ozone hole presented more of a “hot crisis” 
(providing an immediate and concrete sense of risk, p. 298) than does climate change, 
partly due to the future long-term effects of climate change. However, this raises the 
question of why extreme weather events that occur now, do not engender a similar hot 
crisis situation. Ungar (2000) proposed that one reason for this was that a global average 
increase of a few degrees can appear insignificant compared to the fluctuations in 
temperature people experience on a daily basis: “Climate change is a risk ‘buried’ in 
                                                 
31 “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had 
widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (IPCC, 2014, p. 2). 
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familiar natural processes such as temperature change and weather fluctuations” 
(Whitmarsh, 2008, p. 4).  
Another debate relates to the difficulty of attributing single extreme climate 
events (such as floods, hurricanes, heatwaves or droughts) to anthropogenic climate 
change: “Attribution of single extreme events to anthropogenic climate change is 
challenging” (IPCC, 2012, p. 9). The caution that many scientists have shown in linking 
the two has been supported by sparse reporting in the media (Ungar, 2000) and may 
contribute to public uncertainty about the link between extreme weather events and 
climate change.  
Two studies found that 97% of scientists in the field agreed that anthropogenic 
factors were increasing average global temperatures and were changing the climate 
(Anderegg, Prall, Harold & Schneider, 2010; Cook et al., 2016). Other studies have 
suggested there has been an increase in concurrent extremes in climate and that the 
combination and interaction of climate variables have produced extreme impacts (Hao, 
AghaKouchak & Phillips, 2013; Leonard et al., 2014). There is also evidence that global 
warming and the related rise in extreme temperatures has considerably increased the 
probability of extreme events such as heatwaves and droughts (AghaKouchak, Cheng, 
Mazdiyasni & Farahmand, 2014). The IPCC (2012) reported that: “There is evidence 
that some extremes have changed as a result of anthropogenic influences, including 
increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases” (p. 9). Thus, human 
activity (mostly in the global North) has changed the climate to such an extent that 
extreme climate events are more likely.  
Anthropogenic climate change and the case of the California drought 
The subsequent question is whether or not the California drought in particular 
can be linked to anthropogenic climate change. While contentions have been raised over 
a link between the recent California drought and long-term warming trends (Funk, Hoell 
& Stone, 2014; Wang & Schubert, 2014) these studies focused on the incoming flow of 
water, such as precipitation. Patterns of precipitation are anomalously low, but not 
unprecedented in the past seven hundred years and still within 1.5 standard deviations 
of the mean (Griffin & Anchukaitis, 2014). However, other research has indicated that 
there is a link between an anthropogenic influence on the climate and the recent drought 
in California. The latter research pointed towards the importance of the co-occurrence 
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of higher temperatures (changing the outgoing flow of water via evaporation and 
transpiration) and low precipitation (Diffenbaugh, Swain & Touma, 2015; Mann & 
Gleick, 2015). Further, with projections for significantly drier conditions in the future, 
these trends are expected to continue and increase drought severity in coming decades 
(Cook, Ault & Smerdon, 2015). Griffin and Anchukaitis (2014) also concluded that: 
“Future severe droughts are expected to be in part driven by anthropogenic influences 
and temperatures outside the range of the last millennium” (p. 9022).  
Impacts of the drought in California 
Low river levels are endangering salmon migration to the point that the 
California Fish and Wildlife Service is transporting young salmon to the ocean in the 
hope of re-establishing future reproduction (Barkham, 2014). Salmon, such as the 
Chinook salmon, is listed as threatened and in danger of extinction (California 
Department of Fish and Wildlife, n.d.). The decline in salmon population impacts 
especially Native American people, such as the Karuk tribe, whose subsistence, culture 
and religion depends on salmon and is already being harmed as a result of capitalist 
production and related degradation of the natural environment (Hormel & Norgaard, 
2009).  
The pumping of groundwater, increased owing to the drought, has caused the 
subsidence of the ground in the San Joaquin Valley (a more arid southern part of the 
agricultural Central Valley) amounting to almost 2 inches (5 centimetres) per month in 
some areas (Farr, Jones & Liu, 2015; NASA, 2015). Subsidence in turn puts 
infrastructure at risk, because it can damage pipelines, bridges, and drainage and may 
also adversely affect the replenishment of groundwater aquifers as the soil is being 
compacted. Although a groundwater management bill was signed by Governor Brown 
in autumn 2014 (Siders, 2014), the deadline for establishing the rules to track and 
regulate groundwater in California is not until 2020 in most places (Kasler, Sabalow & 
Reese, 2015). 
Drought is contributing to the struggle for clean water in the Central Valley, 
where polluted and dry wells especially affect low-income Latino/Latina farm-working 
communities (Belk, 2016; see also Community Water Center, n.d.). The impact of the 
2015 drought on the agricultural sector was estimated at a total of 21,000 job losses and 
$2.7 billion of economic impact (Howitt, MacEwan, Medellín-Azuara, Lund & Sumner, 
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2015). On 1st April 2015 Governor Brown introduced state-wide restrictions of 25% on 
urban potable water use, relative to the usage in the same months in 2013 (State Water 
Resources Control Board [SWRCB], n.d., 2016). Although these are only some of the 
impacts of the drought, they represent reasons people could be concerned about the 
drought and potentially therefore about climate change.  
Experiences of extreme weather events and views on climate change 
Drought is only one of the possible hazards that climate change poses. Thinking 
in terms of solely one impact could lead to an underestimation of the total risk of 
climate change: “Unlike a heat wave or a hurricane, climate change is not a single 
hazard” (Weber & Stern, 2011, p. 317). However, it is still worthwhile making the link 
between extreme weather events and climate change, since the experience of the former 
may increase concern and action on the latter, as the research reviewed below suggests.  
Some environmental issues manifested at the local level have been found to 
influence beliefs and actions regarding climate change to varying degrees. For example, 
Whitmarsh’s (2008) work in the UK showed that people who experienced flooding 
differed only slightly from people who had not experienced flooding in their knowledge 
of and reaction to climate change. In contrast, people who claimed their health had been 
impacted by air pollution (compared to those who did not) were more likely to perceive 
climate change as a risk and this was related to believing that human activity influenced 
climate change as well as to taking: “… action specifically out of concern for climate 
change” (p. 369). The author suggested that: “Evidently flood victims view climate 
change and flooding as largely separate issues” (p. 368). She explained these findings in 
terms of people’s perceived efficacy to act, because communities could reduce flood 
risk through local flood management, but: “… personal action to mitigate climate 
change could not produce any such tangible, local gain” (p. 368). However, Spence, 
Poortinga, Butler and Pidgeon (2011) found that participants who reported experience 
of flooding showed greater concern over climate change, as well as expressing a greater 
willingness to reduce energy consumption in order to mitigate climate change.  
In another study Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz and Grover (2008) suggested that 
physical vulnerability differently affected perceptions of climate change in the USA. 
Specifically, they found that, on the one hand, living closer to the coastline and in 
relatively low elevation (thus being more susceptible to sea level rise) was significantly 
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correlated with higher climate change risk perception. On the other hand, temperature 
trends and exposure to natural hazards did not significantly correlate with climate 
change risk perception (except for fatalities associated with natural hazards). In contrast, 
Ruddell, Harlan, Grossman-Clarke and Chowell (2012) found that during an extreme 
heat period, metropolitan area residents in Phoenix, Arizona, were sensitive to changes 
in temperature. Concretely, they demonstrated that on the neighbourhood scale, 
people’s perception of temperature significantly correlated with temperature simulations 
for that area. In line with these findings, Armah et al. (2015) showed that a large 
percentage of respondents in coastal areas of Tanzania perceived an increase in 
temperatures which matched the time series for the same period. The authors suggested 
that personal experience of climate change might shift public views on the subject and 
assist adaptation efforts and at the same time increase individual engagement in 
mitigation and policy support.  
Importantly, climate change perceptions and actions have not only been found to 
be related to personal experience of local changes, but also to the experience of the 
impacts of policies. Niles, Lubell and Haden (2013) showed that farmers were more 
likely to believe in climate change if they had positive experiences of previous 
environmental policies (assessed through a farmer’s view on four past policies, 
concerning pesticide use reporting, rice straw burning, a water quality conditional 
waiver program and stationary diesel emissions). Furthermore, the experience of these 
policies was more significant in predicting climate change belief than personal 
experience of climate change impacts (based on a farmers’ perception of change in local 
water availability over the course of their career).  
It would appear that experiencing drought does not consistently heighten 
concern over climate change. For example, Pearce, Willis, Wadham and Binks (2010) 
interviewed people in outback south Australia to examine their responses to drought, 
with the result that the authors identified the acceptance of drought as one key theme. 
They found that for pastoralists, some of whom had experienced previous droughts, 
there were mixed responses in relation to climate change: “For some, the drought was a 
sign of the cycle of weather patterns and very little to do with climate change, for others 
climate change was a clear and present risk” (p. 365). But according to Anderson 
(2008), periods of drought can pose a crucial spur for reflection and change in beliefs. 
The author examined the experience of drought and climate change in Australia (in the 
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Mallee), 2004 – 2007, and noted: “… significant moments of reflection and self-
reflexivity, marked in public discourse by a pronounced shift in beliefs on drought and 
climate change” (p. 68). Evans et al. (2015) proposed that events such as drought 
presented an opportunity for public outreach to be successful in swaying opinions and 
behaviour.  
Beliefs about climate change 
One recent study in the US reported that 63% of its sample thought global 
warming was occurring, whereas 18% thought it was not. Thirty-two percent indicated 
that if global warming were happening, it was mostly down to natural changes, while 
52% attributed it predominantly to human causes (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Feinberg & Rosenthal, 2015). In contrast, another study reported that in California 79% 
of the sample believed global warming was occurring (11% did not). Further, 58% 
attributed global warming mostly to human causes, while 23% thought it was mainly 
due to natural changes. Importantly, 55% of the sample stated that they had personally 
experienced the impacts of global warming. Of those who did believe global warming 
was occurring, 84% indicated that it was at least moderately exacerbating heatwaves 
and 77% thought it had at least moderately influenced droughts (Leiserowitz, Feinberg, 
Howe & Rosenthal, 2013).  
It is crucial to allow for both natural and social science studies to understand the 
implications of climate change. Alves (2014) suggested that it was: “… not possible to 
understand CC [climate change] without identifying the relationships that are 
established between nature, society and its culture” (para. 2). Social factors are crucial 
because climate change affects human communities and also because human actions 
caused climate change and shape the response to it (Alves, 2014).    
The present study 
Information is often shared through conversation (Ungar, 2000), and interviews 
- even if directed by certain questions - are likely to somewhat reflect the existing 
narratives about drought and climate change. In this study I draw on the case of the 
California drought in 2015 and examine people’s experiences thereof in relation to their 
views on climate change. The context of these views is that countries in the West have 
been amongst the highest contributors to per capita carbon emissions (see e.g., Clark, 
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2011; Goldenberg, 2014; Kanemoto, Moran, Lenzen & Geschke, 2014). Divergences in 
climate change responsibility and vulnerability are related to historical relations, 
whereby Western countries built their wealth on colonialism and capitalist production 
based on the exploitation of ‘resources’ and labour (Clark & York, 2005; Klein, 2014; 
Merchant, 2005; Norgaard, 2011, Parks & Roberts, 2006; Stoddart, Tindall & 
Greenfield, 2012): “European capitalism expanded through the establishment of 
colonies in the Western and Southern Hemispheres that supplied both the natural 
resources and cheap labor that extracted them from the earth” (Merchant, 2005, p. 32). 
Further, as Stoddart et al. (2012) stated: “While the wealthier nations of the global 
North bear the greatest historical responsibility for contributing to the problem, many of 
the poorest countries of the global South will likely be the most vulnerable to flooding, 
drought, food shortages, and other environmental risks” (p. 43).  
Past research on the experience of climate change in industrialised countries has 
relied mostly on quantitative surveys and few qualitative studies have been conducted in 
the USA. Using interview data I examined the following research questions: What 
effects is the experience of drought having on people living in California in terms of 
their beliefs about climate change? How do people experience drought and what makes 
them think that it is linked to climate change or not? To what extent do people think that 
the drought has or has not changed their views on climate change?  
Method 
Two and a half months of fieldwork were conducted in California (25th 
September – 8th December 2015). A variety of regions were visited such as Los Angeles 
(LA) and the Bay Area, as well as smaller cities and towns in northern, eastern and 
central parts of the state. For anonymity, people’s names were changed and place names 
were mainly reported for larger cities. In total 77 interviews were voice recorded using a 
Dictaphone. Many other conversations were conducted off-the-record and I also 
followed news coverage of the drought, both of which were recorded in my field notes 
and influenced my analysis. Participants were primarily approached in public spaces, 
such as parks, cafés, buses and the streets. Some people who worked in water-related 
jobs, such as for water utility companies or fire fighters, were contacted by e-mail. This 
resulted in a sample of people from different professions, ranging from teachers, street 
cleaners and health professionals to radio presenters. A semi-structured interview plan 
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was followed from memory and adapted according to the direction of the conversation. I 
opened the conversation by saying I was interested in people’s experiences and views of 
the drought. Towards the end I closed the conversation by asking about people’s views 
on possible causes of the drought and about climate change (if it had not been discussed 
already). Interviews ranged between 5 - 60 minutes in length. Participants were not 
asked for their age, race, and country of origin, gender or occupation (unless they 
mentioned it of their own accord in which case I noted it), because it would have been 
intrusive in the informal setting and flow of the conversation. The sample was largely 
limited to people to whom I easily had access in public spaces. Not being a US national 
myself had several advantages, since I had more of an outsider’s perspective, was able 
to ask ‘naïve’ questions and take fewer social practices for granted.  
Interview Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed by myself and three assistants. Repetitions, 
hesitations, ‘ums’ and ‘errs’, were included, but removed from the quotes reported in 
the final write-up. Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) methods were used to 
guide the coding and data analysis. The analysis was predominantly data-driven, 
following an inductive approach and thus not guided by an existing theory or coding 
structure, although some interpretations will have resulted from my previous readings 
on a topic. A contextualist method was used, to acknowledge: “… the ways individuals 
make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the ways the broader social context 
impinges on those meanings …” (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 9). Following an iterative 
process, transcripts were read and reread. The transcripts were broken down into smaller 
meaning units, i.e. passages which make sense by themselves (Elliott & Timulak, 2005). 
Topics which were repeatedly mentioned, or which were of particular interest to the 
research questions, informed the labelling of themes. Eventually all transcripts were 
coded into themes and subthemes using NVivo. Themes that were related were 
organised together. Differences and idiosyncrasies were also noted (Elliott & Timulak, 
2005), since I was interested in the diverse experiences and views of drought. The 
analysis examined how themes related to each other, as well as to the bigger picture of 
how and why a certain discourse may be operating in society. My role as researcher was 
active, as themes did not emerge from the data, but were selected and interpreted by me 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Triangulation was ensured by comparing responses across 
people from different backgrounds, as well as with news reports and my observations of 
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daily life. The extracts provided in the results are illustrative examples and the 
interpretation was guided by the other responses and by my observations.  
Results 
In this section I discuss four themes pertaining to perceptions of the drought in 
California in relation to views on climate change.  
Linking the drought to climate change  
To begin I examine some of the responses from people who thought that there 
was a possible link between the drought and climate change. Most people who referred 
to climate change or global warming seemed to be making reference to anthropogenic 
climate change. The caution people took in linking drought and climate change was 
notable, even when they agreed that humans have had some impact on the climate. One 
man in a northern mountainous region of California was cautious in his response to link 
the drought to climate change, but listed some of the changes he had noted and deduced 
that “it’s hard to imagine it’s not” linked.  
Sarah: Do you think it is linked to climate change, like the drought getting 
worse? 
Rod: Oh yeah, well clearly the warmer weather has resulted in a significantly 
reduced snowpack. The snowpack in the mountains of California is our number 
one reservoir of water, last year the snowpack in the Sierra Nevada was 5% of 
the historic average … so yeah, we might get more rain, but if we don’t get the 
snowpack, it’s definitely going to affect California and it does appear that 
climate change may already be having an effect, you know, some people say it 
is, some say it isn’t … it’s hard to imagine it’s not with the poor snow we’ve had 
the last few years here. 
Sarah: And you think that’s more natural changes in terms of climate change, or 
also human induced? 
Rod: I think it’s human induced. 
A woman in the Bay Area similarly suspected that global warming had contributed to 
warmer temperatures and a lack of rain, although she was also careful and moderated 
her response with the word “probably” when asked what she thought was causing the 
drought. 
Betty: Probably global warming.  
Sarah: Yeah? 
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Betty: Probably. Well, we’ve always been in the desert, California’s always 
very, been, tricky, but, global warming doesn’t help. So. And the fact that we 
haven’t had rain, it’s something probably manmade (coughs) excuse me. 
Because we’ve never seen temperatures this high this late in the year … Well, I 
think it’s pretty easy. 
Larissa in San Francisco promptly responded that climate change was causing the 
drought.  
Larissa: Climate change. 
Sarah: Climate change?  
Larissa: I mean, obviously, weather is going to be different from year to year, 
but I do believe that climate change is definitely behind the pervasive worsening 
of weather over time, that we’ve been experiencing.  
Sarah: Do you think that climate change is caused by humans? 
Larissa: I don’t know that it’s caused by humans, I do know, I mean I do think 
that it’s exacerbated, that the rate at which we’re losing you know, atmospheric 
cover and all of that, is definitely caused by humans. 
Larissa was initially hesitant to use the notion of cause when talking about the role of 
humans in climate change, but conceded that humans had ‘exacerbated’ changes in 
climate, thereby implying a causal role of some sort. In another case, a young male in 
LA did not mention climate change of his own accord. At first he explained that “there’s 
never been water” and referred to the artificiality of the city. However, when directly 
asked about climate change he was quick to affirm and also saw a potential link to 
humans. 
Sarah: Yeah, and what do you think is causing the drought then, what do you 
think, how come it’s gotten a bit worse? 
Kristian: Because there’s never been water here in the first place. 
Sarah: Right, so it’s just kind of gradually getting worse? 
Kristian: Well if you create an artificial, I guess biosphere, there are certain 
conditions that need to be kept for that biosphere to perform ideally, right? 
Sarah: Yeah, so do you think it’s linked to climate change, or? 
Kristian: Everything is linked to climate change, I mean we are in a bubble, if 
you fart in the bubble, you know, someone’s gonna smell it. Right? (Both 
laughing). Like, realistically, that’s a terrible way to put it, but like. 
Sarah: So like man-made, human-caused emissions? 
Kristian: Yeah, there’s definitely some of that. It’s gotten way, way, way 
warmer in recent years than it has always been. 
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The above people mentioned the warmer temperatures and reduction in rainfall they had 
noticed. One woman in particular, in a north-eastern mountainous area of California, 
first referred to past droughts, but concluded that more so than the drought, it was 
warmer temperatures that, for her, were evidence of climate change. 
Chleo: I mean, I’ll tell you, I’m not a scientist, do I think that the drought is 
linked to climate change? Absolutely. I think that, also though, that California 
has historically had long periods of droughts if you go back even thousands of 
years, I mean we’ve had mega droughts that have lasted over a thousand years. 
But I don’t think, to me, I don’t feel that you can deny the fact that climate 
change is affecting California, or this area, because one of the things, you know, 
more so than the drought, one of the things that I’ve noticed, that I think is a 
direct link to climate change, is the increase in the temperatures in the Basin. So, 
we’re experiencing warmer temperatures that, like this summer is pretty darn 
warm (laughs).  
Note how Chleo moderated her answer by pointing out at the beginning that she is not a 
scientist, a theme which is discussed in more detail below. 
In the Bay Area, Marie, suggested that Californians, who read the newspaper, 
might be more conscious of anthropogenic climate change because politicians were 
talking about it. The media was highlighted as a medium through which people learned 
about climate change. Further, the notion that Californians were more aware of climate 
change than were inhabitants of other states, was also discussed by other participants. 
Beyond feeling affected by the drought, Marie drew on the fact that California was a 
coastal state and that people might be more concerned about climate change because of 
sea level rise. Notably, Marie in contrast to some of the more cautious participants, was 
very certain about climate change, using the term “obviously”. She was a member of an 
environmental activist group and engaged heavily with the topic of anthropogenic 
climate change.  
Sarah: Do you think that this drought is linked to climate change then? 
Marie: Yes, I think it obviously is linked to climate change (laughs). And 
actually I think, I don’t know if the majority of people in California would say 
that. I would say the majority of people who read newspapers, and even our 
politicians would say that. So, and I do think that California has more awareness 
around climate change than most of the other states, partly because we’ve had 
politicians that have drawn attention to it. Maybe because we have a lot of 
coastline, which is being threatened, we have 2 airports right here … that will 
both be underwater, probably within the next 2 decades, so (laughs).  
In the same region, a farmers’ market organiser, Lennard, pointed towards the sinking 
of the ground in the Central Valley. He reflected on the severity of the drought and the 
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consequences this entailed to explain his view that there was a link between the drought 
and climate change and he also pointed towards science “just look at the science”. At a 
later stage he mentioned the need to reduce emissions and switch to renewable energies, 
suggesting that his view was that human emissions had influenced changes in climate.  
Sarah: Do you think that the drought is being made worse by climate change or 
do you think they are not linked? 
Lennard: Oh personally I think it is. 
Sarah: Yeah? 
Lennard: But I mean the hotter it is the more water in California, you know, like 
the Central Valley is sinking ‘cos they are pumping so much water, ‘cos there’s 
less water coming, we had terrible droughts through the winter and even if it 
rains, it’s not cold enough for snow pack in our mountains, so it all kind of goes 
quickly, so our reserves aren’t there, I don’t think you can deny it, you know, 
just look at the science, so … I think some ideologues might have something 
against it, but I think for the most part it’s, people are feeling it, I mean if you 
live in California and you deny climate change, I don’t know how, I mean we 
have water restrictions here. 
Another woman in the same region also maintained that there could be a link to 
anthropogenic climate change, while referring to other social practices, such as 
agriculture, as an important contributor to drought and climate change. Her reply 
connected the drought not only to changes in nature, but also related it to political 
decisions and social water practices – a point that was mentioned by other respondents 
as well (see chapter 4). She pointed towards the complexity of the issue and 
multifaceted links between social practices that exacerbated drought and caused climate 
change, while climate change also exacerbated the drought.  
Sarah: Do you think that it (drought) is linked to climate change or do you think 
it is just a dry area here? 
Willow: I think it’s linked to climate change in that the amount of carbon 
dioxide of the greenhouse gases that are emitted, through just say, how the 
people are using cars, really, really bad agricultural practices that aren’t 
sustainable, a lack of the ability of the earth to sequester carbon sufficiently 
enough, are all contributing to these things, but I guess in essence I think it is 
due to climate change. But I think the severity of the drought is probably as 
much to do with bad agricultural practices which kind of, yeah are still part, still 
part of the issue, still part of climate change, but just a complete disregard for 
sustainable practices when it comes to land management and the amount of 
agriculture that is going on and just done really, really badly and unsustainably. 
The above extracts illustrate that although many opinions were expressed cautiously, 
there was a substantial awareness among people across different regions of California of 
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a possible link between the severity of the drought and climate change. People used a 
combination of media and science sources and their own experience of warmer 
temperatures and other changes to support their understanding of a link.  
Uncertainty and emotion. It is also important to acknowledge that some people 
had not considered a link between drought and climate change. In the following extract 
it is interesting to note that Frank mentioned a gut response to the suggestion of a link, 
illustrating the kind of intuitive and spontaneous reactions people reported. He might 
have already been open to the idea of climate change, but this extract shows how people 
use emotions and potentially social cues, to guide their response. 
Sarah: Do you think it is that, do you think that there is a link to climate change? 
Frank: Linked to climate change and the drought? Let’s think about that one. Is 
there any climate change and the drought? It’s a tough question. It’s a really 
good question ... Do I think there’s a link between climate change and the 
drought? My gut tells me just to say yes. Not just to say it, but that it is yes. 
Sarah: That it is? 
Frank: Yeah that’s just, you know, I don’t think I have actual reason why, but 
does there need to be a reason why? I think yes or no is a good indication. 
Rebecca, a young woman in LA identified the main problem as being an inadequate 
water source. Further, she mentioned that the topic of drought did not grab young 
people’s attention and “hearts” (pointing to the role of emotions). This extract illustrates 
how she discussed the role of technology and innovation. Although she was open to the 
idea that the drought might be linked to climate change her main focus was on the 
necessity for more reliable and alternative water sources. She suggested introducing 
desalination projects, so that there would be no risk of running out of water, even if 
there were not a hard winter. At this point of the interview she was commenting on the 
fact that people were no longer automatically served water in restaurants because of the 
mandatory water restrictions, but instead had to explicitly ask for it. 
Rebecca: So in one aspect I understand, because we want to save our resources, 
but in another aspect, we have a lot of brilliant minds on the planet, so I think we 
should learn how to convert salt water or something, because I think it’s a little 
ridiculous, and it definitely does affect us, you know, because we need water, 
our bodies are mostly made up of water … but in general, yeah, pop culture is 
the most popular thing and especially in the younger generation, unless it’s 
something that really grabs our hearts, unlike recent killings, or something that 
grabs your heart, then everyone pays attention to it, but when it’s something like 
a drought, people think it’s just gonna fix itself … 
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Sarah: Do you personally think that it has anything to do with climate change? 
Rebecca: Maybe about 30%, but in most I think, well, well maybe it does, now 
that I think about it, maybe it does, does climate change, but I think the water 
source is the problem, as well, the source where we get our water, cause I know, 
I read somewhere where we get our water from ice glaciers or something after 
they melt and we get, that’s our source of water or something like that, I just 
think we need more of a different idea, of how to get it, you know, ‘cos, what if 
it doesn’t, the winter there isn’t as, you know icy, you know, what if enough ice 
doesn’t melt, or what if they don’t have a strong winter, you know, you have to 
plan, that can’t be your only source of water. 
Drought is not linked to climate change 
In this section I discuss the views held by people who mostly thought that the 
drought was unrelated to climate change. They tended to think that climate change was 
not caused by humans or was not occurring at all. There were two main ways in which 
people usually argued against a link between the drought and climate change. One had 
to do with identifying a different cause of the drought, such as inappropriate water 
management. The second line of reasoning had to do with California’s dry climate and 
the knowledge of previous droughts, which led them to conclude that droughts were 
cyclical and natural. A public works director and reserve police officer in a small town 
in the Central Valley explained the drought through a lack in rainfall and the wasting of 
water.  
Sarah: And do you think that the drought is at all linked to climate change? 
Because I heard the Governor Brown talk about that, but 
Keith: No, I don’t. 
Sarah: You don’t, right. It’s more like a natural? 
Keith: It’s a result of, you know, less than adequate precipitation and it’s also a 
result of, just wastefulness and over-pumping. 
Sarah: Yeah, ok. 
Keith: Water waste. 
Keith’s suggestion that drought occurred as a consequence of less than adequate 
precipitation left unclear why he thought that there might be less precipitation. Further, 
in his view the role of water waste and over-pumping pointed towards the drought as a 
consequence mostly of social practices (see chapter 4).  
Another person in the Central Valley who was a wholesaler of drilling and well 
materials and whose business was enhanced by the drought, questioned - as did several 
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others - any potential link between climate change and the drought by referring to 
California’s dry climate, past droughts and natural cycles. 
Mike: This is the third drought, I’m fifty-three and this is the third drought in 
California I’ve gone through, it’s cyclical.  
He did not acknowledge that anthropogenic climate change could have already been 
affecting California’s climate over the past 50 years. Later he discredited other people’s 
opinions by stating that they had less experience of the cyclical nature of rainfall 
because they lived in towns or cities. 
Sarah: Because you said that there’s a lot of rain but I’ve also heard people 
saying that it hasn’t actually been raining enough, so maybe even bigger dams 
wouldn’t fill up because there isn’t more rain …?  
Mike: I mean these people that are telling you, they’re stupid, I mean the rains 
will come back, I mean we’ve already seen moisture this year, we’ve had 
droughts before, but you’ve got to remember a lot of the people you’re talking 
to, I would imagine, they live in town, they don't, they haven’t experienced it, 
whereas … I have lived this (my) whole life, having to deal with water.  
He argued that what was causing water problems in California was not climate change 
but rather a lack of storage and too many people. Then he pointed towards his own 
experience of the fact that it had started snowing again in the east of California. He gave 
precedence to his own experience rather than trusting in meteorological science. 
Mike: I mean people that are feeding you that, I mean that’s just, that’s 
ignorance and you know, these meteorologists have yet to be able to predict 
stuff and I don’t know how many times I’ve seen in my life time “oh it’s an El 
Niño, oh it’s an El Niño, it’s this, it’s that”, they have no fucking, oh I’m sorry, 
they have no clue.  
Another person, Martin, used El Niño to argue that droughts were not linked to climate 
change and were cyclical (in line with Mike). He responded to an e-mail of mine as a 
member of the Republican Party in a northern coastal city. In contrast to Mike, who was 
sceptical of meteorology, Martin later invoked science to back up his argument, also 
pointing towards California’s dry climate and previous droughts. 
Martin: I don’t know what usual is, we have one (drought) every, you know five 
or ten years, we live in a desert so it’s common, this one has lasted maybe a year 
longer than frequent, but I don’t think it’s particularly unusual in the history of 
California … This drought is kind of in a mechanistic way it’s driven by the El 
Niño cycle … I mean the fact is we’re gonna have a good El Niño (this winter) 
and it’s gonna you know dump us a whole lot of snow and rain on us and end 
this drought, does that mean that anything has happened in climate change? No, 
absolutely not. 
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Another person in the Silicon Valley area described how some years there was water 
and other years there was not and therefore saw water issues as being related to 
problems of storage.  
Charles: If you grow up here there’s always been more or less of a desert, so we 
don’t, (we’re) frugal with our water, with your garden, what not, but in the last 
year, it’s been really on Facebook, in the newspaper every now and then I’ll read 
an article about the water, the shortage and pictures of dried up reservoirs. A 
couple of years ago we’re full of boats and now we are full of dried up logs. 
There really is a storage problem, everything’s empty, not everything but a lot of 
the above groundwater’s dried up. 
When I asked whether he thought there was a link between the drought and climate 
change he commented that he could not perceive sea-level rise and that he was sceptical 
and would not simply believe what others told him.  
Charles: Empirically my own experience, I can’t tell, I don’t see the seas going 
any higher than they have been, I mean I try to keep an open mind, I’m 
sceptical, but I listen … but just cause somebody tells me … the jury’s out, who 
really knows … We are definitely in a drought, but these things do cycle here. 
A woman who worked for a water utility service in an eastern mountainous town in 
California suggested that views on a link between drought and climate change varied 
depending on people’s age, because older people had experienced previous droughts 
and were therefore more likely to treat it as cyclical (which is in line with Mike’s above 
reference to his own age).  
Chleo: Well, you know, it’s interesting I think to answer that question you have 
to kind of look at our community in terms of age groups (laughs). So we have a 
large older population here and then we have like a large younger population 
and what I’ve found is anyone in their, you know, probably in their 40’s and 
younger is concerned about climate change, believes that it’s happening and 
believes that a lot of the things that we’re seeing are direct effects of climate 
change. Whereas a large part of the older population does not think that so 
much, because they’ve been alive long, to see us go through other periods of bad 
drought and dry winters and things like that so a lot of, I get the impression that 
a lot of people in the older age group view this as normal, cyclical you know 
normal cycles, normal weather cycles and less linked to climate change. 
To summarise, some of the predominant reasoning used to suggest that the drought was 
not linked to climate change involved the notion that droughts were cyclical and natural 
because they have happened in the past. In relation to this point, the importance of 
location and personal history was mentioned, suggesting that because older people had 
experienced previous droughts they tended to be less convinced that the current drought 
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was linked to climate change. Other explanations that participants gave for the 
occurrence of drought related, for example, to issues of water storage, inadequate water 
sources and social practices, such as waste, as well as distrust of meteorological science 
and overpopulation. It should be noted that people who did see a link between drought 
and climate change also acknowledged the importance of social water practices and 
waste.  
I’m definitely not a scientist but… 
Some people excused themselves or downplayed their opinion or its validity by 
commenting: “I’m definitely not a scientist but …”. People experience events, but not 
the causes of those events, in which case science is sometimes used to investigate 
causality. The caution that some people expressed, suggests that people might have felt 
that their experiences and opinions were less valid because they did not have scientific 
training or evidence to back them up.  
For example, two men working on a pier in a smaller northern coastal city 
described elaborately the kinds of changes they had noted, such as warmer ocean 
temperatures, leading to higher acidic algae content, acidification of crabs and fish, 
which in turn affected the whole upward food chain and fishing industry.  
Mark: It’s all the bait fish too, all the anchovies, all the little fish that eat, you 
know, all the algae  
Evan: So you’ll see sick birds and  
Mark: … and then later on it works its way up the food chain and then you’ll 
start seeing sick birds and maybe even sick sea lions down the road … 
Sarah: So it’s not just that, so actually I misunderstood you, when you said that 
it’s not that there are less crabs around, it’s that the crabs are (inedible)  
Evan: Yeah, you just don’t wanna eat them  
Mark: You don’t wanna eat them, because you get sick  
Despite their in-depth knowledge of local changes in the ocean, they ended up 
qualifying their answer by adding that they were not scientists.  
Sarah: Wow. And you think, you think that is linked to climate change?  
Mark: Oh yeah.  
Evan: It definitely could be, yeah.  
Mark: Definitely a possibility. We’re not scientists but (laughing) …  
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Similarly when I asked Larissa whether she thought that more needed to be done to 
address climate change, her response implied that her opinion was not so important or 
valid because she was not a scientist. 
Larissa: Absolutely … You know, I’m definitely not a scientist but, you know, I 
mean if we know that there are certain issues that, are creating a very rapid 
deterioration, that they should be addressed immediately. 
Dave’s comment below illustrated an uncertainty about how to assess scientists’ 
arguments. On the one hand he referred to scientists as much smarter than himself, but 
he did not quite know which side of the ‘science’ to believe.  
Dave: I kinda have my doubts on the climate change, if you look at the long time 
history there’s always been spikes in the climate, and then it drops back down, 
and back up and back down. I’m not smart enough to figure it out (laugh) but I 
read a lot of stuff and I know it’s happened and I’m not saying in the last 20 or 
30 years, but there’s been spikes in the temperature over the history and then it 
always regulates itself. So, it could be happening, I don’t know … I’ve read 
where it’s happening from scientists that are much smarter than me, and I’ve 
read from other scientists that say it’s not happening, so who, which one do you 
believe? 
Sarah: Right, ok, so you don’t think that climate change is necessarily happening 
or that it’s, even if it were to be happening, that it’s caused by human emissions? 
Dave: I’m kind of 50/50 on that (laughs) I just, you know, I don’t, I try to get 
somewhere in the middle, where I don’t completely believe the one’s that say 
there is and I don’t completely believe the one’s that say they’re not. So, who 
knows? 
The extracts may represent cases where people do to not quite trust their own judgement 
and experience, because they are not scientists and some do not know who to believe. 
Although the statement ‘I am not a scientist’ could ‘just’ be a rhetoric device, this 
interpretation would still raise the question as to why such a rhetoric was being used. 
One disadvantage of the heavy reliance on science in modern Western societies may be 
that lay people’s knowledge and everyday experience is not regarded as scientific and 
might therefore be considered less important. As a consequence lay people may not feel 
qualified to make judgements about climate change and refer any such judgements to 
‘people with knowledge’ (i.e. experts, such as scientists and politicians) which 
simultaneously could lead to the displacement of responsibility.  
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Drought did not appear to change people’s minds on climate change 
One of the key questions of this research was to investigate to what extent 
personal experience of drought might influence a change in views on anthropogenic 
climate change. This question developed partly in response to the suggestion that 
Western countries are not taking more action on climate change mitigation because they 
are not (yet) affected. From the observations and interviews in California it appeared 
that this was not the case and I present some of the evidence for this below. I 
acknowledge that there is no straightforward way of testing this, let alone of 
establishing any causality, if there were such an effect. There are also difficulties in 
terms of how to study an omission, i.e. something that is not happening, changing or 
being said (Norgaard, 2011; Zerubavel, 2006). However, I noted that nobody I spoke to 
in the interviews or other conversations ever mentioned that the drought had changed 
their view on climate change. Several responses would seem to support the suggestion 
that people’s views about climate change were not drastically changed by the 
experience of drought. Betty (living in a large northern coastal city) exemplified how 
someone who already believed in climate change only saw the drought as “proof”. 
Sarah: So, do you think that experiencing the drought has changed your views 
on climate change? 
Betty: No, I always felt it was. 
Sarah: You always thought, yeah? 
Betty: Yeah, it’s pretty, it’s pretty, they’ve been warning about this for quite a 
while, good scientific studies always said, something terrible’s about to happen. 
Why would I not believe that? … 
Sarah: So do you think, experiencing the drought, being here and living in the 
drought is making people think more about climate change? 
Betty: Maybe. I think it might, you know. But I think most of us, already have 
believed the scientific studies, saying that it’s, yeah. 
Sarah: Right, so people already believed in it anyway? 
Betty: Right, right. 
Sarah: It’s not like 
Betty: The drought is just proof. You know. We’re like the first sufferers of 
climate change really. 
Martin referred to his attitudinal background and replied that the drought was not linked 
to climate change. At the beginning of this extract he was disputing the link between 
emissions and anthropogenic climate change. Like people who maintained that there 
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was a causal link, he also claimed to draw on scientific evidence to back up his 
argument that there was no link between emissions and climate change. 
Martin: No doubt that that (CO2) has a tendency to capture temperatures, but 
beyond that, the direct correlation of that to any, even longer term change in, in 
the temperature of the earth, the data is not as clear as the advocates would have 
you think and the source, the causation is not that clear and what’s not at all 
clear, is the logic of, ok, so what can you do about it and what would that cost 
and what’s the trade off? So people are, I think I’m speaking for a lot of people 
when I would say that, yes we should do what we can to stop, or to reduce CO2 
emissions, on the other hand, let’s understand what really causes climate change 
and let’s look at the total, global picture and what China does and what India 
does and not just commit suicide economically because it feels good. So kind of 
with that attitudinal background do I think the drought has much to do with 
climate change? The drought is a predictable, short-term you know set of 
weather conditions, the climate is a long-term, you know, circumstance driven 
by the other large factors, so I would say no. The governor (who is a Democrat) 
has said yes.  
Sarah: yeah  
Martin: I think he, I think contrary to the frequent politisation of things, I would 
like to say that Republicans are the Party of science, and I would say the science 
says no … there’s really, you can’t make that connection.  
Martin suggested that carbon emissions do trap heat, but used science discourse to 
suggest that there was no evidence of emissions causing long-term increases in global 
temperatures. His emphasis, however, seemed to be on the question of how to respond 
to emissions. This highlights that the implications of how to respond to a situation are 
not given within science. Martin also referred to China and India as significant 
contributors to emissions, and suggested that emissions should be reduced to an extent. 
Both of these points seem to contradict his previous argument that the role of carbon 
emissions is not clear, since if the latter were the case, then China and India’s emissions 
would not be of relevance. His ultimate concern seemed to be to avoid ‘committing 
economic suicide’ and it appears that, with this in mind, he drew on other factors 
(China’s and India’s emissions) and scientific ‘uncertainty’ to argue for the outcome 
that he supported.  
 A woman in the Bay Area who worked and volunteered for an environmental 
group commented regarding a link between drought and climate change:  
Rose: I don’t see how people could escape thinking that it has to do with climate 
change, but, I don’t know. 
Sarah: Yeah, but then, in your circles people already believe in climate change? 
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Rose: Oh yeah, they already believe in it so, yeah … I think some people feel 
hopeless and then therefore I think that contributes to them not connecting the 
drought with climate change, because you think that it’s already happening and 
there’s nothing we can do about it.  
The feeling of hopelessness and lack of efficacy were suggested as reasons why people 
might shy away from drawing a link. Later I asked Rose whether she had noticed a 
change in awareness, more interest or an increase in membership in her environmental 
group and she replied: 
Rose: I guess I would say I don’t really know, but in some ways, I don’t think so 
yet, like, I still think we are getting the people who cared anyway. 
The conversations seem to suggest that experiencing the drought did not change 
people’s mind on whether anthropogenic climate change was happening. None of the 
participants told me that they used to believe that anthropogenic climate change did not 
exist, but now they were convinced it did, or vice versa. Instead the drought either 
seemed to confirm people’s views if they already believed in climate change, or if they 
did not, then the drought was explained in other ways.  
Discussion 
People who believed that there was a connection between the drought and 
climate change drew on their own experiences and also on science discourses. They 
pointed towards warmer temperatures, poor rain and snow conditions and suggested that 
CO2 emissions brought about by humans were bound to have an effect at some point. 
However, they also acknowledged the role of water practices in affecting water 
availability. These findings are congruent with Armah et al. (2015) and Ruddell et al. 
(2012) who found that participants accurately perceived increases in temperature in 
their local surroundings.  
In contrast, some of the predominant reasoning used to argue that the drought 
was not linked to climate change involved the notion that droughts are cyclical and 
natural because they have happened in the past. This reasoning has previously been 
noted in relation to climate change but is flawed, since just because something has 
happened before, it does not follow that the causes always remain the same:  
The most common fallacious argument is that current climate change must be 
natural because climate has changed naturally in the past. This myth commits 
the logical fallacy of jumping to conclusions. It’s like finding a dead body with a 
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knife sticking out of its back, and arguing that the person must have died of 
natural causes because humans have died of natural causes in the past. The 
premise does not lead to the conclusion. (Cook, 2015, para. 6) 
In relation to this point, the importance of demographics and personal history was 
mentioned by participants, suggesting that because older people have experienced 
previous droughts they tended to be less convinced that the current drought was linked 
to climate change.  
Other reasons used to argue that the drought was not linked to climate change 
were inadequate water storage and sources, as well as bad water practices, such as 
waste. There was also mention of distrust of meteorological science and the suggestion 
that there was overpopulation. This line of reasoning was consistent with one discussed 
by Otto-Banaszak, Matczak, Wesseler and Wechsung (2011) who noted that in their 
interviews with adaptation experts in Europe: “The interviewees did not blame global 
warming for the increased frequency of climate extremes as such but more often 
attributed them to the way people have been managing land and other natural resources” 
(p. 220). 
Thus it appears that even when people begin to experience some of the effects of 
climate change, they do not necessarily draw a connection to the latter, since previous 
understandings influence their interpretation of the events. The explanation of drought 
through natural cycles is also in line with Ungar (2000) and Whitmarsh’s (2008) 
suggestions that changes are lost to people amongst the natural variation in temperature 
and occurrence of extreme weather events. But, as noted above, other participants did 
perceive there to be hotter temperatures and an increase in the severity of drought 
conditions and they linked these to climate change. The present results are in line with 
Pearce et al. (2010) who pointed out that some people in Australia interpreted drought 
as part of natural cyclical variations, whereas for others climate change was a present 
risk. 
A dependence on scientific understanding was evident, as several participants 
qualified their responses, by saying that they were not scientists. This could be taken to 
imply that their opinion on the drought, its causes and consequences were less relevant, 
because they were not scientifically trained. The dominance of Western scientific claims 
to knowledge and the associated language used, points towards the potential 
marginalisation of other epistemologies, such as experiential, local and indigenous ways 
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of knowing (Agrawal, 2002). The present findings indicate how people relied on 
science to understand and define their surroundings and possible causes. As Beck 
(1992) suggested, many modern risks require science to track long-term effects and 
establish a cause:  
… presumptions of causality escape our perception. They must always be 
imagined, implied to be true, believed. In this sense too, risks are invisible. The 
implied causality always remains more or less uncertain and tentative. Thus we 
are dealing with a theoretical and hence a scientized consciousness, even in the 
everyday consciousness of risks. (p. 28) 
One of the dominant way of discussing climate change is in scientised narratives, while 
the direct experience and tracking of changes noted by many indigenous communities 
(e.g., Alaskan native communities) has not received similar acknowledgement 
(Callison, 2014).  
The side-comment ‘I’m not a scientist’ may seem insignificant, but I heard it 
repeatedly. It is noteworthy, as it was already evident that the people I asked were not 
scientists – I had not sought them out as scientific experts – I had asked about their 
experience and opinions. A consequence of this reliance on science to interpret the 
changes that people note around them, could be that definitions of risk are relegated to 
those with a certain level of authority and training, such as scientists. Moreover, Beck 
(2009) questioned: “… who decides what is and is not a risk?” (p. 24) highlighting that 
relations of definition are also relations of domination. As long as definitions and 
understandings of climate change are relegated and dominated by scientific experts and 
people in authority (e.g., politicians) the other experiences and changes noted, or 
opinions that are formed, might be given less importance.  
The experience of drought in California did not appear to change people’s minds 
on climate change. Either participants already believed in climate change in which case 
the drought reaffirmed their beliefs and added to their concern. Alternatively, if they did 
not think that climate change existed or was caused by humans, then they tended to 
interpret the drought as part of natural cyclical changes, or as a consequence of bad 
water practices. Seemingly, people interpreted the drought using their already existing 
frames of reference and accommodated the drought into their worldviews. This could be 
an example of biased assimilation, whereby people seek out and find more convincing 
information that supports their beliefs (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979; Whitmarsh, 2011).  
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Corner, Whitmarsh and Xenias (2012) showed that participants assessed the 
reliability and credibility of information on climate change in line with their pre-
existing beliefs (sceptics were more convinced by the sceptical compared to the pro-
climate change article, and vice-versa). In a longitudinal study in the United States, 
Myers, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Akerlof and Leiserowitz (2013) demonstrated the 
presence of both experiential learning and motivated reasoning. Consistent with 
experiential learning, the self-reported perceived experience of global warming 
influenced the conviction that global warming was occurring. In line with motivated 
reasoning, it was also the case that prior beliefs influenced the perceived personal 
experience of global warming. Notably, those with lower global warming engagement 
were more likely to be influenced by perceived experience than by existing attitudes, 
while those who were more engaged in the topic of global warming (both for or against) 
were more likely to evaluate their perceived experience in alignment with their prior 
views.  
Importantly, in the present study, people sometimes mentioned similar events or 
narratives such as past droughts or scientific evidence to back up different points of 
view. It appeared that ‘evidence’ was interpreted differently depending on existing 
beliefs. This is also consistent with research on cultural polarization, which suggested 
that: “People with different values draw different inferences from the same evidence” 
(Kahan, 2012, p. 255). Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman (2011) showed a strong 
correlation between views on scientific consensus and individuals’ cultural values. In an 
experimental study they found that participants were more likely to judge as expert, 
someone whose position on a risk-related topic (global warming, nuclear power or gun 
control) supported their views.  
The findings of the present research suggested that existing beliefs about climate 
change were important in informing how people made sense of the drought. This 
finding is congruent with Whitmarsh (2011) who showed that prior environmental 
values and political views were the strongest predictors of beliefs in the reality and 
severity of climate change (those with more right-wing views and lower pro-
environmental values were more sceptical of climate change). Education and self-
reported knowledge were not significant predictors of uncertainty and scepticism about 
climate change. The author concluded that: “Critically, more information will not 
engage the most sceptical groups, since information will tend to be interpreted in 
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relation to existing views, and entrenched views are very hard to change” (p. 699). 
According to the present results a similar point seems to apply not only to ‘information’, 
but also to the processing of personal experience and interpretation of local climate 
change.  
Consequently, it appears that information and events (whether they be in form of 
experiencing drought or news coverage) were interpreted in line with what suited 
existing worldviews. The member of the Republican Party, Martin, used various claims 
about scientific uncertainty regarding the causation of climate change from emissions, 
as well as other high-polluting countries, ultimately to argue that the economy should 
not be damaged by mitigation. Klein (2014) examined this line of reasoning in detail, 
proposing that ‘the right’ realised what it would mean for the economy, if they were to 
accept the evidence on anthropogenic climate change. She proposed that, given this 
realisation, people on the right had to disagree with the science, because otherwise it 
would have undermined and threatened their worldviews and the whole economic 
system that those views favoured.  
Klein (2014) attended a conference on climate change by the Heartland Institute, 
a free-market solution oriented think-tank based in Chicago. In her examination of the 
conference she remarked: “Yes, there is a pretense that the delegates’ rejection of 
climate science is rooted in serious disagreement about the data. And the organizers go 
to some lengths to mimic credible scientific conferences…” (p. 33). But, she went on to 
note, that the various theories presented were already debunked and that the delegates 
contradicted each other. One delegate questioned whether warming was even occurring, 
the other suggested there was warming but that it was not linked to greenhouse 
emissions and yet another conceded that there was warming due to CO2 but argued that 
the impacts were minimal and required no further action. This is somewhat similar to 
Martin who used various lines of argument which seemed to contradict each other, such 
as that emissions do not cause climate change, but emissions should be reduced and 
China and India are also to blame. In line with the logic followed by Martin, Klein 
(2014) argued that underlying a rise in denial of climate change among staunch 
conservatives was that: 
…they have come to understand that as soon as they admit that climate change 
is real, they will lose the central ideological battle of our time—whether we need 
to plan and manage our societies to reflect our goals and values, or whether that 
task can be left to the magic of the market. (p. 40) 
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Similarly, McCright and Dunlap (2011b) found what they called a ‘conservative 
white male effect’, whereby the latter were more likely than other adults (of a nationally 
representative sample in the United States) to deny climate change, especially if they 
self-reported having a good understanding of global warming. One of the explanations 
the authors concluded with was that:  
… conservative white males have disproportionately occupied positions of 
power within our economic system. Given the expansive challenge that climate 
change poses to the industrial capitalist economic system, it should not be 
surprising that conservative white males’ strong system-justifying attitudes 
would be triggered to deny climate change. (p. 1171) 
Klein (2014) summarised: “In other words, it is always easier to deny reality than to 
allow our worldview to be shattered …” (p. 37) when, for example, confronted with 
inconvenient scientific evidence. She suggested that therefore conservatives: “… bridle 
before facts that call the dominant economic system into question…” (p. 37).   
Another explanation as to why some people do not draw a link between drought 
and climate change, was offered by Rose, who speculated that it had to do with feelings 
of hopelessness and helplessness, whereby people felt there was nothing they could do 
about climate change (the importance of which was discussed by Norgaard, 2011). 
Perhaps helplessness is one of the reasons why people, despite knowing about climate 
change, do not seem to integrate this knowledge into their everyday lives: “Across 
many sectors of US society, people know facts about climate change that they believe to 
be true, but they live their lives without integrating this information into their decision 
making, political activities, or sense of daily reality” (Norgaard, 2011, p. 204). 
One of the particular contributions of the present study was that it employed 
qualitative research to examine the complexity of interrelated beliefs and the reasoning 
that people used to support each set of beliefs. Many previous studies have relied on 
quantitative data. Although the current research does not provide a quantitative 
assessment of the prevalence or distribution of perceptions, it does illustrate some of the 
patterns and lines of argument to be found in relation to drought and climate change in 
California. The interpretation of drought seemed to depend upon a person’s previous 
climate change beliefs. This suggests that attributing inaction on climate change 
mitigation, to the distance of impacts in Western countries, needs to acknowledge that 
lack of experience of climate change may not be one of the decisive factors. Instead it 
may be that political beliefs, personal biography, one’s environment and social and 
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economic factors have a decisive influence on how the impacts of climate change are 
interpreted locally.  
The explanation of inaction due to a lack of tangibility and immediacy has also 
been criticised for implying that climate action arises primarily out of self-interest (as a 
consequence of experiencing the negative consequences personally) and de-emphasises 
the concern over climate-justice which can also drive action on climate change 
(Isenhour, 2013). The explanation is further problematized by cases such as Sweden, 
where the experience of negative consequences of climate change is rated as low, but 
people are amongst the most concerned and pro-active (Isenhour, 2013). 
The present research relied mostly on interview data and if they had not 
mentioned the topic already participants were prompted to reflect on the potential 
causes of the drought and on climate change specifically. More observational data and 
ethnographic research would have allowed a better judgement of the extent to which 
climate change occurred in everyday conversation and the degree to which it was 
mentioned in relation to drought. However, in the interviews climate change was 
sometimes mentioned without prompting and participants also referred to everyday 
conversations they had on the topic. It could also be of interest to follow interviews up 
at a later point in time.  
Future studies could further investigate how the experience of climate change 
impacts on beliefs and especially on adaptation and mitigation behaviours. Further, a 
quantitative assessment of the moderating effects of previous climate change and other 
beliefs, on the interpretation of drought in California, would be useful. Future research 
could also examine more generally under what circumstances the experience of extreme 
weather events, or other climate change impacts, does lead to changes in concern over 
anthropogenic climate change (as Capstick et al., 2015 found), as well as to changes in 
behaviour.  
In conclusion, those who thought that drought and climate change were linked, 
argued for example that there had been a noticeable rise in temperatures, drew on 
science and/or followed a general belief that humans impact the climate. Nonetheless, 
these participants also acknowledged the role of social water practices in water issues. 
In contrast, those who did not believe there to be a link between drought and climate 
change argued that droughts were natural and cyclical and/or that there was inadequate 
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water storage. Both sides sometimes used science narratives to support their argument. 
It did not appear that the experience of drought changed people’s minds on climate 
change. People tended to interpret their experience of the drought according to their 
already existing opinions on climate change. If they previously believed that climate 
change was happening they were more likely to think that the drought in California 
might be linked to it, but otherwise they did not. The investigation of the relationship 
between the experience of climate impacts and changes in opinions and actual 
mitigation action merits further research. 
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- Chapter 6 - 
Discussion 
In this thesis, through a combination of separate but inter-related chapters, I 
have examined how people relate to climate change. In the Introduction I laid out both 
my personal stance as to why I care, and my position on various scholarly debates. I 
described the context for my research, by outlining some literature on the relationship 
between capitalism and climate change, as well as how capitalism influences humans’ 
thoughts and behaviour. I raised a variety of questions, such as how the current 
dominant economic system might express itself at the individual level.  
One example of this, the case of pro-environmental individual behaviour change 
approaches, was examined in more detail (please refer to the research reported in 
chapters 2 and 3). This approach is one which largely locates the problem of, and 
solution to, excessive carbon emissions in the individual, but leaves unchecked political 
and economic factors (Kent, 2009; Maniates, 2001; Norgaard, 2011, 2017; Shove, 2010; 
Webb, 2012). In Webb’s (2012) words: “Neo-liberal micro-economic governance, 
through behaviour change technology, offers limited and largely self-defeating means of 
transition to a sustainable society” (p. 121).  
I went on to question the suggestion that the failure to reduce emissions in the 
West is due to climate change’s future and distant (from the high-emitting Western 
countries) consequences. Although mentioned at the outset, I have, towards the end of 
my programme of research, increasingly come to realise the particular relevance to my 
research of the notions of ‘omissions’ and ‘silence’ (see Norgaard, 2011; Zerubavel, 
2006). In the Introduction I also outlined my methodology and described my samples.  
  In the first two chapters I concentrated on people’s views and responses to 
approaches to climate change mitigation. Chapter 2 consisted of an exploration of the 
different mitigation strategies which participants mentioned and their views on different 
actors’ responsibility to reduce emissions, were examined. Talking about climate 
change mitigation necessarily involved conversations about understandings of climate 
change, such as whether it was even occurring and whether or not it was human-caused. 
Although this was not the focus of the research, it showed that for some people these 
questions were still open. The results also indicated that these participants (students in 
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the UK) were not perceiving climate change to be affecting them. The persisting doubt 
about the evidence on climate change, even amongst these university students, might be 
testament to the power of the denial industry (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Notably, 
however, even the students who raised doubts about the existence - or about the 
anthropogenic nature - of climate change, nonetheless suggested several measures to 
reduce emissions. These measures were seen as positive for several other reasons, such 
as the reduction of air pollution or (in the case of cycling, for example) the benefits to 
people’s health. This supports the approach taken by research and campaigns which 
have suggested shifting towards an emphasis on viewing climate change mitigation as 
conducive to quality of life, rather than as involving personal sacrifices (see also Klein, 
2014).  
The results from chapter 2 also showed that individuals, the UK government and 
corporations were all, to some extent, seen as having responsibility for reducing 
emissions, but different interests and power relations were suspected of impeding these 
actors’ willingness to respond accordingly. Issues were also raised concerning distrust 
of government and corporations and the extent to which they are committed to change, 
as opposed to being geared towards economic growth and profit. The actual changes 
that participants suggested for the individual, governmental and corporate level of 
mitigation strategies, were also of interest because of the possibilities that were not 
mentioned. Regarding the individual level, participants mentioned for example 
recycling more, turning off unused devices, using more public transport, walking and 
cycling more. These findings were consistent with those described by Maniates (2001) 
who mentioned that among the most popular ‘solutions’ which students suggested to 
global environmental issues were planting a tree, recycling and riding a bike instead of 
driving a car. In the present findings there was little mention of engaging in political 
activities such as protesting and pressuring politicians, energy companies or other 
businesses.  
The UK government was seen as having responsibility to reduce emissions, for 
example by providing better information and education to the public, investing in 
renewable energy and by regulating high polluting industries. However, several 
participants were sceptical whether this would happen, due to the level of collusion 
between government, corporations and industries, consistent with Kent’s (2009) 
proposal that:  
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… people also understand global degradation as symptomatic of weak political 
action (Räthzel & Uzzell 2009, p. 329), so not only do individuals perceive an 
unacceptable level of action from governments on climate change mitigation 
they are also cynical that governments are genuinely serious about climate 
change as it is understood to be against their economic interests (Darnton 2006, 
p.24; Accountability and Consumers International 2007). (p. 143)  
Participants also viewed corporations as having responsibility to reduce emissions, for 
example by reducing waste and recycling ‘what they can’. However, several 
participants were again sceptical about the likelihood of corporations changing, given 
their profit motive. This indicates that there was some awareness of corporations’ 
economic concerns and the framing of climate change mitigation as a threat to capitalist 
organisation.  
Several participants raised the notion that there was a clash between 
environmental and corporate interests. They saw a dichotomy between corporations’ 
profit and growth motive and environmental well-being. One recurring attempt to 
resolve this opposition was the suggestion of win-win solutions, whereby corporations 
somehow needed to be incentivized to reduce emissions, but would still be able to 
continue making a profit. The profit motive itself often remained unquestioned. The 
win-win approach is in line with larger societal discourses and approaches which seek 
market mechanisms to address environmental destruction (Maniates, 2001). These 
findings seem to support the suggestion by Norgaard (2011) that people are somewhat 
sceptical and disillusioned about the political system’s ability to take action and reduce 
emissions. However, this does not seem to have led to a challenging of the values, 
norms and assumptions that dominate society (e.g., profit) or the resolution of taking 
matters into one’s own hands (beyond recycling).  
When protest and more fundamental structural level changes were raised, they 
were supported, but seen as unrealistic and unlikely. This again was in line with 
Maniates’ (2001) findings that:  
When we asked our students … why, after thirteen weeks of intensive study of 
environmental problems, they were so reluctant to consider as “solutions” 
broader changes in policy and institutions, they shrugged. Sure, we remember 
studying these kinds of approaches in class, they said, but such measures were, 
well, fuzzy, mysterious, messy, and “idealistic.” (p. 36) 
This underlines that one crucial factor in the motivation for action and change, is the 
feeling and belief that something can be done (Gamson, 1992; Norgaard, 2011, citing 
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research by Immerwahr, 1999). In the research reported in chapter 2, when giving 
reasons for inertia, participants explained for example, that people did not know enough 
(see also Maniates, 2001) or were lazy because the behaviour changes were seen as 
inconvenient or less important compared to ‘daily worries’. Importantly, the notion was 
raised that people were not being affected enough to begin to care and act more towards 
climate change mitigation, which partly informed the idea for my qualitative research in 
California. The implication of this is that several participants viewed humans in general 
as self-interested, only willing to act when they were personally affected, which might 
indicate one assumption that some people have internalised about human nature.  
 To my knowledge this study is the first one to examine qualitatively what a 
sample of UK citizens think should be done to mitigate climate change. This is 
important because understanding what the public thinks should be done to mitigate 
climate change can inform policy approaches to be in line with public opinion and 
therefore receive public support. Further, understanding what people think should be 
done to mitigate climate change also elucidates which kind of mitigation strategies the 
public are aware of, which ones have been successfully disseminated and which ones 
have not. Campaigns can then be developed and targeted more specifically at 
broadening the public’s understanding of a variety of possibilities for climate change 
mitigation. Further, the study has contributed to research by examining some of the 
underlying assumptions that some people in the public make, for example corporate 
profit is taken for granted in win-win approaches to the reduction of carbon emissions. 
The study reported in chapter 2 also expands existing research by examining the 
relationship that people see between different levels of action. This combines an 
exploration of both personal and individual responsibility for action as well as how it 
relates to the responsibility of structural level actors, such as government and 
corporations. This means that beyond exploring psychological and individual level 
barriers to climate change mitigation (such as laziness as mentioned by some 
participants or the dominance of issues that are perceived as more immediate and 
pressing [Gifford, 2011]) participants explored some of the barriers of action on climate 
change mitigation posed by infrastructure, political and corporate imperatives. For 
example, they discussed how the profit motive and need for economic growth is 
contrary to environmental well-being and climate change mitigation. 
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Using an experimental design, chapter 3 focused on the relationship between 
messaging about individual behaviour change and support for structural level change. 
Overall, the hypotheses that individual behaviour change framings would reduce 
support for structural level changes (compared to when a lack of impact of individual 
behaviour change or possible structural level changes were emphasised) were not 
supported. However, the literature which criticises the individualised approach to 
climate change mitigation, discusses long-term societal processes which influence 
attention, opinions and behaviour. The influence of these long-term processes were 
unlikely to be changed through the provision of a short information paragraph. It was 
expected that positive presentations of individual behaviour change detract attention and 
support from structural level change. The studies did show that many participants 
viewed individual behaviour change as impactful and effective (study 2). Highlighting 
the impact of individual behaviour change seemed to increase support for prioritising 
the environment over the economy compared to when the only option was behaviour 
change versus no behaviour change (study 1). In combination these studies suggest that 
participants viewed individual behaviour change favourably and as effective.  
The main contribution of these studies has been to examine the relationship 
between messaging concerning individual and structural level mitigation approaches. 
They have contributed to broadening the discussion of climate change mitigation 
beyond the need to encourage individual behaviour change to including a wider stance 
on the need for structural level changes. This is important given that a heavy focus on 
individual responsibility and behaviour change may limit approaches to climate change 
mitigation and obscure the need for infrastructure and policy changes which enable and 
mandate change for businesses and corporations as well. Given that climate change 
mitigation will require change on many levels of society, it is also necessary for the 
discipline of Psychology to expand research approaches beyond focusing on individuals 
to an approach that takes into account wider structural constraints and how views and 
behaviour relate to societal contexts.  
Chapters 2 and 3 raised the debate over a renegotiation of the role of 
responsibility in climate change mitigation across different levels of action. Future 
research could further investigate topics touched upon in chapters 2 and 3, by 
examining how alternative approaches to climate change mitigation might be supported. 
Webb (2012) suggested closer examination of: “…the circumstances which could 
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enable subordinated or shadow understandings to develop substantively, to be 
acknowledged and to be acted on systematically” (p. 122).  
The last two research-based chapters referred to fieldwork conducted in 
California, taken as a case study for the occurrence of climate change in form of 
drought, in a Western industrialised part of the world. Chapter 4 unpacked Californians’ 
understanding of drought: specifically what changes were perceived and how the 
drought was seen as related to social dimensions of water practices. The aim of chapter 
4 was to examine to what extent people were aware of climate change locally, by 
focusing on their experience of drought itself (i.e. the focus was not on views of climate 
change). Californians in many parts of the state were noticing changes. In the cities 
these changes were less noticeable, but when they were mentioned they related 
predominantly to the weather. In more rural areas Californians described wider-reaching 
changes, such as lower lake and river levels and lack of snow. Importantly, living in a 
larger city shielded people from the effects of drought and people often described 
learning about drought predominately from the news, rather than from direct 
experience. They sometimes described that they felt they only had an ‘intellectual’ 
awareness of the drought and that it felt distant. Californians’ varied interpretations 
further highlighted the role of different forms of knowing and experiencing, through 
both direct and embodied experiences and indirect sources. In both cases the media, 
scientists’ and politicians’ narratives, as well as infrastructure and location, could 
influence how people conceptualised the drought. Several people also described 
experiencing unpleasant emotions in response to noticing changes in their natural 
environment, which often seemed to back up their understanding of the occurrence of 
drought. These findings are consistent with Norgaard’s suggestion (2011, drawing on 
Zerubavel, 1997; see also Gamson, 1992) that perceptions of distance are socially 
created and do not necessarily depend on physical space or time: 
If climate change is felt to be an “abstract” issue in the community, this fact 
reflects a disjuncture between the local sense of time and place … and the sense 
of time and place that would be needed to conceptualize climate change for it to 
seem “real”. (p. 76)  
A comparable point applies to the understanding of drought in California, where many 
people even experienced the more local and concrete expression of climate change (in 
the form of drought) as distant.  
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Notably, the drought was not just conceptualised as changes in ‘nature’ (e.g., 
affecting rivers, lakes and snow) but also as pertaining to social practices of water 
management which influenced the availability of water and could create or exacerbate 
drought. Agriculture was named as one of the major offenders in terms of intensive 
water usage and ensuing shortage. In addition, some Californians suspected profit 
motives behind the discussion of water scarcity and drought. Finally, there were several 
effects of the drought which gained little mention and mainstream attention, such as the 
effects on the Central Valley, where several farm-working communities were already 
struggling for clean drinking water, and on salmon populations, affecting for example 
Native American communities. 
Chapter 4 highlights how local perceptions of climate change are mediated, for 
example, by architecture (water infrastructure provides water from taps even in times of 
drought), by location and by media coverage. Indeed, the importance of the social 
organisation of attention (which informed the research for chapters 2 and 3) also 
became apparent in chapter 4. For example, certain experiences and consequences of 
drought were mentioned more frequently while others remained less acknowledged. 
Further, people’s attention was shifted towards saving water on a personal level rather 
than talking about the role of ‘big agriculture’ and fracking or water bottling companies 
in the state. Moreover, the drought did not mean the same thing to one person as to 
another, in line with Callison’s (2014) statement that: “The communal life of facts 
matters in explicit and implicit ways—it matters in terms of directing attention (and 
attentional rest)…” (p. 244) which had important impacts because it influenced people’s 
responses. 
Chapter 5 investigated to what extent people viewed the drought as linked to 
climate change and which reasons they gave for their views. Those who saw a link 
between the drought and climate change had already believed in climate change prior to 
the drought and argued that they could see the changes. Those who did not see a 
connection between the drought and climate change referred, for example, to previous 
droughts as providing evidence that droughts were natural and cyclical. Previous 
changes in climate and political views impacted on how people interpreted the drought. 
One implication of the absence of any reported change in beliefs is that experiencing 
climate change does not necessarily convince people of its occurrence. This could be 
because people experience the symptoms and interpret them differently from each other, 
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rather than experiencing a cause (Beck, 1992). That is, even if people were to notice 
changes in climate they would not readily be able to attribute them to the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Further, changes in climate are hidden in everyday fluctuations of 
weather and temperature (Ungar, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2008). Importantly, these findings 
cast doubt on approaches which suggest that inaction on climate change is due to the 
long-term and ‘distant’ consequences of climate change.  
In California, drought was not always talked about as part of climate change and 
the way people made sense of local changes depended on many factors. The absence of 
scientific terminology such as ‘climate change’ does not always imply that there is a 
disconnection between people’s perceptions of local and global events. For example, 
Cochran (the former international chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council [ICC], 
interviewed in Callison, 2014) described that the everyday language used in different 
communities across the Alaskan Arctic tended to focus on symptomatic changes:  
Certainly, when our elders talk about climate change and global warming, those 
are not the words that anybody would ever hear coming from an elder’s mouth 
or anybody else … But if you were to ask elders about the changes in ice 
conditions, and what they have seen in their lifetime, changes in ice? Well, that 
would be a three-month conversation. (p. 45)  
This underscores Callison’s (2014) argument about how the meaning of climate change 
is different across contexts and people. Accordingly, it is not that the labelling of local 
changes as ‘climate change’ is always crucial. Instead what might matter is how local 
changes are connected or disconnected from a larger picture and what implications the 
different interpretations bring. The research in California suggests that belief in climate 
change involves much more than just ‘experiencing climate change’ since changes are 
interpreted in the local context, e.g., of previous droughts and general dryness, and 
because people are shielded from drought through the water infrastructure which still 
provides water. Additionally, people adapt their interpretation of drought to their 
existing beliefs. Further research would be required to explore the relationship between 
the experience of climate change and action on mitigation.  
 The research in California contributes to existing literature in several ways. To 
my knowledge it is one of the first studies using qualitative methods to explore how 
climate change, in the form of drought, is experienced in the USA. This is important 
because climate change does not and will not only affect developing nations now and in 
the future, but also industrialised countries and will affect people within these countries 
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differently (Abbott & Wilson, 2015). Further, given the West’s higher historical and 
present emissions, it is crucial to examine how the consequences of these emissions are 
now experienced. An understanding of how climate change is perceived locally could 
be employed as a basis for researching how behaviour change might begin to occur as a 
result of experiencing environmental change. So far only relatively little research has 
used qualitative methods to examine the experience of drought and/or climate change in 
Western countries, such as in Australia and Norway (Alston, 2006; Anderson, 2008, 
2009; Norgaard, 2011; Pearce, Willis, Wadham & Binks, 2010). Further, it has been 
suggested that there has not been more action to mitigate climate change (e.g. Giddens, 
2011; Moser, 2010) at least partly due to its future and distant consequences. However, 
this research has shown that even in the case where climate change is having an impact 
now, such as is the case with the drought in California, there are in fact several other 
factors which influence the interpretation of the perceived environmental changes. This 
suggests that whether climate change is perceived as a threat or not, as distant or not, 
and as requiring immediate and high emission reductions, is not primarily a result of its 
future consequences, but is rather related to how the issue is framed and acted upon 
within our societal context.  
These chapters interconnect in several ways. Participants interviewed in the UK 
(chapter 2) viewed their own role in reducing emissions primarily in terms of individual 
lifestyle changes, rather than in terms of political action. The focus on individual 
lifestyle changes in conjunction with the sociological literature (Kent, 2009; Maniates, 
2001; Norgaard, 2011; Shove, 2010; Webb, 2012) helped formulate the rationale and 
hypotheses used in all three experimental studies (chapter 3). Further, participants in the 
interviews from chapter 2 also repeatedly mentioned the idea that ‘nothing will change 
until people really feel the consequences’. Or, as one participant put it succinctly: 
“…when shit goes down basically, I think maybe people will change and there will be a 
change in mind set in the general, like, population” (Martin, interviewed for the research 
reported in chapter 2). This seemed to echo the idea existent in some academic literature 
(e.g., Giddens, 2011; Moser, 2010; Swim et al., 2009; Weber & Stern, 2011) that 
inaction on climate change mitigation relates, at least in part, to its ‘distant’ 
consequences.  
When I arrived in California, I met with similar explanations as to why people 
were not ‘doing more’. That is, several Californians implied that the drought (or the 
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effects of the drought) were not yet bad enough to bring about more considerable 
reactions. So even where drought or ‘climate change’ (even if not conceptualised as 
such) was being experienced, and despite the introduction of a mandatory 25% 
reduction in water usage, some people were still pointing towards the notion that people 
would only change their behaviour once circumstances got worse. This raises new 
questions as to what degree of ‘catastrophe’ or change people think is (or actually is) 
required before more people are propelled into some kind of action. And whether by 
that point mitigation might be secondary to the need for adaptation and immediate 
survival (although mitigation might be essential for long-term survival)? Puzzling is the 
predominance of the idea that many humans in the West will not act until they 
experience the impacts of their way of life. If the Easter Island example is anything to 
go by, then people could continue, for example, with deforestation (i.e. deplete their 
own environment) to the point of cutting down the last tree. That is, people sometimes 
seem capable of ignoring even the most direct experience of approaching catastrophe 
and self-destruction (Welzer, 2012). 
Future analyses based on the same California fieldwork could examine the 
relationship between views of the drought and ensuing reported changes in water usage, 
or lack thereof. In California I asked questions about changes in water practices, but 
rarely about climate change mitigation. This was because enough intrusive questions 
had been put to strangers in public spaces, without wanting to open up another door that 
might make participants feel uneasy, by asking “So what are you doing about climate 
change?”. Upon reflection this shows that even within the research setting, certain 
questions were avoided, because they were potentially uncomfortable, disturbing and 
also might not have seemed relevant to the topic of drought. Additionally, there was the 
difficulty of measuring or observing changes in behaviour, although self-reported 
changes could have been just as interesting. Nonetheless, in the conversations 
conducted in California (possibly due to the questions I asked), there seemed to be more 
of a focus on adaptation, rather than mitigation, as people reported their own water-
saving strategies. The relationship between the experience of climate change impacts 
and changes in behaviour remains to be pursued in future analyses and research.  
Parallels between the individualisation of mitigation approaches (discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3) and the individualisation of adaptation approaches in California, in 
terms of water saving measures, were noticeable. In both cases, people are being asked 
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to recycle their waste to reduce emissions or to recycle their water to reduce waste. 
Even though water-saving practices are desirable, it is notable that fracking is allowed 
to continue in California (contributing both to emissions and requiring vast amounts of 
water) (Goldenberg, 2014; Onishi, 2014). The individualisation of responses found both 
in attempts towards climate change mitigation and adaptation is indicative of a larger 
underlying culture, which reproduces thinking and action in terms of individualised 
responsibility. This seems to support arguments that we do not need more information 
or technological fixes to help resolve climate change, but that a shift in moral values and 
thinking is required (Callison, 2014; Klein, 2014). 
In combination these chapters have numerous implications. They have 
highlighted that overall the people sampled did know and care about climate change. 
They were supportive of climate change mitigation on various levels and believed in the 
effectiveness of individual action (chapter 3), pointing towards the importance of beliefs 
in agency. However, although people ‘know’ and ‘care’ to some degree, ideas for and 
engagement with mitigation measures beyond individual behaviour change seemed few 
and far between. A serious consideration of the underlying assumptions, norms and 
values that have created this climate ‘crisis’ and the failure of existing approaches to 
remedy it, are necessary. This could enable alternative ways of thinking and acting to 
emerge or develop. Although we can learn from previous shifts in values and actions 
(such as the abolition of slavery) and how they occurred, the case of climate change 
exists in a new era and context, in which capitalism and consumerism appear to have a 
tight grip on our values and actions (Klein, 2014). Mitigating climate change requires 
more than merely understanding attitudes towards it: it necessitates a fundamental shift 
in how we organise and co-exist in society.  
 From the interviews in chapter 2 the implications are that more public discussion 
as well as working examples of infrastructural changes could help promote public 
imagination and support for wider-ranging climate change mitigation strategies. But 
beyond mere infrastructural changes there may also be value in moving away from the 
stance that accepts our economic system as the only way things can be. Imagination and 
flexibility, inspiring visions on a hereto unknown scale, are required in order to 
implement political and economic alternatives (Maniates, 2001).  
Omissions 
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As mentioned at the outset of this discussion, the relevance to my research of the 
concept of silence and omissions (Zerubavel, 2006) has increasingly dawned on me. 
Studying omissions may pose different challenges than other fields of research, as there 
are difficulties concerning how to study something that is not occurring. Research 
which examines the failure to reduce emissions studies something that is not happening, 
the absence of a phenomenon - whether that be critical engagement with capitalism, 
protests, large-scale infrastructure and social change - or other attempts to mitigate 
climate change. Zerubavel (2006) succinctly summarised the difficulties of studying 
conspiracies of silence in this way:  
… they typically consist of nonoccurrences, which, by definition, are rather 
difficult to observe. After all, it is much easier to study what people do discuss 
than what they do not (not to mention the difficulty of telling the difference 
between simply not talking about something and specifically avoiding it). (p. 13)  
The overall failure of the ‘knowledge’ of, and discussions about, climate change to 
result in a large scale public outcry and reductions in emissions is a testament to the fact 
that, we might to some extent, be living in denial. As explored by Norgaard (2011) and 
supported by the findings on Californians’ perception of the drought, one factor may 
relate to the social production of distance and individualism:  
In the absence of a well-developed sociological imagination that connects 
individuals to society and the local to the global, private or local troubles look 
merely personal rather than political, and their consequences seem less 
significant. Although such constructions of the local feel natural, they are a way 
of “not seeing” that has powerful implications for social action. (p. 100) 
Some people in California did notice changes, felt emotional reactions and reported 
changes in behaviour. But others did not feel that drought impinged upon their own life 
and it felt as yet ‘abstract’. Thus, in some cases, it is not only that people keep climate 
change at a distance, but also experience climate change’s more local expression in the 
form of drought, as distant.  
The findings from all the research reported here highlight the extent to which 
climate change is a social issue. This is both because emissions are caused by human 
activities (such as industrial production) and because the responses to climate change 
are social in nature. Different responses towards climate change mitigation were 
highlighted in chapter 2. The variety of social responses was also exemplified in the 
different ways in which the meaning of drought and climate change was interpreted in 
California (chapters 4 and 5). This emphasis on the social factors surrounding climate 
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change is relevant, given that there has been criticism of a lack of integration between 
the social and natural sciences and climate change related institutions:  
… neither the IPCC nor the ACC [America’s Climate Choices] reports consider 
the importance of the myriad other aspects of social organization and culture: 
governance, power structures, political activism, labor policies, the countless 
drivers of consumption, the force of social routines and expectations, systems of 
global production, cultural values, and a range of other sociological factors that 
shape and constrain mitigation opportunities apart from technologically focused 
solutions. (Ehrhardt-Martinez, Rudel, Norgaard & Broadbent, 2015) 
Worldviews, values and belief systems  
Believing in the evidence of climate change is far more than one particular 
belief. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 highlighted in different ways that beliefs about climate 
change are part of a whole range of worldviews and belief systems. This recognition 
was especially striking in California. There were particular cultural beliefs, values and 
norms which were mentioned when explaining attitudes towards both the drought and 
climate change, which highlighted the importance of frameworks of reference, such as a 
faith in God’s greater plan or belief in conspiracy theories. It showed how people’s 
views of the world are already so completely different from each other, that people are 
unlikely to be convinced by scientists with whom they may share few other beliefs 
about how the world works. Different worldviews (unrelated to climate change) mean 
that people may have such different explanations of how and why things happen in the 
world, that they have too little in common to agree on one way of understanding climate 
change (see also Callison, 2014; Hulme, 2009).  
The importance of our worldviews in influencing how we understand climate 
change, is in line with the present findings on people’s different perceptions of the 
drought. Similarly, Cochran (former chair of the ICC, interviewed in Callison, 2014) 
discussed the importance of different ways of talking about the world and worldviews:  
I don’t mean different Native languages, but the way we use common everyday 
language. And then the other piece of that is the Native worldview. All things 
are connected, and so to take one piece of a problem and not connect it to the 
rest of the world and the environment around? It just logically makes no sense. 
How can we talk about changes in weather without talking about changes in 
vegetation or the air or the people or the animals, as all of those things are part 
of a natural mix. All things are connected in our universe. (p. 46) 
The above quote about worldviews also relates back to the relevance of conceptions of 
nature which treat humans and the environment as separate (Ingold, 2000). Some 
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examples of this appeared in chapter 2 where human and economic interests were 
discussed as separate from environmental protection. A short-term priority given to the 
economy, however, fails to acknowledge that climate change would ultimately affect 
the economy.  
Values were also discussed by Beck (1992) in relation to definitions of risk and 
understanding of science. He pointed towards the role of values in defining acceptable 
levels of risk and in prioritisation. Klein (2014) drew a comparison to the change in 
values during the abolition of slavery (although there are differences which she 
acknowledged): “As the historian David Brion Davis writes, abolitionists understood 
that their role was not merely to ban an abhorrent practice but to try to change the 
deeply entrenched values that had made slavery acceptable in the first place” (p. 463). 
Climate change may require a major transformation in moral perception, or as Klein 
(2014) formulated it:  
… any attempt to rise to the climate challenge will be fruitless unless it is 
understood as part of a much broader battle of worldviews, a process of 
rebuilding and reinventing the very idea of the collective, the communal, the 
commons, the civil, and the civic after so many decades of attack and neglect. 
(p. 460)  
Reflections on the research method 
I became very aware of how the research process that I chose for the California 
fieldwork was dependent on me being a white woman, because approaching strangers in 
the street and asking them to engage could have been more difficult if I was a person of 
colour. The responses and people I got to engage with me will have been influenced by 
my socio-demographic background.  
The qualitative research had an impact on me and maybe on my participants. For 
me, it was interesting to interview people about the drought and many participants also 
thanked me for an interesting conversation, sometimes adding their intention to further 
think about certain questions. Similarly, for the interviews reported in chapter 2, people 
around me were invited to discuss what should be done about climate change, in line 
with Callison’s (2014) proposal that: “For wider publics, what flows from the “so what” 
question is a drive to know and understand more, to do something, to adopt a position, 
to be part of discussions about what ought to be done” (p. 246).  
Reflections on the role of the researcher 
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My role as the researcher was to establish what research there is on people’s 
responses to climate change in order to examine where there may be gaps and how, 
specifically, research on reactions to climate change in the discipline of Psychology 
could be expanded. I began by asking what would need doing to seriously mitigate 
climate change. Questions of how to significantly reduce carbon emissions led me back 
to issues of how we organise the economy and modes of production, since emissions 
and economic processes are closely entwined (Clark & York, 2005; Ockwell, 2008). 
Further, the existing growth-based economic model influences consumption and 
lifestyle decisions, which are often the focus of psychological research on the 
relationship between human behaviour and environmental issues. Swim et al. (2009) 
suggested: “…characteristics of individuals that influence their ability and motivation to 
engage in consumption including many psychological constructs related to 
environmental consciousness, such as attitudes and values, have been the focus of much 
research on predictors of environmentally responsible behaviors” (p. 35). Economic and 
larger political structures’ influence on cognition and behaviour are rarely considered in 
the psychological literature. For example, the recent American Psychological 
Association’s task force report on climate change (Swim et al., 2009) mentioned 
capitalism just once and that was in reference to a paper by Kasser, Cohn, Kanner and 
Ryan (2007) in which the authors criticised Psychology’s lack of engagement with 
economic structures. Instead the report asked: “What are the human behavioral 
contributions to climate change and the psychological and contextual drivers of these 
contributions?” (p. 29) and, in response, discussed mainly population and consumption 
issues. Psychology’s remit of response to the issue of climate change was identified 
predominantly as relating to the topics of increased population and consumption.  
When I set out to conduct the research for my PhD I questioned how to combine 
psychological research with the bigger picture of economics and societal structures. The 
critiques emerging in some sociological literature regarding individual behaviour 
change in consumption and lifestyle (discussed in more detail in chapters 1, 2 and 3) 
posed one such possibility, as that literature discusses the relationship between 
individuals and surrounding societal structures. My role as the researcher was 
influenced by my personal political interests in trying to understand the bigger picture 
and to examine and address the root causes of problems. In light of a currently 
somewhat depoliticised psychological academic approach to climate change research, 
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which is ‘biased’ in the sense that it continues to tread the line of the status quo, there 
seemed to be a particular need for a more critical and politically aware approach to 
research.  
 My research in California developed out of some of the explanations for inaction 
on climate change that I had come across both in my first set of interviews in England 
and from academic readings. It was being suggested that people needed to be exposed to 
the effects of climate change for serious emission reduction efforts to begin. When I 
came across the news reports on the recent California drought, some of which were 
reporting the drought as linked to climate change, this sparked the idea of examining 
people’s experience of the drought and their views on climate change in California as a 
case study of what happens when people live through a local impact of climate change. 
Further, when I started looking into the existing literature I realised that there was 
mainly survey research on this topic, while there were only a few examples of 
interviews with or ethnographies of people living in areas affected by climate change, 
especially in industrialised countries. Here again, my political interests in social and 
environmental justice led me to read academic literature discussing how countries in the 
global North are mostly responsible for large quantities of past and present carbon 
emissions, while countries in the global South would feel the consequences and have 
less potential to mitigate climate change and fewer resources to adapt to climate change 
(Byrne, Martinez & Glover, 2002; Klein, 2014; Norgaard, 2011; Parks & Roberts, 2006; 
Stoddart, Tindall & Greenfield, 2012). With greater responsibility for climate change 
and greater potential to reduce emissions in the global North, it seemed particularly 
pertinent to study perceptions of climate change that might lead to a change in 
behaviour or politics in an industrialised country such as the USA. So in the research for 
all my chapters my personal interests in left-wing politics influenced the academic 
literature that I read, research questions and research design that I developed.  
 In terms of data collection I tried not to let my political views become apparent 
in the interview questions and interviews, so as to encourage the participants to feel they 
could speak freely. I tried to remain open and friendly and to create a space in which the 
participants could voice their views honestly. I had the impression that this worked, 
since I gathered a range of opinions both in the interviews in England (reported in 
chapter 2) and during the interviews in California (reported in chapters 4 and 5). I did 
not get the impression that people were just telling me what they might have expected 
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me to ‘want to hear’. However, there will have been certain questions, such as asking 
what, if anything, participants thought should be done to address climate change, which 
will have implied, that I as a researcher assumed climate change to exist. Further, it is 
likely to have implied to participants that I as a researcher believe that something should 
be done. But these were ‘assumptions’ I was conscious of and willing to make and bring 
into my research, since climate change does exist (as outlined in chapter 1). 
Additionally the interview question was formulated as follows: “What do you think 
should be done in order to reduce the degree of climate change, if anything?” to leave 
the option open for participants to discuss if and why they did not think anything needed 
doing to mitigate climate change. 
 Further, in my research in California I tried to interview people from different 
backgrounds and with different opinions. For example, I asked people in different 
locations, such as parks, cafés, bus stops and did indeed interview a range of people, 
such as teachers, gardeners, fire fighters, unemployed people, homeless people, and 
youth workers. I acknowledge that my political leanings and my personal characteristics 
(e.g., being a white middle-class woman) are still likely to have influenced how people 
interacted with me and what kind of responses they might have given. Nonetheless, I 
spoke to people of different political leanings to myself and was at least just as curious 
and open to hearing what they would say, as to any of the other participants. 
Participants often gave lengthy and very different answers from what I might say or 
‘want to hear’.  
 In the way that my political views influenced the research questions and design 
and the actual interview questions, they will also have influenced the data analysis, 
since this also links back to the research questions, i.e. data analysis occurs partly in 
light of the research questions and interview questions asked. Further, my particular 
interests in questions about the role of the economic system of capitalism will also have 
influenced my data analysis, such as examining what kinds of critiques participants 
voiced of corporations and the profit motive. Nonetheless, I would argue that my 
interests did not bias data analysis apart from highlighting particular themes, since the 
extracts presented were present in the data and my aim was to present the data 
accurately. Moreover, throughout my work I have been transparent on the approaches 
and readings that have influenced my work and on the views I hold, which are relevant 
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to my work and might have influenced it. The reader can therefore engage with and 
assess my work and the presentation of my data, as well as the analysis.  
Strengths and weaknesses of different methodological decisions 
 Chapter 2 presents a study drawing on interviews which followed a semi-
structured interview schedule and all interviews were held in a private study room in a 
university library. The methodological decision of employing interviews for data 
collection was key to the design of this study, since the aim was to explore in depth how 
participants talked about different actors’ responsibility and different possibilities for 
climate change mitigation. Interviews made the most sense to achieve this research aim, 
since I wanted to examine what kind of suggestions came to participants’ minds, thus 
requiring an open-ended technique and precluding any form of multiple choice 
questionnaire procedure. Further, I wanted to be able to follow up on what participants 
had said, therefore the semi-structured approach was well-suited. Additionally, part of 
the data analysis focused on how people talked about certain topics and what kind of 
assumptions were taken for granted, which also required qualitative interviews rather 
than questionnaires with pre-existing response options. One of the methodological 
weaknesses of this study was that of using two different researchers to interview 
participants. The research assistant who helped me by conducting several interviews 
was unsurprisingly not as involved in the research literature, design and aims of the 
study as I was. This meant, for example, that the research assistant did not follow up 
with questions as extensively as I would have if I had been the interviewer.  
 For the studies reported in chapter 3, it could be argued that one of the 
methodological weaknesses was to employ experimental methods. This is because the 
nature of some of the sociological literature’s critique (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Shove, 2010), 
which these studies were based on, also pertains to methodological issues in 
Psychology, such as experimental methods and survey methods (like that used for 
Theory of Planned Behaviour research) and assumptions about measurable predictors 
and outcomes. Shove (2010) argued that the: “… interpretation both of the problem 
(one of consumer behaviour and choice) and of potential policy responses (influencing 
choice) structures the meaning and the method of useful social science” (p. 1280). The 
author argued that certain theoretical approaches underlying different methods of 
research do not combine well for synthesis: 
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On all the counts that matter, social theories of practice on the one hand, and of 
behaviour on the other, are like chalk and cheese. Whereas social theories of 
practice emphasise endogenous and emergent dynamics, social theories of 
behaviour focus on causal factors and external drivers. Likewise, people figure 
in the first case as carriers of practice and in the second as autonomous agents of 
choice and change. It is useful to be clear about the incommensurability of these 
contrasting paradigms, and hence about the impossibility of merger and 
incorporation. (p. 1279) 
The critique of individual behaviour change theories is that they are based on 
psychological theories, such as the theory of planned behaviour which treat people as 
rational processors in which behaviour can be quantified and theorised as the outcome 
of a formula taking account of beliefs, attitudes, intentions and some variation of 
another variable. Shove (2010) criticized this approach for compartmentalizing and 
decontextualizing attitudes and behaviours, which she argued occurs in such 
behavioural theories and equally in studies using quantitative methods that are based on 
them. Therefore, using experimental methods, which are part of the critique that Shove 
(2010) voiced about individual behaviour change approaches to environmental 
problems, is arguably to miss the point. Other methodologies, such as ethnographies 
would have been better suited to examine a research question and study based on these 
sociological critiques to the individual behaviour change approaches. A large part of the 
reason why I used experimental methods had to do with the fact that these were the 
methods available to me, as they are what I had learned and what is common and 
accepted within Psychology. I had little knowledge or experience of ethnographies. In 
line with this I did not know how to design a study using ethnographic methods to 
empirically examine the critiques mentioned by the likes of Brulle (2010), Kent (2009), 
Maniates (2001), Shove (2010) and Webb (2012). However, I acknowledge the flaw of 
using experimental methods for such an investigation and future research could explore 
the possibilities of examining the extent to which individual behaviour change messages 
detract attention and support from structural level changes using other methods. 
 For the research in California I again employed semi-structured interviews, 
however, this time I adapted the questions more flexibly than the semi-structured 
interview schedule reported in chapter 2. This was because I approached the interviews 
more conversationally, as they occurred in different settings in public spaces and 
therefore I had to adapt them to the situation and the length of time that I thought I 
would have to engage with each participant. Further, the setting was different for each 
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participant which meant the place where each interview took place was less formal than 
for the interviews reported in chapter 2, which all took place in a similar looking room 
and a quiet, private space in a university library. Being flexible with the setting and the 
interview questions meant that I could more easily adapt to and use more opportunities 
of interviewing people in various spaces. It also meant that I could access a greater 
range of people spontaneously when it suited them in their own time and space. Further, 
interviews were easier to conduct than an ethnography, which might have provided a 
more extensive insight into the research topic, but which would have required more 
training and time on my part and was therefore beyond the means of my PhD. 
Interviews were more suited to examining the research questions than closed or even 
open-ended survey questions would have been, since I wanted to be able to follow up in 
more depth on the responses participants gave. 
 Overall, these methodological considerations will influence the work I conduct 
in future as I have become more aware of the benefits and disadvantages of different 
methods to examine various research interests and I will continue to reflect on how to 
best work with my political leanings in academic and research contexts.  
Reflections on the role of science 
In her examination of the meaning-making process of climate change across 
different groups, Callison (2014) noted that: “Climate change provides exemplary 
insight into how scientists and journalists are negotiating professional detachment and 
distance…” (p. 3). The negotiation of detachment is especially relevant in the context of 
climate change debates where advocates are frequently attacked by climate change 
sceptics and lobbying think-tanks as to the veracity of their claims and accused of 
alarmism (Callison, 2014). Oreskes (2004) suggested that many scientists responded by 
trying to deliver the necessary evidence or ‘proof’. The author argued that this response 
was misguided, as it was rarely scientific proof which was at stake in a disputed 
environmental issue (Oreskes, 2004).  
The underlying assumption of efforts to persuade people about climate change 
using science narratives, is that the objective, detached facts speak for themselves and 
will necessitate action or transformation of society (Callison, 2014). But as the present 
research highlighted, there are many other factors which moderate how the evidence 
and relevance of climate change are interpreted. The gap left by the scientific process, 
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differences in the latter and inherent uncertainty, will be capitalised on, if the results 
have religious, economic or political consequences (Oreskes, 2004). Therefore, it seems 
that to communicate the reality and relevance of climate change and to encourage 
climate change mitigation will require more than the presentation of scientific facts. As 
highlighted by the present research the role of socially dominant narratives and 
‘solutions’, beliefs, emotions and worldviews are also relevant. Since scientific ‘facts’ 
about climate change do not speak for themselves (Callison, 2014) specific 
interpretations and courses of action require articulation. 
Academics can continuously double check and question the assumptions, topics, 
methods and approaches used in order not to perpetuate a silence around currently less 
favoured alternatives to climate change mitigation. This is consistent with Zerubavel’s 
(2006) suggestion that: “As one might expect, what we ignore or avoid socially is often 
also ignored or avoided academically, and conspiracies of silence are therefore still a 
somewhat undertheorized as well as understudied phenomenon” (p. 13). In the context 
of the destructive status quo of industrial production, adding daily to greenhouse gas 
emissions, the relevance of ‘sins of omission’ is highlighted. It seems that threats are 
often conceptualised as arising from a harmful action, i.e. the notion of ‘sins of 
commission’, but in this case it is inaction, or business as usual, that poses a danger 
(which is an understatement).  
Higher Education 
If researchers are pressured to produce ‘realistic’ policy-focused and impact-
oriented research, are we in danger of toeing the dominant line, although it is precisely 
that which is in need of questioning and undermining? How can we develop research 
questions, designs, and findings which contradict the actions of government and 
corporations, when we increasingly depend upon them for our funding? One of the first 
decisions Theresa May made when she became prime-minister was to abolish the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change and reallocate responsibility for climate 
change to the new Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (Johnston, 
2016). Producing more policy advice for such politicians or governments does not seem 
particularly useful in terms of climate change mitigation. There is ample scientific 
evidence on the reality of climate change, communication literature on how to 
communicate about climate change and the technology to reduce emissions, but in the 
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absence of a political will or force to base actions on this knowledge, efforts towards 
change (e.g., through reform and government) seem futile.  
Closing thoughts 
Since starting my research, I no longer view climate change just as an idea that 
is interpreted differently (according to the suggestion by Hulme, 2009). Instead, I have 
come to see it as a form of life, as proposed by Callison (2014), because climate change 
has involved and will involve physical and social changes that impact on how people 
live. 
Studies exist concerning the public lack of understanding, lack of concern, lack 
of action, but there is little indication as to what action is absent, i.e. to imagine and 
describe the omissions. My research has indicated that more alternative strategies to 
mitigate climate change require formulating and discussing in public (chapters 2 and 3). 
Additionally, drought and climate change are experienced and viewed differently 
depending on various factors, which need taking into account when discussing climate 
change mitigation, such as the influence of previous beliefs (chapters 4 and 5). Climate 
change mitigation hinges on questions of what ought to be done. Ultimately, the aim of 
convincing people about climate change is to persuade them to take action: But what 
form should that action take? What would a reasonable or effective response to climate 
change look like? And what are we ourselves doing? There seems to be little 
articulation of what action on climate change should look like or constitute and perhaps 
this is exactly the imagination (Norgaard, 2017) or formulation of responses that needs 
to be ignited. Some hope may be derived from already existing social movements, as 
Klein (2014) suggested:  
Climate change does not need some shiny new movement that will magically 
succeed where others failed. Rather, as the furthest-reaching crisis created by the 
extractivist worldview, and one that puts humanity on a firm and unyielding 
deadline, climate change can be the force—the grand push—that will bring 
together all of these still living movements. (p. 459)  
Mitigating climate change might require many people to start imagining that another 
world is possible and to begin creating it. 
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Appendix A 
Semi-structured interview schedule for research reported in chapter 2.  
What do you think should be done in order to reduce the degree of climate change, if 
anything? (If answer not clear or too abstract ask How? Examples? Please specify.) 
Depending on the answer different follow up questions: 
a) Why not? 
b) What impact do you think that will have?  
c) To what extent do you think that will be sufficient to reduce the degree of 
climate change? If not, what else do you think needs doing? 
d) To what extent do you think you yourself should be doing these things that 
you have suggested? /What do you think your role is? (If nothing, ask why not) / 
What is stopping you from doing some of those things (beyond the ones that you 
may already be doing)? 
e) What do you think other people should be doing? (For example friends, 
family, colleagues) 
f) How does one get people to do those things you have suggested? What ideas 
do you have? 
g) What role do you think the British government should play in reducing the 
degree of climate change? 
h) What role do you think governments across the world should play in reducing 
the degree of climate change? 
i) What role do you think corporations should play in reducing the degree of 
climate change?  
j) Do you think that the suggestions you have made will be “enough” to 
“significantly” reduce the degree of climate change? If not, what else do you 
think needs doing to reduce the degree of climate change? 
k) How can it be done? By whom? 
 
What is your age? Occupation? Gender? 
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Appendix B 
Attitudes and beliefs 2015 - Study 1 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study investigating attitudes and beliefs 
in early 2015. The data from the study will be used by you as part of your practical 
assignment on the C8035 'Social Psychology' module. It will also contribute to a PhD 
research project. 
It is entirely up to you whether or not you take part in this research. Clicking the 
continue button below indicates that you consent to participating in the study.  
(If you don't wish to take part, you will be given a hard copy of the questionnaire to 
look through, so that you can familiarize yourself with the questionnaire items.) 
If you take part, you will be asked about your attitude towards a topical issue and a 
number of related questions. This should take no more than 20-25 minutes to complete. 
Once everyone in the class has completed the questionnaire, there will be a discussion 
of the key features of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire is completed anonymously (your name is not required). All the 
information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will be treated in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). Any identifying information such as 
age and gender will be removed from the datafile that will be given to students.  
Prior to completion of the questionnaire you can withdraw from the study by closing the 
browser.  
This short study has been approved through the Sciences and Technology Cross-
Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC approval ER/HAFD4/13), which can be 
contacted directly via email (c-recpsysci@sussex.ac.uk). If you have any other concerns 
about the research, please contact me at p.sparks@sussex.ac.uk. 
At the beginning of the questionnaire there was a section of questions based on the 
theory of planned behaviour, the results of which will be reported elsewhere.  
 
Action impact condition 
30. If a person turns down their thermostat where they live, how much impact do you 
think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
no impact at all  
negligible impact  
very little impact  
little impact  
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a lot of impact  
a huge impact  
 
This same response scale was used for questions 31 - 40. 
 
31. If a person switches off appliances that aren't in use where they live, how much 
impact do you think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
32. If a person switches to a renewable energy provider where they live, how much 
impact do you think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
33. If a person eats little or no meat from now on, how much impact do you think that 
particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
34. If a person eats few or no dairy products from now on, how much impact do you 
think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
35. If a person buys and cooks only what is needed to avoid food waste from now on, 
how much impact do you think that particular action will have in reducing climate 
change?  
 
36. If a person reuses, recycles, repairs or borrows more often (rather than buying new) 
from now on, how much impact do you think that particular action will have in reducing 
climate change?  
 
37. If a person flies less often from now on, how much impact do you think that 
particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
38. If a person cycles more often from now on, how much impact do you think that 
particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
39. If a person takes public transport more often from now on, how much impact do you 
think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
40. If a person buys 'local' food more often from now on, how much impact do you 
think that particular action will have in reducing climate change?  
 
Beneficial individual action condition 
Which one of each of the following pairs of behaviours is better for a person to engage 
in in order to reduce climate change? (tick either 'A' or 'B' for each pairing) 
30. A. Turning down the thermostat where they live  
B. Not turning down the thermostat where they live  
 
31. A. Switching off appliances that aren't in use where they live  
B. Not switching off appliances that aren't in use where they live  
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32. A. Switching to a renewable energy provider  
B. Not switching to a renewable energy provider  
 
33. A. Eating little or no meat  
B. Not eating little or no meat  
 
34. A. Eating few or no dairy products  
B. Not eating few or no dairy products  
 
35. A. Buying and cooking only what is needed to avoid food waste  
B. Not buying and cooking only what is needed to avoid food waste  
 
36. A. Reusing, recycling, repairing or borrowing more often (rather than buying 
new)  
B. Not reusing, repairing or borrowing more often (instead buying new)  
 
37. A. Flying less often  
B. Not flying less often  
 
38. A. Cycling more often  
B. Not cycling more often  
 
39. A. Taking public transport more often  
B. Not taking public transport more often  
 
40. A. Buying 'local' food more often  
B. Not buying 'local' food more often  
 
Control condition - no manipulation statement 
 
Dependent variables 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
41. "Protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing 
economic growth"  
 
Very strongly disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Slightly disagree  
Neither disagree nor agree  
Slightly agree  
Strongly agree  
Very strongly agree  
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The same response scale was used for questions 42 - 58.  
 
42. "Economic growth should be given priority, even if the environment suffers to some 
extent"  
 
43. "The government's main priority should be to focus on growing global economic 
problems"  
 
44. "The government's main priority should be to focus on growing environmental 
problems"  
 
45. "The government should introduce green taxes to discourage actions that harm the 
environment"  
 
46. "The government should introduce measures such as green taxes now"  
 
47. "In its search for continuous growth, the current economic system is increasingly 
becoming a destructive force that is stimulating climate change, resource scarcity, 
growing inequality, and biodiversity loss on an epic scale"  
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following should do more to reduce 
climate change? 
48. Your local council should do more to reduce climate change  
 
49. Your member of parliament should do more to reduce climate change  
 
50. Corporations and industry should do more to reduce climate change  
 
51. The UK government should do more to reduce climate change  
 
52. Individual citizens should do more to reduce climate change  
 
53. I intend to vote for pro-environmental candidates.  
 
54. I intend to sign petitions supporting environmental protection.  
 
55. I intend to write to politicians/newspapers in support of environmental protection.  
 
56. I intend to donate to environmental organizations.  
 
57. I intend to join environmental/political groups.  
 
58. I intend to take part in a protest or demonstration about an environmental issue.  
 
59. What is your gender? (Please note that this information will not appear on the data 
file that you and other students will have access to.) 
 
226 
 
 
 
60. What is your age? (Please note that this information will not appear on the data file 
that you and other students will have access to.)  
  
61. What is your nationality? (If you have dual nationality and would prefer to mention 
both nationalities please specify them below.)  
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
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Appendix C 
Views on Current Topics - Study 2 
Similar demographic information as in Study 1 was also obtained in study 2. 
Participants were provided with information on the study at the outset and asked for 
their consent. At the end of the study they were thanked.  
Large impact condition 
Please read the following information carefully and then answer the questions that 
follow it: 
There are many ways in which people can help reduce climate change: for example by 
recycling, turning down their thermostat, driving and flying less and buying local food 
produce. These kinds of behaviour changes have been shown to have a large impact in 
reducing national carbon emissions. 
4. I have read the above information carefully. (You will be asked questions relating to 
this).  
No  
Yes  
 
Very little impact condition 
Please read the following information carefully and then answer the questions that 
follow it: 
There are not many ways in which people can help reduce climate change; it is not as 
simple as recycling, turning down their thermostat, driving and flying less and buying 
local food produce. These kinds of behaviour changes have been shown to have very 
little impact in reducing national carbon emissions. 
4. I have read the above information carefully. (You will be asked questions relating to 
this).  
No  
Yes  
 
Control condition - no manipulation statement 
Additional dependent variables (only those not used and already reported for Study 1): 
Please indicate to what extent you would oppose or support the introduction of the 
following measures in the UK: 
5. Increased government spending on improving public transport within towns and 
cities  
Very strongly oppose  
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Strongly oppose  
Slightly oppose  
Neither oppose nor support  
Slightly support  
Strongly support  
Very strongly support  
 
The same response scale was used for questions 6 - 17. 
 
6. A reduction in government spending on the military  
 
7. Cheaper public transport through increased government subsidies  
 
8. An immediate removal of all government subsidies to the fossil fuel industry  
 
9. The introduction of a tax on airline fuel  
 
10. Government subsidies for improving the insulation of homes  
 
11. The introduction of a complete ban on coal mining  
 
12. Charging companies and industries that are environmentally damaging (e.g., in the 
form of a pollution tax)  
 
13. Government legislation to prevent airport expansion  
 
14. The introduction of a complete ban on oil drilling  
 
15. Introducing further government subsidies for renewable energy production  
 
16. Government legislation to prevent road expansion  
 
17. A complete ban on fracking (the extraction of oil and natural gas through hydraulic 
fracturing)  
 
To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements? 
18. "I believe the economic system needs to change in order to reduce climate change."  
Very strongly disagree  
Strongly disagree  
Slightly disagree  
Neither disagree nor agree  
Slightly agree  
Strongly agree  
Very strongly agree  
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The same response scale was used for questions 19 – 57 and 59. 
 
19. "I think fundamental changes to the political system need to be made in order to 
reduce climate change."  
 
20. "I think that climate change can be reduced by shifting away from economic growth 
towards an economy based on everyone's needs."  
 
21. "I think that existing power relations need to change in order to address climate 
change."  
 
22. "I consider the profit-oriented economy to be greatly responsible for causing 
excessive carbon emissions."  
 
To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements? 
23. "I believe that economic, social and environmental problems can be addressed 
together."  
24. "I think that the well-being of the natural environment can be achieved without 
economic growth."  
 
25. "I think that social well-being can be achieved without economic growth."  
 
26. "I believe that environmental and social justice are interrelated."  
 
To what extent do you disagree or agree that you intend to engage in the following 
actions in the future? 
46. I intend to improve the insulation where I live.  
 
47. I intend to turn down the thermostat where I live.  
 
48. I intend to switch off appliances when they are not in use.  
 
49. I intend to switch to a renewable energy provider.  
 
50. I intend to eat less or no meat.  
 
51. I intend to eat less or no dairy products.  
 
52. I intend to buy only what is needed to avoid food waste.  
 
53. I intend to reuse, recycle and repair rather than buying new goods.  
 
54. I intend to fly less often.  
 
55. I intend to cycle more often.  
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56. I intend to take public transport more often.  
 
57. I intend to buy local food more often.  
 
58. Did the information you read at the beginning of the study indicate that individual 
people's behaviour change has a large impact or very little impact in reducing national 
carbon emissions?  
A large impact  
Very little impact  
 
59. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statement? "There are 
not many ways in which people can help reduce climate change; it is not as simple as 
recycling, turning down their thermostat, driving and flying less and buying local food 
produce. These kinds of behaviour changes have been shown to have very little impact 
in reducing national carbon emissions."  
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Appendix D 
Attitudes and beliefs 2016 - Study 3 
Similar demographic information as that obtained in Studies 1 and 2 was also recorded 
in Study 3. Participants were also provided with information, asked for their consent at 
the beginning of the study and thanked at the end.  
Structural change condition 
Climate researchers maintain that structural changes are crucial in making the difference 
to reducing climate change. These kinds of transformations include government 
investment in renewable energy production while reducing fossil fuel extraction, 
cheaper and improved public transport and funding for insulated housing. For example, 
for the first time this summer renewables made up over a quarter of the UK’s power 
mix. All the clean technology being built meant renewables became the second largest 
electricity source. 
4. I have read the above information carefully. (You will be asked questions relating to 
this).  
No  
Yes 
Individual action condition 
Climate researchers maintain that people engaging in pro-environmental actions is 
crucial in making the difference to reducing climate change. These kinds of actions 
include recycling, turning down thermostats and switching off unused devices, using 
less electricity, eating less meat, and flying and driving less. For example, figures show 
that 8% of the total electricity used in UK homes comes from appliances left on 
standby, which is the equivalent of around two power stations’ worth of electricity each 
year.  
4. I have read the above information carefully. (You will be asked questions relating to 
this).  
No  
Yes  
 
Control condition - no manipulation statement 
The dependent variables consisted of an adaptation of those provided in Studies 1 and 
2.  
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Appendix E 
Interview schedule for the research reported in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
This is a semi-structured interview schedule and follow up questions varied depending 
on the participants’ responses.  
Section 1: Experiences of drought and water regulation  
1. To what extent have you perceived there to be a drought occurring in California 
(specify exact region)? For how long?  
2. To what extent have you felt affected by the drought?  
3. Have you changed any of your water usage practices/habits?  
4. Have you heard of and what do you think about the introduction of the 25% water 
reduction in urban areas?  
5. To what extent have you been affected by these new regulations introduced in June 
2015?  
6. What do you think the local government should be doing to address the drought/water 
shortage?  
 
Section 2: Opinions on climate change  
1. Do you think that climate change is occurring? Do you think it is caused by human 
emissions? Why/Why not?  
2. To what extent do you think the current drought is linked to climate change?  
3. If yes to some extent: When/How did you first come to think that there is a link (e.g., 
read a news report?)  
4. If yes: To what extent do you think that you are personally being affected by climate 
change?  
5. Do you think that the experience of the drought has changed your opinions of climate 
change? If so, how?  
6. What do you think is driving current emissions? What do you think would need to 
change in order to reduce emissions and thereby climate change?  
7. To what extent do you think the economic system (growth, profit motive, free trade) 
plays a role in climate change?  
